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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
Time: 10:59 pm
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Results for homeland security
112 results foundAuthor: U.S. Congress. House Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Investigations. Majority Staff Title: A Line in the Sand: Confronting the Threat of the Southwest Border Summary: The Texas-Mexico border region has been experiencing an alarming rise in the level of criminal cartel activity, including drug and human smuggling, which has placed significant additional burdens on Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies. This interim report will examine the roots of the crimnial enterprise and its effects on the local populations, what steps are being taken or should be taken to counter the threat, and the significance of these issues for the overall homeland security of the United States. Details: Washington, DC: 2006 Source: Year: 2006 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 113887 Keywords: Criminal ActivityHomeland SecuritySmuggling |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Homeland Security: Actions Needed to Improve Security Practices at National Icons and Parks Summary: The September 11 terrorist attacks have heightened concerns about the security of the nation's icons and parks, which millions of people visit every year. The National Park Service (Park Service) within the Department of the Interior (Interior) is responsible for securing nearly 400 park units that include icons and other parks. In 2004, GAO identified a set of key protection practices that include: allocating resources using risk management, leveraging technology, information sharing and coordination, performance measurement and testing, and strategic management of human capital. As requested, GAO determined whether the Park Service's security efforts for national icons and parks reflected key practices. To meet this objective, GAO used its key practices as criteria, reviewed five icons and parks to gain firsthand knowledge, analyzed Interior documents, and interviewed Interior officials. The Park Service has implemented a range of security improvements since the September 11 terrorist attacks and has worked to integrate security into its primary mission to preserve national icons and parks for the public's enjoyment. For example, it has established a senior-level security manager position and taken steps to strengthen security at the icons, and is developing a risk management program for small parks. These efforts exhibit some aspects of the key protection practices, but GAO found limitations in each of the areas. The Park Service does not allocate resources using risk management servicewide or cost-effectively leverage technology. While the Park Service, with assistance from Interior, has conducted risk assessments and implemented countermeasures to enhance security at the icons, some critical vulnerabilities remain. Moreover, the Park Service has not advanced this risk management approach for icons to the rest of its national parks. Without a servicewide risk management approach, the Park Service lacks assurance that security efforts are focused where they are needed. Furthermore, while icons and parks may use a variety of security technologies and other countermeasures, they do not have guidance for evaluating the cost-effectiveness of these investments, thus limiting assurances of efficiency and cost-effectiveness. Additionally, the Park Service faces limitations with sharing and coordinating information internally and lacks a servicewide approach for routine performance measurement and testing. Although the Park Service collaborates with external organizations, it lacks comparable arrangements for internal security communications and, as a result, parks are not equipped to share information with one another on common security problems and solutions. Furthermore, the Park Service has not established security performance measures and lacks an analysis tool that could be used to evaluate program effectiveness and inform an overall risk management strategy. Thus, icons and parks have little information on the status and performance of security that they can use to manage daily activities or that Park Service management can use to manage security throughout the organization. Finally, strategic human capital management is an area of concern because of the Park Service's lack of clearly defined security roles and a security training curriculum. For example, staff that are assigned security duties are generally not required to meet qualifications or undergo specialized training. Absent a security training curriculum, there is less assurance that staff are well-equipped to effectively identify and mitigate risks at national icons and parks. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2009. 47p. Source: Internet Resource; GAO-09-983 Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 119422 Keywords: Homeland SecurityParksRecreation AreasSecurityTerrorism |
Author: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General Title: DHS Needs to Improve the Security Posture of Its Cybersecurity Program Systems Summary: Cyber threats pose a significant risk to economic and national security. In response to these threats, the President, legislators, experts, and others have characterized cybersecurity, or measures taken to protect a computer or computer system against unauthorized access or attack, as a pressing national security issue. The National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) was established to serve as the national focal point for addressing cybersecurity issues in the public and private sectors. The United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), created under NCSD, is responsible for compiling and analyzing information about cybersecurity incidents and providing timely technical assistance to operators of agency information systems regarding security incidents. The team provides response support and defense against cyber attacks for the federal civil executive branch; disseminates reasoned and actionable cybersecurity information to the public; and facilitates information sharing with state and local government, industry, and international partners. This audit focused on the security of the systems that US-CERT uses to accomplish its cybersecurity mission. Overall, NCSD has implemented adequate physical security and logical access controls over the cybersecurity program systems used to collect, process, and disseminate cyber threat and warning information to the public and private sectors. However, a significant effort is needed to address existing security issues in order to implement a robust program that will enhance the cybersecurity posture of the federal government. To ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its cybersecurity information, NCSD needs to focus on deploying timely system security patches to mitigate risks to its cybersecurity program systems, finalizing system security documentation, and ensuring adherence to departmental security policies and procedures. The report makes 10 recommendations to the Director, NCSD. NCSD has already begun to take the actions to implement them. National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD)’s response is summarized and evaluated in the body of this report and included, in its entirety, as Appendix B. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 14, 2010 at: http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_10-111_Aug10.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_10-111_Aug10.pdf Shelf Number: 119796 Keywords: Computer CrimesCybercrimesCybersecurityHomeland Security |
Author: BearingPoint Title: Private Screening Operations Performance Evaluation Report Summary: This report presents an evaluation of the performance of private security screening operations at U.S. airports for the Transportation Security Administration. The evaluation sought to determine whether performance of private screening operations was equal to or greater than that provided by the federal government. An impartial process was developed for analyzing performance and reviewed the five commercial airports that retained private screening personnel after federalization of the nation's security screeing workforce in 2002. The evaluation determined that private screened airports performed at the same or a better level than federally screened operations. Details: Washington, DC: Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 21, 2010 at: http://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/Summary_Report.pdf Year: 2004 Country: United States URL: http://www.tsa.gov/assets/pdf/Summary_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 119854 Keywords: Airports, SecurityHomeland SecurityPassenger ScreeningPrivate Security |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Maritime Security: Vessel Tracking Systems Provide Key Information, but the Need for Duplicate Data Should be Reviewed Summary: U.S. ports, waterways, and coastal approaches are part of a system handling more than $700 billion in merchandise annually. With the many possible threats—including transportation and detonation of weapons of mass destruction, suicide attacks against vessels, and others—in the maritime domain, awareness of such threats could give the Coast Guard advance notice to help detect, deter, interdict, and defeat them and protect the U.S. homeland and economy. GAO was asked to review the Coast Guard’s efforts to achieve awareness about activity in the maritime domain. This report addresses: the extent to which the Coast Guard (1) has vessel tracking systems in place, (2) can use these systems to track vessels that may be threats, and (3) has coordinated the development and implementation of these systems. To answer these questions, GAO analyzed relevant statutes, regulations, and plans for vessel tracking systems, compared the roles of the planned systems, and interviewed appropriate officials. To ensure efficient use of resources, GAO recommends that the Commandant of the Coast Guard determine the extent to which duplicate vessel tracking information from LRIT and commercially provided long-range AIS is needed to accomplish Coast Guard missions, particularly in light of information already available through national technical means. DHS agreed with this recommendation. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-09-337: Accessed October 9, 2010 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09337.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09337.pdf Shelf Number: 114343 Keywords: Homeland SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityTerrorismTransportation Security |
Author: National Research Council. Committee to Review the Department of Homeland Security's Approach to Risk Analysis Title: Review of the Department of Homeland Security's Approach to Risk Analysis Summary: The events of September 11, 2001 changed perceptions, rearranged national priorities, and produced significant new government entities, including the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) created in 2003. While the principal mission of DHS is to lead efforts to secure the nation against those forces that wish to do harm, the department also has responsibilities in regard to preparation for and response to other hazards and disasters, such as floods, earthquakes, and other "natural" disasters. Whether in the context of preparedness, response or recovery from terrorism, illegal entry to the country, or natural disasters, DHS is committed to processes and methods that feature risk assessment as a critical component for making better-informed decisions. Review of the Department of Homeland Security's Approach to Risk Analysis explores how DHS is building its capabilities in risk analysis to inform decision making. The department uses risk analysis to inform decisions ranging from high-level policy choices to fine-scale protocols that guide the minute-by-minute actions of DHS employees. Although DHS is responsible for mitigating a range of threats, natural disasters, and pandemics, its risk analysis efforts are weighted heavily toward terrorism. In addition to assessing the capability of DHS risk analysis methods to support decision-making, the book evaluates the quality of the current approach to estimating risk and discusses how to improve current risk analysis procedures. Review of the Department of Homeland Security's Approach to Risk Analysis recommends that DHS continue to build its integrated risk management framework. It also suggests that the department improve the way models are developed and used and follow time-tested scientific practices, among other recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2010. 148p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 2, 2010 at: http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12972 Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12972 Shelf Number: 120156 Keywords: Homeland SecurityRisk AssessmentTerrorism |
Author: Davis, Lois M. Title: Long-Term Effects of Law Enforcement's Post-9/11 Focus on Counterterrorism and Homeland Security Summary: Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the need for increased counterterrorism (CT) and homeland security (HS) efforts at the federal, state, and local levels has taken the spotlight in public safety efforts. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, many law enforcement agencies (LEAs) shifted more resources toward developing CT and HS capabilities, and the federal government continues to support these efforts with grants provided through the Department of Homeland Security. This monograph examines the long-term adjustments that large urban LEAs have made to accommodate the focus on CT and HS, as well as the advantages and challenges associated with it. The study relies primarily on in-depth case studies of five large urban LEAs, as well as a review of federal HS grant programs and a quantitative analysis of the potential costs associated with shifting law enforcement personnel from traditional policing to focus on HS and CT functions. Major trends among the five case study LEAs include the creation of specialized departments and units, as well as an increased emphasis on information-sharing, which, nationwide, has led to the creation of fusion centers that serve as formal hubs for regional information-sharing networks. LEAs' HS and CT efforts are also greatly influenced by the restrictions and requirements associated with federal HS grant funding. Finally, using cost-of-crime estimates, it is possible to partially quantify the costs associated with LEAs' shifting of personnel away from traditional crime prevention toward CT and HS - there are also clear benefits associated with law enforcement's focus on CT and HS, but they are difficult to quantify, and this is posing a challenge for LEAs as the economic downturn puts pressure on public budgets. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010. 133p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 15, 2010 at: http://health.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1031.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://health.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1031.pdf Shelf Number: 120522 Keywords: CounterterrorismDomestic IntelligenceEmergency PreparednessHomeland SecurityLaw Enforcement |
Author: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Office of Inspector General Title: Customs and Border Protection's Implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative at Land Ports of Entry Summary: The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative requires citizens of the United States, Canada, Bermuda, and Mexico arriving at land ports of entry to present passports or other approved documents to enter the United States. Although the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative became effective at land ports on June 1, 2009, Customs and Border Protection is not fully enforcing the new document requirement. Customs and Border Protection is using informed compliance procedures to educate noncompliant travelers about the new document requirement. Customs and Border Protection is reporting an average compliance rate of 96% at its land border crossings. Our objective was to determine whether Customs and Border Protection is prepared to fully enforce the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative’s new document requirement at land ports of entry. Customs and Border Protection is not prepared to fully enforce the new document requirement at land ports of entry. Although Customs and Border Protection has acquired and deployed substantial technological tools to aid in inspecting travelers, Customs and Border Protection has not analyzed the impact that a substantial increase in secondary inspection workload will have on secondary inspection staffing and infrastructure during full enforcement. The reported Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative compliance rates during the initial eight-month informed compliance period indicate noncompliant travelers arriving at the agency’s 39 busiest land ports may increase the secondary inspection workloads at these ports by an average of 73% if all noncompliant travelers required secondary inspections. The agency has not finalized the operating procedures its officers will use to verify the identity and citizenship of noncompliant travelers. Customs and Border Protection officials told us other priorities have precluded them from completing the operating procedures. Until the new travel document requirement is fully enforced, the agency continues to incur risk that persons falsely claiming to be citizens of the United States, Canada, and Bermuda may be admitted to the United States. We are making four recommendations to better prepare the agency to fully implement the new requirement at land ports of entry. CBP agreed with our proposed corrective actions and is in the process of implementation. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: OIG-11-16: Accessed March 21, 2011 at: http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_11-16_Nov10.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_11-16_Nov10.pdf Shelf Number: 121081 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityHomeland Security |
Author: Ford, Jess T. Title: Border Security: DHS’s Visa Security Program Needs to Improve Performance Evaluation and Better Address Visa Risk Worldwide Summary: Since 2003, the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Visa Security Program (VSP) has participated in the visa process by reviewing applications at some embassies and consulates, with the intention of preventing individuals who pose a threat from entering the United States. The attempted bombing of an airline on December 25, 2009, renewed concerns about the security of the visa process and the effectiveness of the VSP. For this report GAO assessed (1) the ability of DHS's Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to measure the program's objectives and performance, (2) challenges to VSP operations, and (3) ICE efforts to expand the VSP program. To evaluate the VSP, we reviewed VSP data, guidance, and the ICE's 5-year expansion plan. We also interviewed ICE officials, and observed VSP operations at 6 posts overseas. ICE cannot accurately assess progress toward its VSP objectives. ICE outlined three primary objectives of the VSP--identifying and counteracting potential terrorist threats from entering the United States, identifying not-yet-known threats, and maximizing law enforcement and counterterrorism value of the visa process--and established performance measures intended to assess VSP performance, including situations where VSP agents provide information that results in a consular officer's decision to deny a visa. ICE's VSP tracking system, used to collect data on VSP activities, does not gather comprehensive data on all the performance measures needed to evaluate VSP mission objectives. In addition, data collected by ICE on VSP activities were limited by inconsistencies. ICE upgraded its VSP tracking system in April 2010 to collect additional performance data, but the system still does not collect data on all the performance measures. Therefore, ICE's ability to comprehensively evaluate the performance of the VSP remains limited. While ICE can provide some examples demonstrating the success of VSP operations, ICE has not reported on the progress made toward achieving all VSP objectives. Several challenges to the implementation of the VSP affected operations overseas. DHS and the Department of State (State) have issued some guidance, including several memorandums of understanding, to govern VSP operations. However, some posts experienced difficulties because of the limited guidance regarding interactions between State officials and VSP agents, which has led to tensions between the VSP agents and State officials at some posts. In addition, most VSP posts have not developed standard operating procedures for VSP operations, leading to inconsistency among posts. Additionally, the mandated advising and training of consular officers by VSP agents varies from post to post, and at some posts consular officers received no training. Finally, VSP agents perform a variety of investigative and administrative functions beyond their visa security responsibilities that sometimes slow or limit visa security activities, and ICE does not track this information in the VSP tracking system, making it unable to identify the time spent on these activities. In 2007, ICE developed a 5-year expansion plan for the VSP, but ICE has not fully followed or updated the plan. For instance, ICE did not establish 9 posts identified for expansion in 2009 and 2010. Furthermore, the expansion plan states that risk analysis is the primary input to VSP site selection, and ICE, with input from State, ranked visa-issuing posts by visa risk, which includes factors such as the terrorist threat and vulnerabilities present at each post. However, 11 of the top 20 high-risk posts identified in the expansion plan are not covered by the VSP. Furthermore, ICE has not taken steps to address visa risk in high-risk posts that do not have a VSP presence. Although the expansion of the VSP is limited by a number of factors, such as budgetary limitations or limited embassy space, ICE has not identified possible alternatives that would provide the additional security of VSP review at those posts that do not have a VSP presence. GAO made several recommendations designed to address weaknesses we identified in the VSP. DHS concurred with the recommendations that the VSP provide consular officer training and develop a plan to provide more VSP coverage at high-risk posts. DHS did not concur with the recommendations that the VSP collect comprehensive data on all performance measures and track the time spent on visa security activities. GAO continues to maintain that these recommendations are necessary to accurately assess VSP performance. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-315: Accessed April 22, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11315.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11315.pdf Shelf Number: 121478 Keywords: Border SecurityComputer SecurityHomeland SecurityImmigrationTerrorismVisa Security |
Author: Jeszeck, Charles A.: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Criminal Alien Statistics: Information on Incarcerations, Arrests, and Costs Summary: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) estimated that as of fiscal year 2009 the total alien--non-U.S.-citizen--population was about 25.3 million, including about 10.8 million aliens without lawful immigration status. Some aliens have been convicted and incarcerated (criminal aliens). The federal government bears these incarceration costs for federal prisons and reimburses states and localities for portions of their costs through the Department of Justice's (DOJ) State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP). GAO was asked to update its April and May 2005 reports that contained information on criminal aliens. This report addresses (1) the number and nationalities of incarcerated criminal aliens; (2) the types of offenses for which criminal aliens were arrested and convicted; and (3) the costs associated with incarcerating criminal aliens and the extent to which DOJ's methodology for reimbursing states and localities for incarcerating criminal aliens is current and relevant. GAO analyzed federal and SCAAP incarceration and cost data of criminal aliens from fiscal years 2003 through 2010, and conviction and cost data from five states that account for about 70 percent of the SCAAP criminal alien population in 2008. GAO analyzed a random sample of 1,000 criminal aliens to estimate arrest information due to the large volume of arrests and offenses. GAO also estimated selected costs to incarcerate criminal aliens nationwide using The number of criminal aliens in federal prisons in fiscal year 2010 was about 55,000, and the number of SCAAP criminal alien incarcerations in state prison systems and local jails was about 296,000 in fiscal year 2009 (the most recent data available), and the majority were from Mexico. The number of criminal aliens in federal prisons increased about 7 percent from about 51,000 in fiscal year 2005 while the number of SCAAP criminal alien incarcerations in state prison systems and local jails increased about 35 percent from about 220,000 in fiscal year 2003. The time period covered by these data vary because they reflect updates since GAO last reported on these issues in 2005. Specifically, in 2005, GAO reported that the percentage of criminal aliens in federal prisons was about 27 percent of the total inmate population from 2001 through 2004. Based on our random sample, GAO estimates that the criminal aliens had an average of 7 arrests, 65 percent were arrested at least once for an immigration offense, and about 50 percent were arrested at least once for a drug offense. Immigration, drugs, and traffic violations accounted for about 50 percent of arrest offenses. About 90 percent of the criminal aliens sentenced in federal court in fiscal year 2009 (the most recently available data) were convicted of immigration and drug-related offenses. About 40 percent of individuals convicted as a result of DOJ terrorism-related investigations were aliens. SCAAP criminal aliens incarcerated in selected state prison systems in Arizona, California, Florida, New York, and Texas were convicted of various offenses in fiscal year 2008 (the most recently available data at the time of GAO's analysis). The highest percentage of convictions for criminal aliens incarcerated in four of these states was for drug-related offenses. Homicide resulted in the most primary offense convictions for SCAAP criminal aliens in the fifth state--New York--in fiscal year 2008. GAO estimates that costs to incarcerate criminal aliens in federal prisons and SCAAP reimbursements to states and localities ranged from about $1.5 billion to $1.6 billion annually from fiscal years 2005 through 2009; DOJ plans to update its SCAAP methodology for reimbursing states and localities in 2011 to help ensure that it is current and relevant. DOJ developed its reimbursement methodology using analysis conducted by the former Immigration and Naturalization Service in 2000 that was based on 1997 data. Best practices in cost estimating and assessment of programs call for new data to be continuously collected so it is always relevant and current. During the course of its review, GAO raised questions about the relevancy of the methodology. Thus, DOJ developed plans to update its methodology in 2011 using SCAAP data from 2009 and would like to establish a 3-year update cycle to review the methodology in the future. Doing so could provide additional assurance that DOJ reimburses states and localities for such costs consistent with current trends. In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS and DOJ had no written comments to include in the report. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-187: Accessed April 22, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11187.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11187.pdf Shelf Number: 121479 Keywords: Costs of CrimeCriminal AliensHomeland SecurityIllegal AliensImmigrantsImmigrants and CrimeImmigration |
Author: Mueller, John Title: Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security Summary: The cumulative increase in expenditures on US domestic homeland security over the decade since 9/11 exceeds one trillion dollars. It is clearly time to examine these massive expenditures applying risk assessment and cost-benefit approaches that have been standard for decades. Thus far, officials do not seem to have done so and have engaged in various forms of probability neglect by focusing on worst case scenarios; adding, rather than multiplying, the probabilities; assessing relative, rather than absolute, risk; and inflating terrorist capacities and the importance of potential terrorist targets. We find that enhanced expenditures have been excessive: to be deemed cost-effective in analyses that substantially bias the consideration toward the opposite conclusion, they would have to deter, prevent, foil, or protect against 1,667 otherwise successful Times-Square type attacks per year, or more than four per day. Although there are emotional and political pressures on the terrorism issue, this does not relieve politicians and bureaucrats of the fundamental responsibility of informing the public of the limited risk that terrorism presents and of seeking to expend funds wisely. Moreover, political concerns may be over-wrought: restrained reaction has often proved to be entirely acceptable politically. Details: Paper Prepared for presentation at the panel, "Terror and the Economy: Which Institutions Help Mitigate the Damage?” at the Annual Convention of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 1, 2011. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 9, 2011 at: http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/MID11TSM.PDF Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/MID11TSM.PDF Shelf Number: 121664 Keywords: Cost-Benefit AnalysisHomeland SecurityRisk AssessmentTerrorism |
Author: Muhlhausen, David B. Title: Terror Trends: 40 Years' Data on International and Domestic Terrorism Summary: A decade after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, looking back is as important as looking forward in order to learn from the past and to examine the current and future threats facing the U.S. This survey aggregates international data on global and domestic terrorism from the past 40 years. Combined with new intelligence, this data can better inform U.S. counterterrorism decisions and continue the process of delineating enhanced homeland security policies for the future. From 1969 to 2009, almost 5,600 people lost their lives and more than 16,300 people suffered injuries due to international terrorism directed at the United States. The onus is now on the President and Congress to ensure that the U.S. continues to hone and sharpen its counterterrorism capabilities and adapt them to evolving 21st-century threats. Details: Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2011. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 1, 2011 at: http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/sr0093.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/sr0093.pdf Shelf Number: 121937 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismHomeland SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Archick, Kristin Title: U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism Summary: The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks gave new momentum to European Union (EU) initiatives to combat terrorism and improve police, judicial, and intelligence cooperation among its member states. Since the 2001 attacks, the EU has sought to speed up its efforts to harmonize national laws and bring down barriers among member states’ law enforcement authorities so that information can be meaningfully shared and suspects apprehended expeditiously. Among other steps, the EU has established a common definition of terrorism and a common list of terrorist groups, an EU arrest warrant, enhanced tools to stem terrorist financing, and new measures to strengthen external EU border controls and improve aviation security. As part of its drive to improve its counterterrorism capabilities, the EU has also made improving cooperation with the United States a top priority. Washington has largely welcomed these efforts, recognizing that they may help root out terrorist cells and prevent future attacks against the United States or its interests abroad. U.S.-EU cooperation against terrorism has led to a new dynamic in U.S.-EU relations by fostering dialogue on law enforcement and homeland security issues previously reserved for bilateral discussions. Contacts between U.S. and EU officials on police, judicial, and border control policy matters have increased substantially since 2001. A number of new U.S.-EU agreements have also been reached; these include information-sharing arrangements between the United States and EU police and judicial bodies, two new U.S.-EU treaties on extradition and mutual legal assistance, and accords on container security and airline passenger data. In addition, the United States and the EU have been working together to clamp down on terrorist financing and to improve aviation and transport security. Despite U.S.-EU strides to foster closer counterterrorism and law enforcement cooperation, some challenges remain. Data privacy has been and continues to be a key sticking point. In February 2010, the European Parliament (EP) rejected a U.S.-EU agreement—known as the SWIFT accord—that would have continued allowing U.S. authorities access to financial data stored in Europe to help combat terrorism on the grounds that it did not contain sufficient protections to safeguard the personal data and privacy rights of EU citizens. Although the EP approved a revised U.S.-EU SWIFT agreement in July 2010, some Members of the European Parliament—for many years and for similar reasons—have also challenged a U.S.-EU agreement permitting airlines to share passenger name record (PNR) data with U.S. authorities. U.S. and EU officials are currently negotiating revisions to the existing PNR accord in an effort to assuage EP concerns. Other issues that have led to periodic U.S.-EU tensions include terrorist detainee policies, differences in the U.S. and EU terrorist designation lists, and balancing border security with legitimate transatlantic travel and commerce. Nevertheless, both the United States and the EU appear committed to fostering closer cooperation in the areas of counterterrorism and other homeland security issues. Congressional decisions related to improving border controls and transport security, in particular, may affect how future U.S.-EU cooperation evolves. In addition, given the European Parliament’s growing influence in many of these policy areas, Members of Congress may be able to help shape Parliament’s views and responses through ongoing contacts and the existing Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue (TLD). This report examines the evolution of U.S.-EU counterterrorism cooperation and the ongoing challenges that may be of interest in the 112th Congress. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: RS22030: Accessed July 6, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22030.pdf Shelf Number: 121982 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismHomeland SecurityTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Vargas, Alejandro, Jr. Title: Applying Psychosocial Theories of Terrorism to the Radicalization Process: A Mapping of De La Corte‘s Seven Principles to Homegrown Radicals Summary: This study contains an application of psychosocial theories to the process of radicalization among Muslim militants (jihadis) with a history of activity in the United States. Drawing extensively from De la Corte‘s seven psychosocial principles of terrorism, the study codes each principle into a corresponding example from case studies of American jihadism. The end result is the use of theory to create a new empirical and psychosocial perspective into homegrown jihadism. The application of De la Corte‘s theory is also used as a framework to suggest frameworks for detection, intervention, and interdiction when it comes to homegrown jihadi activity. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Master's Thesis: Accessed September 19, 2011 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=683351 Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=683351 Shelf Number: 122777 Keywords: Homeland SecurityMuslimsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism (U.S.)Terrorists |
Author: Whiteneck, Daniel Title: The Navy at a Tipping Point: Maritime Dominance at Stake? Summary: For the past 60 years, since roughly the outbreak of the Korean War and the U.S. response to that war, the Navy has had a consistent strategy for the structure, deployment, and posturing of the fleet. American maritime dominance has been based on forces that were deployed forward and always ready to respond quickly to emerging situations in areas of vital interest to American foreign policy. Because of the perceived need to be able to respond at the highest levels of warfare throughout the Cold War, those forces were built, trained, and equipped to be “combat credible” against capable challengers. “Combat credible” meant the ability to project power against advanced air defenses, conduct and enable littoral/amphibious operations in opposed environments, and establish blue-water dominance against highly capable surface, sub-surface, and air threats. In the post-Cold War environment, and since 9/11, evidence illustrates that the demand signal for naval forces has not waned. In fact, the Navy continues to be tasked with a range of operations, from disaster response to peacetime engagement and shows of force, and from counter-piracy and maritime interdiction to participation in major combat operations by TACAIR and other power-projection forces. This demand signal did not go down during the 1990s (“reaping the peace dividend”) as the Navy took on persistent operations in the Balkans, the Caribbean, and the Arabian Gulf after Desert Storm, continued its role in Asia, and expanded its peacetime engagement as COCOMs increased “shaping” activities. After 9/11, the Navy shed its role in the Balkans and the Caribbean but increased its homeland defense role and its ballistic missile defense missions, and it has played a major part in strike operations for OIF and OEF for the past decade. The Navy also picked up significant roles in humanitarian assistance, maritime partnership building, littoral combat, and special operational forces (SOF), and routinely had over 10,000 sailors ashore in CENTCOM to support operations there. If the Navy hoped that reductions in the demand signal would give it breathing room to reset the force and invest in platforms and assets at the expense of operations, its hopes have proved to be false. The Navy battle force has shrunk by 20 percent in the last decade, while the number of ships on deployment has remained relatively steady. In a period of constant demand, resources to meet those demands, pay for needed future structure, and meet growing demands for spending on people and health care have shrunk. They will not grow in the future. There is a gap that must be addressed. Details: Alexandria, VA: CNA Analysis & Solutions, 2010. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 29, 2011 at: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/The%20Navy%20at%20a%20Tipping%20Point%20D0022262.A3.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/The%20Navy%20at%20a%20Tipping%20Point%20D0022262.A3.pdf Shelf Number: 122787 Keywords: Homeland SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime SecurityPirates/PiracyU.S. Navy |
Author: Parfomak, Paul W. Title: Keeping America’s Pipelines Safe and Secure: Key Issues for Congress Summary: Nearly half a million miles of pipeline transporting natural gas, oil, and other hazardous liquids crisscross the United States. While an efficient and fundamentally safe means of transport, many pipelines carry materials with the potential to cause public injury and environmental damage. The nation’s pipeline networks are also widespread and vulnerable to accidents and terrorist attack. Recent pipeline accidents in Marshall, MI, San Bruno, CA, Allentown, PA, and Laurel, MT, have heightened congressional concern about pipeline risks and drawn criticism from the National Transportation Safety Board. Both government and industry have taken numerous steps to improve pipeline safety and security over the last 10 years. Nonetheless, while many stakeholders agree that federal pipeline safety programs have been on the right track, the spate of recent pipeline incidents suggest there continues to be significant room for improvement. Likewise, the threat of terrorist attack remains a concern. The federal pipeline safety program was authorized through the fiscal year ending September 30, 2010, and is currently operating under a continuing resolution. The 112th Congress is considering new legislation to reauthorize the program for four years and to improve the safety and security of the U.S. pipeline network. Legislative proposals include the Strengthening Pipeline Safety and Enforcement Act of 2011 (S. 234), the Pipeline Transportation Safety Improvement Act of 2011 (S. 275), the Clean Rivers Act of 2011 (S. 1502), the Pipeline Safety and Community Empowerment Act of 2011 (H.R. 22), the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 (H.R. 2845), the Pipeline Modernization for Safety Act of 2011 (H.R. 2871), and the Pipeline Infrastructure and Community Protection Act of 2011 (H.R. 2937). Pipeline-related provisions are also found in a draft of the Transportation Security Administration Authorization Act of 2011 approved by the House Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security. The Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2012 (S. 1596) would appropriate federal pipeline safety funds for FY2012. The legislative proposals above contain a broad range of provisions addressing pipeline safety and security. Among the most significant are provisions that would increase the number of federal pipeline safety inspectors, would require automatic shutoff valves for transmission pipelines, would mandate internal inspections of transmission pipelines, would increase civil penalties for pipeline safety violations, and would mandate reviews of diluted bitumen pipeline regulation. S. 1502 and H.R. 2937 would mandate a review of federal safety regulations for pipelines crossing inland bodies of water. The Transportation Security Administration Authorization Act of 2011 would mandate a study regarding the relative roles and responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Transportation with respect to pipeline security. As it debates reauthorization of the federal pipeline safety program and oversees the federal role in pipeline security, Congress may wish to assess how the various elements of U.S. pipeline safety and security fit together in the nation’s overall strategy to protect transportation infrastructure. Pipeline safety and security necessarily involve many groups: federal agencies, oil and gas pipeline associations, large and small pipeline operators, and local communities. Reviewing how these groups work together to achieve common goals could be an oversight challenge for Congress. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2011. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: R41536: Accessed October 26, 2011 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R41536.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R41536.pdf Shelf Number: 123148 Keywords: Homeland SecurityInfrastructure Security (U.S.)Terrorism |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Federal Courthouses: Improved Collaboration Needed to Meet Demands of a Complex Security Environment Summary: Safe and accessible federal courthouses are critical to the U.S. judicial process. The Federal Protective Service (FPS), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Marshals Service (Marshals Service), within the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOUSC), and the General Services Administration (GSA) are the federal stakeholders with roles related to courthouse security. As requested, this report addresses (1) attributes that influence courthouse security considerations and (2) the extent to which stakeholders have collaborated in implementing their responsibilities and using risk management. GAO analyzed laws and documents, such as security assessments; reviewed GAO's work on key practices for collaboration and facility protection; visited 11 courthouse facilities, selected based on geographic dispersion, age, size, and other criteria; and interviewed agency and judiciary officials. While the results from site visits cannot be generalized, they provided examples of courthouse security activities. Various attributes influence security considerations for the nation's 424 federal courthouses, which range from small court spaces to large buildings in major urban areas. According to DOJ data, threats against the courts have increased between fiscal years 2004 and 2010--from approximately 600 to more than 1,400. The Interagency Security Committee--an interagency group that develops standards for federal facility security--has assigned courthouses the highest security level because they are prominent symbols of U.S. power. Federal stakeholders have taken steps to strengthen their collaboration, such as establishing agency liaisons, but have faced challenges in implementing assigned responsibilities and using risk assessment tools. (1) A 1997 memorandum of agreement (MOA) outlines each stakeholder's roles and responsibilities and identifies areas requiring stakeholder coordination. However, at 5 of the 11 courthouses GAO visited, FPS and the Marshals Service were either performing duplicative efforts (e.g., both monitoring the courthouse lobby) or performing security roles that were inconsistent with their responsibilities. The judiciary and other stakeholders stated that having the Marshals Service and FPS both provide security services has resulted in two lines of authority for implementing and overseeing security services. Updating the MOA that identifies roles and responsibilities could strengthen the multiagency courthouse security framework by better incorporating accountability for federal agencies' collaborative efforts. (2) In 2008, Congress authorized a pilot program, whereby the Marshals Service would assume FPS's responsibilities to provide perimeter security at 7 courthouses. In October 2010, the judiciary recommended that the pilot be expanded. AOUSC noted general consensus among various stakeholders in support of the pilot and estimated the costs of expanding it, but AOUSC did not obtain FPS's views on assessing the pilot results or on how the expansion may affect FPS's mission. Additional analysis on the costs and benefits of this approach and the inclusion of all stakeholder perspectives could better position Congress and federal stakeholders to evaluate expansion options. (3) The Marshals Service has not always completed court security facility surveys (a type of risk assessment), as required by Marshals Service guidance. At 9 of the courthouses GAO visited, the Marshals Service had not conducted these surveys, but Marshals Service officials at some courthouses told us that they assessed security needs as part of their budget development process. However, these assessments are less comprehensive than the court security facility surveys required by Marshals Service guidance. FPS has faced difficulties completing its risk assessments, known as facility security assessments, and recently halted an effort to implement a new system for completing them. Furthermore, GAO found that the Marshals Service and FPS did not consistently share the full results of their risk assessments with each other and key stakeholders. Sharing risk assessment information could better equip federal stakeholders to assess courthouses' security needs and make informed decisions. GAO recommends DHS and DOJ update the MOA to, among other things, clarify stakeholders' roles and responsibilities and ensure the completion and sharing of risk assessments; and further assess costs and benefits of the perimeter pilot program, in terms of enhanced security, and include all stakeholders' views, should steps be taken to expand the program. DHS and DOJ concurred with GAO's recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-857: Accessed October 31, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-857 Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-857 Shelf Number: 123186 Keywords: Building SecurityCourthousesHomeland SecurityRisk Assessment |
Author: Barry, Tom Title: Fallacies of High-Tech Fixes for Border Security Summary: In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush created the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The new department promised border security over traditional border-control operations. Rushing to secure the borders, the abundantly funded DHS nearly tripled the number of Border Patrol agents, fortified ports-of-entry, built a highly controversial border wall and quickly opted for several high-tech initiatives to patrol the border with virtual eyes. DHS rushed ahead with its two remote surveillance initiatives—the SBInet program (commonly known as the “virtual fence”) and the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) program—without having a detailed or focused border security strategy in place. Not only did this expedited border security lack a strategy, but it also lacked a foundation of successful experience in high-tech border control. Instead, it has been based more on dreams, hopes and fantasy—and on the widely shared, but faulty, assumption that technology provided by private contractors could meet the challenge of securing the country’s nearly 6,000 miles of land borders with remote surveillance systems. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the DHS agency in charge of border security, states it is committed to “a comprehensive and systemic upgrading of the technology used in controlling the border.” But the new agency lacks the oversight and management capacity, in-house technological expertise, and the necessary commitment to direct and operate its proposed high-tech solutions. CBP professes its commitment to protecting the homeland against the entry of “dangerous people and goods.” Yet it lacks a strategy that prioritizes actual threats. Its high-tech initiatives, like the entire Secure Border Initiative (SBI) endeavor, which encompasses the two main high-tech border security programs, are shockingly unfocused and nonstrategic. Even when the immensely expensive technological surveillance occasionally does work, CBP’s high-tech web catches only illegal border crossers looking for work or carrying backpacks of marijuana. These arrests and drug seizures are certainly not the reason the Department of Homeland Security was created and cannot justify the continuing depletion of the U.S. treasury in the unfocused post-September 11 quest for border security. Trying to stand by its promise to gain “operational control” over the land borders, DHS hurriedly turned to high-tech fixes for border security. But DHS’s hasty commitment to remote surveillance technology—such as virtual fences and drones—has been symptomatic of the new department’s apparent confidence that there would be unlimited funding for border security and that its operations would not be subject either to cost-benefit analysis or to evaluations of the impact on homeland security. Rather than being guided by threat assessments, they have been experiments in technological wish fulfillment. This International Policy Report examines the failed SBInet and UAV programs. Sidebars in the report examine the support of high-tech fixes for border security by liberal sectors and the role of congressional supporters of UAVs. A final section includes conclusions and recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, 2010. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: International Policy Report: Accessed November 29, 2011 at: http://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/1004_TBP.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.ciponline.org/images/uploads/1004_TBP.pdf Shelf Number: 123487 Keywords: Border Security (U.S.)Homeland SecurityIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsIllegal Immigration |
Author: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Title: Small Vessel Security Strategy Summary: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) exists within the framework of other security strategies. It does not replace any of the current strategies or relevant documents. Rather, this strategy harmonizes directions from related strategies into a multi-layered, unified approach for the component agencies within the DHS, and to lay the groundwork for DHS participation in coordination across all levels of government, as well as other public, private and international stakeholders in the maritime domain. This strategy’s purpose is to address the risk that small vessels1 might be used to smuggle terrorists or WMD into the United States or might be used as either a stand-off weapon platform or as a means of a direct attack with a WBIED. The resulting risks are difficult to manage because small vessels are not centrally registered, operators have not always demonstrated proficiency in small vessel operations, and the ability to screen or detect vessel-borne hazards is extremely limited. There is, moreover, a tradition and expectation among the large population of small vessel operators of largely unrestricted access to U.S. waterways. This strategy also describes the small vessel community and the environment in which it operates. It discusses and identifies the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences resulting from four key risk scenarios. Understanding the relationship of the threat, risk, vulnerability, and consequence of a small vessel terrorist attack on the United States will help to reduce the risk of such an attack. The guiding principles and overall goals of this strategy complement existing solutions for large vessels. Details: Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2008. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 12, 2012 at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/small-vessel-security-strategy.pdf Year: 2008 Country: United States URL: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/small-vessel-security-strategy.pdf Shelf Number: 123566 Keywords: Homeland SecurityMaritime CrimeShipping, Security MeasuresTerrorism |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: IT Supply Chain: National Security-Related Agencies Need to Better Address Risks Summary: Federal agencies rely extensively on computerized information systems and electronic data to carry out their operations. The exploitation of information technology (IT) products and services through the global supply chain is an emerging threat that could degrade the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of critical and sensitive agency networks and data. GAO was asked to identify (1) the key risks associated with the IT supply chains used by federal agencies; (2) the extent to which selected national security-related departments have addressed such risks; and (3) the extent to which those departments have determined that their telecommunication networks contain foreign-developed equipment, software, or services. To do this, GAO analyzed federal acquisition and information security laws, regulations, standards, and guidelines; examined departmental policies and procedures; and interviewed officials from four national security-related departments, the intelligence community, and nonfederal entities. GAO is recommending that the Departments of Energy, Homeland Security, and Justice take steps, as needed, to develop and document policies, procedures, and monitoring capabilities that address IT supply chain risk. These departments generally concurred with GAO’s recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-12-361: Accessed April 9, 2012 at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-361 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-361 Shelf Number: 124895 Keywords: Homeland SecurityInformation SecuritySupply Chains |
Author: Willis, Henry H. Title: Terrorism Risk Modeling for Intelligence Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Summary: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has adopted a focused approach to risk reduction. DHS is moving increasingly to risk analysis and risk-based resource allocation, a process that is designed to manage the greatest risks instead of attempting to protect everything. This report applies a probabilistic terrorism model that is broadly applied in the insurance industry to assess risk across cities, to assess risks within specific cities, and to assist intelligence analysis. Among the authors' conclusions: Terrorism risk is concentrated in a small number of cities, with most cities having negligible relative risk, so terrorism estimates such as those described in the report should be incorporated into the grant allocation assessment process. DHS should consider funding the development of city profiles of major metropolitan areas receiving DHS preparedness grants. It should also develop descriptions of terrorist attack planning and operations that can be used to translate estimates from risk models of likely attack scenarios into detailed recommendations. Finally, DHS should develop tabletop exercises to test the scenarios and provide feedback. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007. 95p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 18, 2012 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2007/RAND_TR386.pdf Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2007/RAND_TR386.pdf Shelf Number: 125343 Keywords: Homeland SecurityRisk AssessmentTerrorism (U.S.) |
Author: Larance, Eileen R. Title: Terrorist Watchlist: Routinely Assessing Impacts of Agency Actions since the December 25, 2009, Attempted Attack Could Help Inform Future Efforts Summary: The December 25, 2009, attempted bombing of Northwest Flight 253 exposed weaknesses in how the federal government nominated individuals to the terrorist watchlist and gaps in how agencies used the list to screen individuals to determine if they posed a security threat. In response, the President tasked agencies to take corrective actions. GAO was asked to assess (1) government actions since the incident to strengthen the nominations process, (2) how the composition of the watchlist has changed based on these actions, and (3) how agencies are addressing gaps in screening processes. GAO analyzed government reports, the guidance used by agencies to nominate individuals to the watchlist, data on the volumes of nominations from January 2009 through May 2011, the composition of the list, and the outcomes of screening agency programs. GAO also interviewed officials from intelligence, law enforcement, and screening agencies to discuss changes to policies, guidance, and processes and related impacts on agency operations and the traveling public, among other things. This report is a public version of the classified report that GAO issued in December 2011 and omits certain information, such as details on the nominations guidance and the specific outcomes of screening processes. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism ensure that the outcomes and impacts of agencies’ actions to strengthen nominations and screening processes are routinely assessed. Technical comments were provided and incorporated. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 52p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-12-476: Accessed June 27, 2012 at: http://gao.gov/assets/600/591312.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://gao.gov/assets/600/591312.pdf Shelf Number: 125421 Keywords: Homeland SecurityTerrorismTerrorists (U.S.) |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Foreign Police Assistance: Defined Roles and Improved Information Sharing Could Enhance Interagency Collaboration Summary: In April 2011, we reported that the United States provided an estimated $3.5 billion for foreign police assistance to 107 countries during fiscal year 2009. We agreed to follow up that report with a review of the extent to which U.S. agencies evaluated and coordinated their foreign police assistance activities. As such, this report (1) updates our analysis of the funding U.S. agencies provided for foreign police assistance during fiscal years 2009 through 2011, (2) examines the extent to which DOD and State/INL assess or evaluate their activities for countries with the largest programs, and (3) examines the mechanisms U.S. agencies use to coordinate foreign police assistance activities. GAO focused on DOD and State because they have the largest foreign police assistance programs. GAO analyzed program and budget documents and interviewed officials from DOD, State, Energy, the U.S. Agency for International Development, Justice, the Treasury, and Homeland Security. GAO recommends that (1) NSC complete its efforts to define agency roles and responsibilities, and (2) the Secretaries of Defense and State establish mechanisms to better share and document information among various U.S. agencies. NSC provided technical comments, but did not comment on our recommendation. DOD concurred and State partially concurred, noting the importance of interagency collaboration. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 67p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-12-534: Accessed June 29, 2012 at: http://gao.gov/assets/600/590747.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://gao.gov/assets/600/590747.pdf Shelf Number: 125432 Keywords: Foreign PoliceHomeland SecurityInteragency CollaborationPolicing |
Author: Rodriguez Cuevas, Jose A. Title: The Balloon Effect and Mexican Homeland Security: What it Means to be the Weakest Link in the Americas’ Security Chain Summary: The sudden increase in crime and violence in some Mexican cities and regions has raised security concerns not only in Mexico, where President Felipe Calderon categorized these crimes as a threat to Mexican society, but also in the United States, where Department of Homeland Secretary head Janet Napolitano referred to stemming the violence as “vital to core U.S. national interests.” Mexico is concerned with the latent threat of violence spreading all over the nation, while the U.S. is trying to guard against spillover. Both governments are concerned by the increased violence and its impact on communities along the U.S.–Mexican border. Because of its geopolitical location along the southern U.S. border, Mexico is susceptible to possible undesired effects of U.S. strategies. These unintended, second-degree consequences are known as “balloon effects,” after the airflow inside a balloon when constriction applied to one area sends pressure to another area in the balloon, thinning and weakening its wall. Since 2006, Mexico’s strategy for countering transnational organized crime and related activities has sent the balloon effect in two directions: first, inside Mexico, where government actions have unbalanced the criminal structure, creating balloon effects inside Mexican territory; and second, within the U.S. while asking to escalate the Mexican effort to improve its anti-crime strategy with U.S. assistance has escalated conflict and led to a holistic strategy against transnational organized crime and related activities in the Americas. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. 85p. Source: Internet Resoruce: Thesis: Accessed July 3, 2012 at: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2011/December/11Dec_Rodriguez_Cuevas.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Mexico URL: http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2011/December/11Dec_Rodriguez_Cuevas.pdf Shelf Number: 125464 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingDrug ViolenceHomeland SecurityOrganized Crime (Mexico) |
Author: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency Title: Improving the Public’s Awareness and Reporting of Suspicious Activity: Key Research Findings from Literature Review, Household Surveys, Focus Groups and Interviews Summary: In January 2011, three cleanup workers notified law enforcement of a suspicious backpack they found on a bench along the route of a parade honoring Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in Spokane, Washington. The backpack contained a live radio-controlled pipe bomb. Thanks to the timely report, law enforcement officers and bomb specialists were able to reroute the parade and neutralize the bomb before anyone was injured. This is just one of many examples that demonstrate the importance of the public’s awareness and willingness to report suspicious activity. Members of the public have long served as the “eyes and ears” of the communities in which they reside and work. Community members have a vested interest in keeping their neighborhoods safe and are critical to support law enforcement’s duty to prevent and investigate crime and terrorism. Many law enforcement agencies are already implementing local programs to enhance their community’s awareness of reporting suspicious activity, yet there is little guidance or research regarding best practices to improve citizen reporting. Improving the Public’s Awareness and Reporting of Suspicious Activity: Key Research Findings presents research-based fi ndings that can inform local officials in developing education and awareness campaigns. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 25, 2012 at: http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/SARKeyResearchFindings_508.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/SARKeyResearchFindings_508.pdf Shelf Number: 126448 Keywords: Homeland SecurityPublicity CampaignsTerrorism |
Author: Buentello, Tara Title: Operation Streamline: Drowning Justice and Draining Dollars along the Rio Grande Summary: Operation Streamline, a policy begun in 2005 by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in conjunction with the Department of Justice (DOJ), mandates that nearly all undocumented immigrants apprehended near the southern border in designated areas be detained and prosecuted through the federal criminal justice system, a dramatic departure from previous practices when most immigration cases were handled exclusively within the civil immigration system. According to the Department of Homeland Security’s Operation Streamline press release: “Those aliens who are not released due to humanitarian reasons will face prosecution for illegal entry. The maximum penalty for violation of this law is 180 days incarceration. While the alien is undergoing criminal proceedings, the individual will also be processed for removal from the United States.” Operation Streamline’s key component is that it mandates that immigrants crossing the border in designated areas be arrested, detained while awaiting trial, prosecuted with a misdemeanor or felony charge, incarcerated in the federal justice system, and finally deported. On December 16, 2005, The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) launched Operation Streamline along a section of the Texas-Mexico border near Del Rio, Texas, spanning a total of 210 miles. Operation Streamline has spread to other areas along the U.S.-Mexico border, including much of Arizona and Texas. Operation Streamline has exposed undocumented immigrants crossing the southern border to unprecedented rates of incarceration; overburdened the federal criminal justice system in the districts where it has been implemented; and added enormous costs to the American taxpayer while providing a boon to the for-profit private prison industry. The extent of the program is so sweeping that by 2009, 54% of all federal prosecutions nationwide were for immigration offenses. The effect is more pronounced in border districts. In April 2010, prosecutions of 1325 and 1326 alone accounted for 84% of all prosecutions in the Southern District of Texas, which includes Houston. Since Operation Streamline began in 2005, there has been a 136% in prosecutions for unauthorized entry and an 85% increase in prosecutions for unauthorized re-entry in the Western and Southern Districts of Texas. More than 135,000 migrants have been criminally prosecuted in these two border districts since 2005 under the two sections of the federal code that make unauthorized entry and re-entry a crime. Operation Streamline has funneled more than $1.2 billion into the largely for-profit detention system in Texas, driving the expansion of private prisons along the border. Operation Streamline has significantly increased the caseload of public defenders and federal judges while radically increasing the number of individuals incarcerated for petty immigration violations in for-profit private prisons and county jails throughout Texas. Data in this report show an increase in criminal prosecutions of undocumented border-crossers even as the estimated number of migrants to the United States has dropped. In 2009, two border districts in Texas prosecuted 46,470 immigrants, representing approximately 186 entry and re-entry prosecutions a day for federal courts along the border. Proponents of Operation Streamline argue that it has deterred illegal entry. However, research conducted amongst migrants in the United States indicates that the decreased migration has largely been caused by the economic downturn, while the ironic impact of beefed-up border enforcement has been to deter migrants from returning to their countries of origin during the recession. Operation Streamline: Drowning Justice and Draining Dollars along the Rio Grande presents facts, figures, and testimony highlighting the human and financial costs Operation Streamline exacts on migrants, the federal judiciary, and the detention system in Texas. The recommends report recommends the repeal of Operation Streamline. Successor policies to Operation Streamline addressing undocumented border crossers should return jurisdiction over immigration violations to civil immigration authorities, reduce the use of detention for border crossing violations, and promote and promote a pathway for legal and reasonable means for immigrants to obtain legal status in the United States. Details: Charlotte, NC: Grassroots Leadership, 2010. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Green Paper: Accessed October 1, 2012 at: Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 126536 Keywords: Border SecurityCosts of Criminal JusticeHomeland SecurityIllegal AliensIllegal Immigrants (U.S.)Immigrant DetentionImmigration Policy |
Author: Robertson, Alistair Graham Title: Operation Streamline: Costs and Consequences Summary: In 2005, the Del Rio sector of the Border Patrol, an agency within the federal Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection, faced a peculiar issue. With civil detention facilities at capacity and voluntary return to Mexico available only to Mexican citizens, non-Mexican migrants were given a notice to appear in front of an immigration judge and released in the United States.” In 2004, Border Patrol apprehended approximately 10,000 non-Mexican migrants in the Del Rio sector; just one year later, the figure spiked to 15,000. The solution to this enforcement issue, Border Patrol decided, was to circumvent the civil immigration system by turning non-Mexican migrants over for criminal prosecution, a practice until then relegated almost exclusively to cases of violent criminal history or numerous reentries. Upon considering the proposition, the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Texas responded with one caveat: in order to avoid an equal protection violation, the courts would have to criminally prosecute all migrants within a designated area, not just those from countries other than Mexico. With the signature of Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff, it was decided to do just that. Starting in December of 2005, “Operation Streamline” required all undocumented border-crossers in the Eagle Pass area of the Del Rio Border Patrol sector to be funneled into the criminal justice system and charged with unlawful entry or re-entry (8 U.S.C. § 1325 or 1326). Those charged with improper entry usually face a sentence of up to 180 days, and a judge may impose a sentence of over ten years dependent upon criminal history. Re-entry offenders also face tough sentences, including a felony charge that places up to a ten-year bar on legal immigration. The Department of Homeland Security since has drastically expanded the criminal referral model through similar programs in the Yuma sector in 2006, the Laredo sector in 2007, and the Tucson sector in 2008. By 2010, every U.S.-Mexico border sector except California had implemented a “zero-tolerance” program of some sort, the whole of which are commonly referred to by the moniker of the original program— Operation Streamline. Depending upon the sector, the degree of implementation may vary significantly. For example, according to Federal Public Defenders in the Yuma and Del Rio sectors, Border Patrol refers nearly 100% of apprehended immigrants in those areas for criminal prosecution. In the Tucson sector, where greater migrant volume renders such high referral rates logistically unfeasible, the percentage on immigrants “Streamlined” may be closer to 10%, or about 70 of the 800 migrants apprehended each day. The resulting prisoner volume has led the Bureau of Prisons in the Department of Justice to depend upon private prison corporations like Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and GEO Group. Through increased facility use and contracts for other services, CCA and GEO have enjoyed a combined $780 million increase in annual federal revenues since 2005. In FY2011, the federal government paid immense sums of taxpayer money to private prison companies, $744 million and $640 million to CCA and GEO Group, respectively. Much of this revenue derives from contracts for Criminal Alien Requirement (CAR) prisons, where federal immigrant prisoners are segregated in privately owned, privately operated prisons contracted by the Bureau of Prisons. The terms of CAR contracts include incentives (and sometimes guarantees) to fill facilities near capacity with immigrant prisoners. Each year, these companies dedicate millions of dollars to lobbying and campaign contributions. The federal dollars behind immigrant incarceration come at a significant cost to the taxpayer, climbing in 2011 to an estimated $1.02 billion annually. Before the announcement of Operation Streamline in 2005, the federal government annually committed about 58% of that total, or $591 million toward incarcerating immigrants. In 1994, the amount was about $72 million, 7% of its current level. Recent budget proposals indicate that federal spending on 2 Operation Streamline: Costs and Consquences prosecution and incarceration will likely increase, as Congress recently stated an ambition to “expand Operation Streamline to additional Border Patrol sectors” alongside a record-setting DHS budget request of $45.2 billion. The sheer volume of immigration cases has also severely burdened the courts in border districts, which have been forced to handle a near 350% increase of petty immigration cases from 12,411 in 2002 to 55,604 in 2010. In Tucson, courts may see as many as 200 immigrants lined up for prosecution in a single morning. To handle the expanded caseload, the Department of Justice has pursued a combination of resource-intensive options, including privately contracting with defense attorneys, deputizing Border Patrol agents as special Assistant U.S. Attorneys, and bringing several magistrate judges out of retirement. Furthermore, Operation Streamline strips Assistant U.S. Attorneys of the power to prosecute the crimes they deem pressing. Immigration cases made up 36% of all criminal prosecutions nationwide in 2011, surpassing drug and fraud prosecutions combined. Details: Charlotte, NC: Grassroots Leadership, 2012. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed october 1, 2012 at: http://www.grassrootsleadership.org/files/GRL_Sept2012_Report%20final.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.grassrootsleadership.org/files/GRL_Sept2012_Report%20final.pdf Shelf Number: 126537 Keywords: Border SecurityCosts of Criminal JusticeHomeland SecurityIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionImmigrationOperation Streamline (U.S.)Private Prisons |
Author: Lydgate, Joanna Title: Assembly-Line Justice: A Review of Operation Streamline Summary: The current administration is committed to combating the drug and weapon trafficking and human smuggling at the root of violence along the U.S.-Mexico border. But a Bush-era immigration enforcement program called Operation Streamline threatens to undermine that effort. Operation Streamline requires the federal criminal prosecution and imprisonment of all unlawful border crossers. The program, which mainly targets migrant workers with no criminal history, has caused skyrocketing caseloads in many federal district courts along the border. This Warren Institute study demonstrates that Operation Streamline diverts crucial law enforcement resources away from fighting violent crime along the border, fails to effectively reduce undocumented immigration, and violates the U.S. Constitution. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began implementing Operation Streamline along the U.S.-Mexico border in 2005. The program has fundamentally transformed DHS’s border enforcement practices. Before Operation Streamline began, DHS Border Patrol agents voluntarily returned first-time border crossers to their home countries or detained them and formally removed them from the United States through the civil immigration system. The U.S. Attorney’s Office reserved criminal prosecution for migrants with criminal records and for those who made repeated attempts to cross the border. Operation Streamline removed that prosecutorial discretion, requiring the criminal prosecution of all undocumented border crossers, regardless of their history. Operation Streamline has generated unprecedented caseloads in eight of the eleven federal district courts along the border, straining the resources of judges, U.S. attorneys, defense attorneys, U.S. Marshals, and court personnel. The program’s voluminous prosecutions have forced many courts to cut procedural corners. Magistrate judges conduct en masse hearings, during which as many as 80 defendants plead guilty at a time, depriving migrants of due process. Indeed, in December 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Operation Streamline’s en masse plea hearings in Tucson, Arizona violate federal law. By focusing court and law enforcement resources on the prosecution of first-time entrants, Operation Streamline also diverts attention away from fighting drug smuggling, human trafficking, and other crimes that create border violence. To examine Operation Streamline’s effects, the Warren Institute observed Operation Streamline court proceedings and conducted interviews with judges, U.S. attorneys, defense attorneys, Border Patrol representatives, and immigration lawyers in four border cities in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. This report outlines the Warren Institute’s findings. It concludes that Operation Streamline is not an effective means of improving border security or reducing undocumented immigration. Furthermore, Operation Streamline has unacceptable consequences for the agencies tasked with implementing the program, for the migrants it targets, and for the rule of law in this country. The administration should therefore eliminate Operation Streamline and restore U.S. attorneys’ discretion to prosecute serious crimes along the border. If the administration seeks to punish first-time border crossers, it need look no further than the civil system. Details: Berkeley, CA: Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on Race, Ethnicity & Diversity, University of California, Berkeley Law School, 2010. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed October 1, 2012 at: http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf Shelf Number: 126538 Keywords: Border SecurityHomeland SecurityIllegal AliensIllegal Immigrants (U.S.)Immigrant DetentionImmigration PolicyOperation StreamlinePrison Prisons |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Critical Infrastructure Protection: An Implementation Strategy Could Advance DHS's Coordination of Resilience Efforts across Ports and Other Infrastructure Summary: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is developing a resilience policy, but an implementation strategy is a key next step that could help strengthen DHS resilience efforts. DHS defines resilience as the ability to resist, absorb, recover from, or adapt to adversity, and some high-level documents currently promote resilience as a key national goal. Specifically, two key White House documents emphasize resilience on a national level--the 2011 Presidential Policy Directive 8 and the 2012 National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security. Since 2009, DHS has emphasized the concept of resilience and is currently in the process of developing a resilience policy, the initial steps of which have included creating two internal entities--the Resilience Integration Team and the Office of Resilience Policy (ORP). According to ORP officials, they saw a need to establish a policy that provides component agencies with a single, consistent, department-wide understanding of resilience that clarifies and consolidates resilience concepts from high-level guiding documents, and helps components understand how their activities address DHS's proposed resilience objectives. ORP officials hope to have an approved policy in place later this year. However, DHS officials stated that currently there are no plans to develop an implementation strategy for this policy. An implementation strategy that defines goals, objectives, and activities; identifies resource needs; and lays out milestones is a key step that could help ensure that DHS components adopt the policy consistently and in a timely manner. For example, an implementation strategy with goals and objectives could provide ORP with a more complete picture of how DHS components are implementing this policy. The Coast Guard and the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) work with stakeholders to address some aspects of critical infrastructure resilience, but they could take additional collaborative actions to promote portwide resilience. The Coast Guard is port focused and works with owners and operators of assets, such as vessels and port facilities, to assess and enhance various aspects of critical infrastructure resilience in ports--such as security protection, port recovery, and risk analysis efforts. In contrast, IP, through its Regional Resiliency Assessment Program (RRAP), conducts assessments with a broader regional focus, but is not port specific. An RRAP assessment is conducted to assess vulnerability to help improve resilience and allow for an analysis of infrastructure "clusters" and systems in various regions--for example, a regional transportation and energy corridor. The Coast Guard and IP have collaborated on some RRAP assessments, but there may be opportunities for further collaboration to conduct port-focused resilience assessments. For example, IP and the Coast Guard could collaborate to leverage existing expertise and tools--such as the RRAP approach--to develop assessments of the overall resilience of specific port areas. Having relevant agencies collaborate and leverage one another's resources to conduct joint portwide resilience assessments could further all stakeholders' understanding of interdependencies with other port partners, and help determine where to focus scarce resources to enhance resilience for port areas. U.S. ports are part of an economic engine handling more than $700 billion in merchandise annually, and a disruption to port operations could have a widespread impact on the global economy. DHS has broad responsibility for protection and resilience of critical infrastructure. Within DHS, the Coast Guard is responsible for the maritime environment, and port safety and security, and IP works to enhance critical infrastructure resilience. Recognizing the importance of the continuity of operations in critical infrastructure sectors, DHS has taken initial steps to emphasize the concept of resilience. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS has provided a road map or plan for guiding resilience efforts, and (2) the Coast Guard and IP are working with port stakeholders and each other to enhance port resilience. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed key legislation and DHS documents and guidance. GAO conducted site visits to three ports, selected based on geography, industries, and potential threats; GAO also interviewed DHS officials and industry stakeholders. Information from site visits cannot be generalized to all ports, but provides insights. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DHS develop an implementation strategy for its resilience policy and that the Coast Guard and IP identify opportunities to collaborate to leverage existing tools and resources to assess port resilience. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2012. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-11: Accessed November 2, 2012 at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-11 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-11 Shelf Number: 126819 Keywords: Critical Infrastructure ProtectionHomeland SecurityMaritime SecurityPort Security |
Author: U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Homeland Security. Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management Title: A Line in the Sand: Countering Crime, Violence and Terror at the Southwest Border. A Majority Report Summary: The first edition of A Line in the Sand, released in 2006, (hereafter “first edition”) exposed the rising threat of Mexican drug cartels and the vulnerabilities of our porous Southwest border. The horrific violence perpetrated by Mexican drug cartels continues to grow and, in many cases documented in this report, spills into the United States. The cartels now have a presence in more than 1,000 U.S. cities and dominate the wholesale illicit drug trade by controlling the movement of most of the foreign-produced drug supply across the Southwest border. This report documents the increased operational control of the cartels inside the United States, their strategy to move illegal drugs, and the bloody turf wars that have taken place between rival cartels, as they struggle to control valuable trafficking corridors. Collectively, Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) maintain firm control of drug and human smuggling routes across the U.S.- Mexico border creating safe entry for anyone willing to pay the price. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security, in its most recent assessment, asserts it can control only 44 percent of our border with Mexico. Terrorism remains a serious threat to the security of the United States. The Congressional Research Service reports that between September 2001 and September 2012, there have been 59 homegrown violent jihadist plots within the United States. Of growing concern and potentially a more violent threat to American citizens is the enhanced ability of Middle East terrorist organizations, aided by their relationships and growing presence in the Western Hemisphere, to exploit the Southwest border to enter the United States undetected. This second edition emphasizes America’s ever-present threat from Middle East terrorist networks, their increasing presence in Latin America, and the growing relationship with Mexican DTOs to exploit paths into the United States. During the period of May 2009 through July 2011, federal law enforcement made 29 arrests for violent terrorist plots against the United States, most with ties to terror networks or Muslim extremist groups in the Middle East. The vast majority of the suspects had either connections to special interest countries, including those deemed as state sponsors of terrorism or were radicalized by terrorist groups such as al Qaeda. American-born al Qaeda Imam Anwar al Awlaki, killed in 2011, was personally responsible for radicalizing scores of Muslim extremists around the world. The list includes American-born U.S. Army Major Nidal Hassan, the accused Fort Hood gunman; “underwear bomber” Umar Faruk Abdulmutallab; and Barry Bujol of Hempstead, TX, convicted of providing material support to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. In several documented cases, al Awlaki moved his followers to commit “jihad” against the United States. These instances, combined with recent events involving the Qods Forces, the terrorist arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Hezbollah, serve as a stark reminder the United States remains in the crosshairs of terrorist organizations and their associates. In May of 2012, the Los Angeles Times reported that intelligence gleaned from the 2011 raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound indicated the world’s most wanted terrorist sought to use operatives with valid Mexican passports who could illegally cross into the United States to conduct terror operations. The story elaborated that bin Laden recognized the importance of al Qaeda operatives blending in with American society but felt that those with U.S. citizenship who then attacked the United States would be violating Islamic law. Of equal concern is the possibility to smuggle materials, including uranium, which can be safely assembled on U.S. soil into a weapon of mass destruction. Further, the standoff with Iran over its nuclear program, and the uncertainty of whether Israel might attack Iran drawing the United States into a confrontation, only heightens concern that Iran or its agents would attempt to exploit the porous Southwest border for retaliation. Confronting the threat at the Southwest border has a broader meaning today than it did six years ago. As this report explains, the United States tightened security at airports and land ports of entry in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, but the U.S.-Mexico border is an obvious weak link in the chain. Criminal elements could migrate down this path of least resistance, and with them the terrorists who continue to seek our destruction. The federal government must meet the challenge to secure America’s unlocked back door from the dual threat of drug cartels and terrorist organizations who are lined up, and working together, to enter. One of the central criticisms made by the 9/11 Commission regarding the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks was a failure of imagination in piecing together the threat picture from al-Qaeda before it was too late. Recognizing and proactively confronting threats has presented a perennial challenge to our country. In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, we failed to deal with the Soviet threat before it resulted in a full-blown crisis that threatened nuclear war. Now we are faced with a new threat in Latin America that comes from the growing collaborations between Iran, Venezuela, Hezbollah and transnational criminal organizations. Similar to the Cuban missile crisis, the evidence to compel action exists; the only question is whether we possess the imagination to connect the dots before another disaster strikes. The intent of this report is to present that evidence, not to incite anxiety, but rather to reinvigorate vigilance towards our Southwest border and beyond to the threats we face in Latin America. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. House of Representatives, 2012. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 3, 2012 at: http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/11-15-12-Line-in-the-Sand.pdf Shelf Number: 127109 Keywords: Border SecurityDomestic TerrorismDrug CartelsDrug Trafficking (Mexico-U.S)Homeland SecurityRadical GroupsTerrorism |
Author: Coburn, Tom Title: Safety At Any Price: Assessing the Impact of Homeland Security Spending in U.S. Cities Summary: The Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 and the attacks of September 11, 2011 will forever be etched in our collective memory and forever serve as painful reminders that the enemies of freedom are many and our security often comes at a steep price—in dollars, lives and liberty. We no longer can assume our distant shores from foreign lands or having the greatest military force in the history of the world are enough to protect us. We now live with the reality terrorists are within our midst and they may look, sound and act like us, but they hate everything we are and the values we share. The balancing act between liberty and security has been tenuous throughout the history of our nation, founded upon basic freedoms granted by our Creator and protected from government infringement within the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. But a new element has been added to this equation over the past decade that threatens to undermine both our liberty and security—excessive government spending and insurmountable debt. We cannot secure liberty and guarantee security simply by spending more and more money in the name of security. Every dollar misspent in the name of security weakens our already precarious economic condition, indebts us to foreign nations, and shackles the future of our children and grandchildren. Our $16 trillion national debt has become the new red menace not only lurking in our midst, but created and sustained by shortsighted and irresponsible decisions made in Washington. We can only defend our freedoms by ensuring the dollars we spend on security are done so in a fiscally responsible manner, meet real needs, and respect the very rights we are aiming to preserve and protect. This report, Safety at Any Price, exposes misguided and wasteful spending in one of the largest terror-prevention grant programs at the Department of Homeland Security – the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI). We cannot assume that because the UASI program has an important mission and a large budget it is accomplishing its goals, however. Significant evidence suggests that the program is struggling to demonstrate how it is making U.S. cities less vulnerable to attack and more prepared if one were to occur—despite receiving $7.1 billion in federal funding since 2003. After ten years, a clear danger for the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) grant program is that it would be transformed from a risk-based program targeting security gaps into an entitlement program for states and cities. My office has conducted a year-long inquiry into the this grant program found that to wide of latitude is given to states and urban areas to determine the projects they will fund, and program parameters defining what constitute allowable expenses are extremely broad. Congress and DHS failed to establish metrics to measure how funds spent through the UASI program have made us safer or determine the right amount to dedicate to counterterrorism programs to mitigate the threat. While DHS recently established its first National Preparedness Goal, it has yet to develop a robust assessment of the nation’s current preparedness capabilities or defined performance metrics to assess the effectiveness of federal expenditures made to date. If in the days after 9/11 lawmakers were able to cast their gaze forward ten years, I imagine they would be surprised to see how a counter-terrorism initiative aimed at protecting our largest cities has transformed into another parochial grant program. We would have been frustrated to learn that limited federal resources were now subsidizing the purchase of low-priority items like an armored vehicles to protect festivals in rural New Hampshire, procure an underwater robot in Ohio and to pay for first responder attendance at a five-day spa junket that featured a display of tactical prowess in the face of a “zombie apocalypse.” As we mark the tenth anniversary of the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the time has come for Congress to reconsider DHS’s mission and approach to counterterrorism. We must be honest with the American people that we cannot make every community around the country invulnerable to terrorist attacks by writing large checks from Washington, D.C. Not only is this an unrealistic goal, but it also undermines the very purpose of our efforts. By letting every level of government – federal, State and local – do the things each does best, we can secure our cities and our freedoms. Confusing these roles, as we have done with UASI, leads to waste, inefficiency and a false sense of security. We must rededicate ourselves to ensuring that every dollar the federal government spends on terrorism prevention programs is spent wisely, yielding the largest improvement in security and best return on investment for your tax dollars. Facing a $16 trillion national debt, Congress needs to have a conversation about what we can afford to spend on the Department of Homeland Security’s terrorism prevention programs and where to spend it. The American people recognize and understand the limits we face. They understand that we should never sacrifice all of our freedoms in the name of security. We similarly cannot mortgage our children and grandchildren’s future by funding unnecessary and ineffective programs, even including those that have important missions. Details: Washington, DC: Office of U.S. Senator Tom Coburn; Member, Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, 2012. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 13, 2012 at http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public//index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=b86fdaeb-86ff-4d19-a112-415ec85aa9b6 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public//index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=b86fdaeb-86ff-4d19-a112-415ec85aa9b6 Shelf Number: 127209 Keywords: Costs of Criminal JusticeCounterterrorismCrime PreventionHomeland SecuritySecurity |
Author: Rush, Mathew C. Title: Violent Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations in Texas: Political Discourse and an Argument for Reality Summary: In 2006, Mexico President Felipe Calderon, with U.S. assistance, launched a military campaign to combat Violent Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations in attempt to disrupt the growing violence throughout Mexico. The result has been an uncontrollable drug war that has claimed more lives within Mexico than the U.S. campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq combined. From the U.S. perspective, the threat of spillover violence emanating from Mexico is a wicked problem and one that polarizes the political discourse. Conflicting opinions about the meaning of spillover violence has driven misrepresentation of events and evidence that fuel the political narrative. Therefore, no metric for analysis can be put in place to accurately document and monitor the threat to the U.S. homeland. The term spillover violence, instead, has become the focal point. This research seeks to find a broader framework outside of political agendas that provides analysis in a systematic manner rather than focusing on semantics. This research identifies gaps in the understanding of how spillover violence is defined and captured within the current construct; examines current criminal metrics used to classify and report violent crime statistics; and evaluates the scope of Texas border operations dedicated toward violent crime crossing the Southwestern border. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. 153p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed February 5, 2013 at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA567362 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA567362 Shelf Number: 127478 Keywords: Criminal CartelsDrug TraffickingHomeland SecurityOrganized CrimeViolent Crime (Texas, U.S.) |
Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat Summary: This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. For this report, “homegrown” describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph. The term “violent jihadist” characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity. The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism and describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. Appendix A provides details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013. 141p. Source: Internet Resource: R41416: Accessed February 22, 2013 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf Shelf Number: 127702 Keywords: Extremist GroupsHomegrown TerroristsHomeland SecurityJihadist TerrorismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism (U.S.)TerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Biasotti, Michael C. Title: Management of the Severely Mentally Ill and its Effects on Homeland Security Summary: As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, law enforcement agencies nationwide have been assigned a plethora of terrorism prevention and recovery related duties. Many federal documents outline and emphasize duties and responsibilities pertaining to local law enforcement. The prevention of acts of terrorism within communities has become a focal point of patrol activities for state and local police agencies. Simultaneously, local law enforcement is dealing with the unintended consequences of a policy change that in effect removed the daily care of our nation’s severely mentally ill population from the medical community and placed it with the criminal justice system. This policy change has caused a spike in the frequency of arrests of severely mentally ill persons, prison and jail population and the homeless population. A nationwide survey of 2,406 senior law enforcement officials conducted within this paper indicates that the deinstitutionalization of the severely mentally ill population has become a major consumer of law enforcement resources nationwide. This paper argues that highly cost-effective policy recommendations exist that would assist in correcting the current situation, which is needlessly draining law enforcement resources nationwide, thereby allowing sorely needed resources to be directed toward this nation’s homeland security concerns. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2011. 155p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed March 5, 2013 at: http://www.nychiefs.org/media/Mgmt_Severely_Mentally_Ill_Homeland_Security_Biasotti.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.nychiefs.org/media/Mgmt_Severely_Mentally_Ill_Homeland_Security_Biasotti.pdf Shelf Number: 127828 Keywords: Homeland SecurityHomelessnessLaw Enforcement ResourcesMental Health ServicesMental Illness (U.S.)Mentally Ill Offenders |
Author: Berkebile, Richard E. Title: Causes of Domestic Terrorism: 1970-2010 Summary: Contrary to conventional wisdom, the structural determinants of transnational and domestic terrorism are not necessarily synonymous. A domestic terrorism event population was derived by applying definitional criteria to the University of Maryland's Global Terrorism Database. Economic, political, systemic, and social structural determinants were tested with a negative binomial regression on 194 states between 1970 and 2010. Results suggested an inverse U relationship between wealth and the incidence of terrorism. Interestingly, short term economic growth had the opposite effect. It depressed terrorism. Political regimes were categorized into three different types - autocracies, anocracies, or democracies. Autocracies were the least susceptible to terrorism. Anocracy was the regime type most conducive to terrorism. Democratic regimes occupied the middle space. They suffered more terrorism than dictatorships but less than anocratic regimes. Cold War bipolarity systemically encouraged terrorism compared to the unipolarity of the post-Cold War era, suggesting superpower rivalry manifested in more terrorist violence. Social tension effects varied depending on type. Linguistic fractionalization increased the incidence of violence. Paradoxically, ethnic fractionalization impeded terrorism. Religious fractionalization had little impact on terrorism. Among control variables, population and a history of terrorism were directly related to terrorism. Mountain terrain and urbanization were not significantly related to it. Details: Columbia, MO: University of Missouri-Columbia, 2012. 191p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed March 5, 2013 at: https://mospace.umsystem.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10355/16521/research.pdf?sequence=2 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: https://mospace.umsystem.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10355/16521/research.pdf?sequence=2 Shelf Number: 127851 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism (U.S.)Homeland SecurityRadical GroupsRadicalizationSocioeconomic Variables |
Author: National Research Council: Carriquiry, Alicia Title: Options for Estimating Illegal Entries at the U.S.-Mexico Border Summary: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for securing and managing the nation’s borders. Over the past decade, DHS has dramatically stepped up its enforcement efforts at the U.S.–Mexico border, increasing the number of U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) agents, expanding the deployment of technological assets, and implementing a variety of “consequence programs” intended to deter illegal immigration. During this same period, there has also been a sharp decline in the number of unauthorized migrants apprehended at the border. Trends in total apprehensions do not, however, by themselves speak to the effectiveness of DHS’s investments in immigration enforcement. In particular, to evaluate whether heightened enforcement efforts have contributed to reducing the flow of undocumented migrants, it is critical to estimate the number of border-crossing attempts during the same period for which apprehensions data are available. With these issues in mind, DHS charged the National Research Council (NRC) with providing guidance on the use of surveys and other methodologies to estimate the number of unauthorized crossings at the U.S.–Mexico border, preferably by geographic region and on a quarterly basis. The NRC appointed the Panel on Survey Options for Estimating the Flow of Unauthorized Crossings at the U.S.–Mexican Border to carry out this task. A better understanding of the magnitude, timing, and location of these flows will help DHS to better evaluate the effectiveness of its enforcement efforts and to more efficiently allocate its resources along the border. This study focuses on Mexican migrants since Mexican nationals account for the vast majority (around 90 percent) of attempted unauthorized border crossings across the U.S.–Mexico border. A discussion of the use of surveys and statistical methods to measure unauthorized border flows needs to be set in the context of border enforcement and the migration process, both current and past. The migration process is highly complex, and it is influenced by a variety of factors such as the economic, social, and environmental conditions in sending and destination areas; immigration policies; and interior and border enforcement. Furthermore, migrants and their smugglers have adapted, and can continue to adapt, to changes in resources and strategies on the U.S. side of the border, and enforcement efforts in one geographic area can have spillover effects into another. This situation argues for a broader conception of the border, not segmented into ports of entry and sectors between the ports of entry. The migration process is also dynamic and evolving, and survey designs and modeling approaches that may be well suited for capturing certain aspects of migration flows today may not be able to do so with the same reliability in the future. Thus, flexibility of design and continuous evaluation of how DHS is implementing border metrics will be of the utmost relevance. Within this context, one can assess the usefulness of different types of data to capture information on migration flows. There are a number of major surveys in the United States and Mexico that collect some information about migration and border crossing. On the U.S. side, the American Community Survey (ACS) and Current Population Survey (CPS) each target U.S. households. On the Mexican side, the “long questionnaire” of the Mexican Census of Housing and Population (administered to a 10 percent sample of the population in Mexico), the National Survey of Occupation and Employment (ENOE), the National Survey of Population Dynamics (ENADID), and the longitudinal Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) target households at a national level. None of these surveys was specifically designed to study migration. The Mexican Migration Project (MMP) and Mexican Migration Field Research Program (MMFRP), in contrast, focus on studying migration, although the surveys are not based on probability sampling. The Survey of Migration at the Northern Border (EMIF-N), which has a probability sample conceptual basis, targets migrants passing through northern border cities of Mexico. Details: Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2013. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 18, 2013 at: http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13498 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=13498 Shelf Number: 128011 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityHomeland SecurityIllegal AliensIllegal ImmigrantsImmigration (U.S.) |
Author: Mawdsley, Jocelyn Title: A European Agenda for Security Technology: From Innovation Policy to Export Controls Summary: The development and production of scanners, unmanned aircraft, cameras, coding, firewalls etc., are heavily promoted at the European level. These technologies are important for our security and they are an incentive for a new economic market. However, we have to ensure security technology doesn't become a weapon against human rights. Security first -- Attention to security has become an unprecedented priority ever since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. More than ever, citizens are made aware of the security risks in every aspect of our society and have become accustomed to various controls. Politicians emphasize the importance of 'homeland security', which must be defended on our own territory as well as elsewhere in the world. An industrial security industry, which taps into these new markets, has emerged alongside the traditional defence industry. This has to do with research, development and production for information technology, navigation, biometry, communication equipment, electronic identification, etc. In this regard, frequent use is made of generic civil technologies from, for instance, the world of communication and information technology. The 'civil' industries, but also the traditional defence industries, are active on the security market. European Commission explores new economic market -- Following the lead of the US, the European Union is also focusing on greater collaboration to reinforce internal security. Combating terrorism, attacks to critical infrastructure, cyber crime or guarding external European borders are among the policy areas that the EU takes to heart. Greater security is, however, not the only motive of the EU: in its report, the Flemish Peace Institute demonstrates how the European Commission seizes upon this area in order to develop a new economic market. A great deal of attention and resources are being dedicated to research in the security industry: 1.4 billion euros in the five past years. In this way, the European Commission is also specializing in research and development for security and defence, a domain which has traditionally been controlled by the Member States themselves. Exports in order to make the European security industry profitable -- The European Commission stimulates the supply, but the European demand (still a matter for the Member States) is not following. Member States are not totally convinced that these security technologies are a universal remedy against security threats. Moreover, European agencies have a smaller budget due to the economic crisis. Thus, according to the Commission, external markets are required in order to keep the European security industry profitable. This economically oriented attitude of the European Commission does not take into account the strategic and ethical aspects of the common foreign and security policy which the Member States within the EU are developing. Human rights on the radar -- The risks of the growing technological security apparatus with respect to privacy and respect for human rights in our own society, have often been pointed out. In the search for new markets, however, these risks are also exported outside the EU. Recently, during the Arab Spring, it became clear that security technologies are not only used to guarantee the security of civilians, but also for repression and human rights violations. European deep packet inspection technologies were used to filter the information available to citizens on the internet, while surveillance technologies were used to track and capture activists through social media use. Details: Brussela: Flemish Peace Institute, 2013. 94p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 22, 2013 at: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/images/manager/publicaties/onderzoeksrapporten/pdf/a%20european%20agenda%20for%20security%20technology_report.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/images/manager/publicaties/onderzoeksrapporten/pdf/a%20european%20agenda%20for%20security%20technology_report.pdf Shelf Number: 128083 Keywords: Border SecurityHomeland SecuritySecurity IndustrySecurity TechnologyTechnology and Crime (Europe) |
Author: Olson, Eric L. Title: The State of Security in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region Summary: Concerns about global terrorism, potential threats posed by those entering the United States illegally, and fears that skyrocketing violence in Mexico might spillover into the United States have led to dramatic policy shifts and significant efforts to secure the border. Without a doubt, the U.S. and Mexican federal governments have made large investments in staffing, infrastructure and technology and have reorganized and refocused efforts to respond to specific threats and events. Yet gains in areas such as apprehensions of undocumented migrants and reductions in violence in key cities such as Ciudad Juarez seem tenuous at best and beg for more comprehensive, creative and collaborative solutions between these two countries, one a superpower and the other a key emerging power. Details: Washington, DC: . Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Mexico Institute, 2012. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Working Paper Series on the State of the U.S.-Mexico Border: Accessed April 4, 2013 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/State_of_Border_Security_Olson_Lee.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/State_of_Border_Security_Olson_Lee.pdf Shelf Number: 128206 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder Security (U.S., Mexico)Homeland SecurityIllegal Immigration |
Author: Smith, David Michael Title: Immigrants and Counterterrorism Policy: A comparative study of the United States and Britain Summary: This project examines the political mechanisms through which foreign nationals are perceived as security threats and, as a consequence, disproportionately targeted by counterterrorism policies. Evidence suggests that domestic security strategies that unduly discriminate against non-citizens or national minorities are counterproductive; such strategies lead to a loss of state legitimacy, they complicate the gathering of intelligence, and they serve as a potential source of radicalization. At the same time, discriminatory counterterrorism policies represent a significant break from liberal democratic ideals by legitimizing unfair treatment of targeted groups. If discriminatory counterterrorism policies are counterproductive and undemocratic, why do policymakers support such strategies in the first place? By what means do these types of policies and related administrative measures gain traction in the political system? How do these measures operate in practice, and what accounts for variations in their implementation over time? To answer these questions, a policy process model is used that distinguishes between the problem definition and agenda setting, policy formulation and legitimation, and policy implementation phases of policymaking. The American government’s handling of the First Red Scare (1919-1920), the American response to 9/11, and the British response to 9/11 are examined to provide a comparative perspective on these issues. Policy outputs across these three cases were remarkably similar. The rights of noncitizens were curtailed to a much greater extent than were the rights of citizens. These similarities are attributed to the ways in which notions of national identity influence problem definition and policy legitimation. In particular, concepts that were prevalent in nationalist narratives about the Other were incorporated into dominant policy narratives about terrorism. The nationalist Other became indistinguishable from the terrorist Other, thereby contributing to the translation of group-neutral policies into a group-specific practice of counterterrorism. The greatest variation, within and between cases, was observed in the implementation of counterterrorism policy. Each instance of implementation represented a unique trajectory, and both American cases displayed a much more vigorous and public set of counterterrorism activities than the British case. These differences are traced to variations in other institutional (domestic and international) and political variables that were found to be influential in each case. Details: Boston: Northeastern University, Department of Political Science, 2013. 263p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed May 22, 2013 at: http://iris.lib.neu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=polisci_diss Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://iris.lib.neu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=polisci_diss Shelf Number: 128779 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismDomestic SecurityHomeland SecurityImmigrants (U.S. and U.K.)TerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Krouse, William J. Title: Terrorist Watch List Screening and Background Checks for Firearms Summary: The November 2009 shooting at Fort Hood, TX, renewed interest in terrorist watchlist screening and background checks for firearms through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). Pursuant to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (P.L. 103-159), in November 1998 the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) activated NICS for the purposes of determining an individual’s firearms transfer and possession eligibility whenever a private person seeks to acquire a firearm from a federally licensed gun dealer. Prior to February 2004, however, the FBI did not conduct terrorist watchlist queries as part of firearms background checks because being a known or suspected terrorist was not a disqualifying factor for firearms transfer and possession eligibility; nor is it today under current law. Similarly, the April 15, 2013, Boston Marathon bombing could generate renewed interest in terrorist watchlist screening, because at least one of the alleged perpetrators was possibly entered into the National Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC’s) Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE). As a consequence, he was possibly watch-listed in the FBI-led Terrorist Screening Center’s Terrorist Screening Database—the U.S. government’s master watchlist of known and suspected terrorists. In addition, on April 18, 2013, both alleged perpetrators—Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev—are further alleged to have shot and killed a police officer, high-jacked an automobile and taken its owner hostage at gunpoint, and engaged in a subsequent shootout with police. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) is tracing a pistol recovered at the scene of the shootout. If the watch-listed brother, Tamerlan, had acquired the pistol from a federally licensed gun dealer, it might have generated a terrorist watchlist hit through NICS. Critics could argue that watchlist hits through NICS, or border and aviation security screening systems, might have prompted federal investigators to scrutinize Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s travels and activities more closely prior to the bombing. As described in this report, moreover, a NICS-generated watchlist match might have prevented him from acquiring the pistol. Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the U.S. government reevaluated its terrorist screening procedures. As part of this process, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and FBI modified the Brady background check procedures and recalibrated NICS to query an additional file in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) that included terrorist watchlist records. Since February 2004, information related to the subjects of NICS-generated terrorist watchlist matches have been passed on to the FBI Counterterrorism Division and special agents in the field, who are usually members of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). These FBI agents, in turn, verify the match between the individual and the watchlist record, and they check for information that would prohibit that individual, the prospective transferee, licensee, or permittee, from possessing firearms or explosives (e.g., illegal immigration or fugitive status). While the modified NICS procedures initially generated little public opposition, those procedures called three possible issues into question. One, should terrorist watchlist checks be incorporated statutorily into the firearms- and explosives-related background check processes? Two, given certain statutory prohibitions related to prohibiting a firearms registry, should approved firearm transfer records be maintained on a temporary basis to determine whether persons of interest in counterterrorism investigations have obtained firearms? Three, should the Attorney General be granted authority to deny a firearms transfer based solely on a terrorist watchlist match? Since the 109th Congress, several related legislative proposals have been introduced. Several of those bills would have addressed the retention of firearms-related transfer records. Another proposal would have prohibited persons watch-listed as terrorists for aviation security purposes on the “No Fly” list from firearms transfer or possession eligibility. In the 110th Congress, Senator Frank Lautenberg and Representative Peter King introduced a bill based on a legislative proposal developed by DOJ that would have authorized the Attorney General to deny the transfer of firearms or the issuance of firearms (and explosives) licenses/permits to “dangerous terrorists” (S. 1237/H.R. 2074). In the 111th Congress, they reintroduced this bill (S. 1317/H.R. 2159), which supporters dubbed the “Terror Gap” proposal. In the 112th Congress, they introduced similar bills (S. 34 and H.R. 1506). And, in the 113th Congress they reintroduced their bills (S. 34 and H.R. 720) once more. When the Senate considered the Safe Communities, Safe Schools Act of 2013 (S. 649) in April 2013, Senator Lautenberg also filed an amendment (S.Amdt. 734) to that bill, which is nearly identical to S. 34. While the Senate leadership set S. 649 aside, if the Senate reconsiders this bill, it might also consider S.Amdt. 734. In addition, Representative James Moran has included similar provisions in the NRA Members’ Gun Safety Act of 2013 (H.R. 21). The Terror Gap proposal raises several potential issues for Congress. One, should the Attorney General notify watch-listed individuals who have been deemed to be “dangerous terrorists” for the purposes of gun control? Two, what form of redress and/or remedy would be provided to individuals wrongfully denied a firearm transfer because they were misidentified, or improperly watch-listed, and then deemed to be a “dangerous terrorist”? Three, if enacted, would such a law draw unwanted attention to related terrorist screening procedures, possibly undermining the effectiveness of these procedures by making terrorists and other adversaries aware of them, and possibly setting a judicial review precedent for other terrorist watchlist screening processes? Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: R42336: Accessed May 30, 2013 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=736360 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=736360 Shelf Number: 128858 Keywords: Background ChecksFirearmsHomeland SecurityTerrorismTerrorists (U.S.) |
Author: Heyman, Josiah McC. Title: Guns, Drugs, and Money: Tackling the Real Threats to Border Security Summary: The external borders of the United States matter to security, but how and in what ways is neither automatic nor obvious. The current assumption is that borders defend the national interior against all harms, which are understood as consistently coming from outside—and that security is always obtained in the same way, whatever the issue. Some security policies correctly use borders as tools to increase safety, but border policy does not protect us from all harms. The 9/11 terrorists came through airports with visas, thus crossing a border inspection system without being stopped. They did not cross the U.S.-Mexico border. Future terrorists would not necessarily cross a land border. U.S. citizens and residents, and nationals of Western Europe, also represent an important element of the terrorist threat, and they have unimpeded or easy passage through U.S. borders. Fortified borders cannot protect us from all security threats or sources of harm. Moreover, not all border crossers pose security concerns, even ones who violate national laws. The hundreds of thousands of unauthorized migrants who cross the U.S.-Mexico border each year have not posed a threat of political terrorism, and external terrorists have not traveled through this border. Enforcement of laws against unauthorized immigration is, in the vast majority of cases, a resource- and attention-wasting distraction from sensible national security measures. That does not mean the U.S.-Mexico border is free from risk of harm, such as increasingly violent drug trafficking organizations operating nearby in Mexico. But that issue needs to be addressed in different ways than current enforcement policy does. Details: Washington, DC: Immigration Policy Center, American Immigration Council, 2011. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 1, 2013 at: http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives/guns-drugs-and-money-tackling-real-threats-border-security Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/perspectives/guns-drugs-and-money-tackling-real-threats-border-security Shelf Number: 128897 Keywords: Border Security (Mexico, U.S.)Drug TraffickingHomeland SecurityIllegal ImmigrantsTerrorism |
Author: Schwan, Michael J. Title: Border Cracks: Approaching Border Security from a Complexity Theory and Systems Perspective Summary: Presently, U.S. border security endeavors are compartmentalized, fragmented, and poorly coordinated. Moreover, international collaborations are extremely limited; success hinges on effective international cooperation. This thesis addresses U.S. border security management using complexity theory and a systems approach, incorporating both borders and all associated border security institutions simultaneously. Border security research has rarely viewed all stakeholders as a holistic unit up to this point, nor has border security been thoroughly examined using a systems approach. This research scrutinizes the current U.S. border security paradigm in an attempt to determine the systemic reasons why the system is ineffective in securing U.S. borders. Additionally, the research investigates the current level of international cooperation between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. This thesis increases awareness and will possibly create dissent among established agencies, which is the first step in instituting needed changes that will ultimately increase North American security. The thesis contends that the establishment of a tri-national— United States, Canadian, and Mexican—border security agency, in addition to legalizing drugs and reestablishing a guest worker program, will be more effective and costefficient in securing North American borders. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2012. 153p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed June 1, 2013 at: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=732181 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=732181 Shelf Number: 128908 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingHomeland SecurityIllegal Immigration |
Author: Perliger, Arie Title: Challengers from the Sidelines: Understanding America’s Violent Far-Right Summary: In the last few years, and especially since 2007, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of attacks and violent plots originating from individuals and groups who self-identify with the far-right of American politics. These incidents cause many to wonder whether these are isolated attacks, an increasing trend, part of increasing societal violence, or attributable to some other condition. To date, however, there has been limited systematic documentation and analysis of incidents of American domestic violence. This study provides a conceptual foundation for understanding different far-right groups and then presents the empirical analysis of violent incidents to identify those perpetrating attacks and their associated trends. Through a comprehensive look at the data, this study addresses three core questions: (1) What are the main current characteristics of the violence produced by the far right? (2) What type of far-right groups are more prone than others to engage in violence? How are characteristics of particular far-right groups correlated with their tendency to engage in violence? (3) What are the social and political factors associated with the level of far-right violence? Are there political or social conditions that foster or discourage violence? It is important to note that this study concentrates on those individuals and groups who have actually perpetuated violence and is not a comprehensive analysis of the political causes with which some far-right extremists identify. While the ability to hold and appropriately articulate diverse political views is an American strength, extremists committing acts of violence in the name of those causes undermine the freedoms that they purport to espouse. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2013. 147p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2013 at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/challengers-from-the-sidelines-understanding-americas-violent-far-right Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/challengers-from-the-sidelines-understanding-americas-violent-far-right Shelf Number: 129588 Keywords: Domestic TerrorismExtremist GroupsHomeland SecurityRadical GroupsTerrorism (U.S.)Terrorist GroupsViolent Extremism |
Author: Southern Poverty Law Center Title: Terror From the Right: Plots, Conspiracies and Racist Rampages Since Oklahoma City Summary: At 9:02 a.m. on April 19, 1995, a 7,000-pound truck bomb, constructed of ammonium nitrate fertilizer and nitromethane racing fuel and packed into 13 plastic barrels, ripped through the heart of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. The explosion wrecked much of downtown Oklahoma City and killed 168 people, including 19 children in a day-care center. Another 500 were injured. Although many Americans initially suspected an attack by Middle Eastern radicals, it quickly became clear that the mass murder had actually been carried out by domestic, right-wing terrorists. The slaughter engineered by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, men steeped in the conspiracy theories and white-hot fury of the American radical right, marked the opening shot in a new kind of domestic political extremism — a revolutionary ideology whose practitioners do not hesitate to carry out attacks directed at entirely innocent victims, people selected essentially at random to make a political point. After Oklahoma, it was no longer sufficient for many American right-wing terrorists to strike at a target of political significance — instead, they reached for higher and higher body counts, reasoning that they had to eclipse McVeigh’s attack to win attention. What follows is a detailed listing of major terrorist plots and racist rampages that have emerged from the American radical right in the years since Oklahoma City. These have included plans to bomb government buildings, banks, refineries, utilities, clinics, synagogues, mosques, memorials and bridges; to assassinate police officers, judges, politicians, civil rights figures and others; to rob banks, armored cars and other criminals; and to amass illegal machine guns, missiles, explosives and biological and chemical weapons. Each of these plots aimed to make changes in America through the use of political violence. Most contemplated the deaths of large numbers of people — in one case, as many as 30,000, or 10 times the number murdered on Sept. 11, 2001. Details: Montgomery AL: Southern Poverty Law Center, 2012. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2013 at: http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/publication/terror_from_the_right_2012_web_0.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/publication/terror_from_the_right_2012_web_0.pdf Shelf Number: 129598 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism (U.S.)Extremist GroupsHomeland SecurityRadical GroupsTerrorists |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Strengthen Collaborative Mechanisms along the Southwest Border Summary: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has coordinated border security efforts using collaborative mechanisms in Arizona and South Texas, specifically (1) the Joint Field Command (JFC), which has operational control over all U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) resources in Arizona; (2) the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT), which is a multiagency law enforcement partnership in Arizona; and (3) the South Texas Campaign (STC), which integrates CBP resources and facilitates coordination with other homeland security partner agencies. Through these collaborative mechanisms, DHS and CBP have coordinated border security efforts in (1) information sharing, (2) resource targeting and prioritization, and (3) leveraging of assets. For example, to coordinate information sharing, the JFC maintains an operations coordination center and clearinghouse for intelligence information. Through the ACTT, interagency partners work jointly to target individuals and criminal organizations involved in illegal cross-border activity. The STC leverages assets of CBP components and interagency partners by shifting resources to high-threat regions and conducting joint operations. DHS and CBP have established performance measures and reporting processes for the JFC and ACTT in Arizona and the STC in South Texas; however, opportunities exist to strengthen these collaborative mechanisms by assessing results across the efforts and establishing written agreements. Each collaborative mechanism reports on its results to DHS or CBP leadership through a variety of means, such as accomplishment reports and after-action reports. However, CBP has not assessed the JFC and STC mechanisms to evaluate results across the mechanisms. JFC and STC components GAO interviewed identified challenges with managing resources and sharing best practices across the mechanisms. For example, officials from all five JFC components GAO interviewed highlighted resource management challenges, such as inefficiencies in staff conducting dual reporting on operations to CBP leadership. Best practices for interagency collaboration call for federal agencies engaged in collaborative efforts to create the means to monitor and evaluate their efforts to enable them to identify areas for improvement. An assessment of the JFC and STC could provide CBP with information to better address challenges the mechanisms have faced. In addition, DHS has not established written agreements with partners in the ACTT and STC Unified Command - the entity within STC used for coordinating activities among federal and state agencies - consistent with best practices for sustaining effective collaboration. Officials from 11 of 12 partner agencies GAO interviewed reported coordination challenges related to the ACTT and STC Unified Command, such as limited resource commitments by participating agencies and lack of common objectives. For example, a partner with the ACTT noted that that there have been operations in which partners did not follow through with the resources they had committed during the planning stages. Establishing written agreements could help DHS address coordination challenges, such as limited resource commitments and lack of common objectives. GAO recommends that CBP assess the JFC and STC, and that DHS, among other things, establish written agreements with ACTT and the STC Unified Command partners. DHS concurred with the recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2014. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 30, 2014 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664479.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664479.pdf Shelf Number: 132572 Keywords: Border SecurityHomeland SecurityPartnerships |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Coast Guard: Resource Provided for Drug Interdiction Operations in the Transit Zone, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands Summary: The Coast Guard provided varying levels of resources for drug interdiction operations in the transit zonethe area from South America through the Caribbean Sea and the eastern Pacific Ocean that is used to transport illicit drugs to the United Statesduring fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and generally did not meet its performance targets for several reasons. As the figure shows, Coast Guard resources included vessels (cutters), aircraft, and law enforcement detachments. The number of cutter days, aircraft hours, and law enforcement detachment days the Coast Guard provided for drug interdiction operations in the transit zone varied during fiscal years 2009 through 2012, and then sharply declined in fiscal year 2013. For example, in fiscal year 2012, the Coast Guard provided 1,947 cutter days for transit zone operations and in fiscal year 2013 the Coast Guard provided 1,346 daysa 30 percent decline. During fiscal years 2009 through 2013, the Coast Guard met targets for its primary drug interdiction mission performance measurethe removal rate of cocaine from noncommercial vessels in the transit zoneonce, in fiscal year 2013. Coast Guard officials cited the declining readiness of its aging vessels, delays in the delivery of replacement vessels, and sequestration as factors affecting Coast Guard resource deployments and the ability to meet its drug interdiction mission performance targets. In support of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) effort to address the increased violent crime associated with illicit drug smuggling into Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Coast Guard has increased vessel and aircraft operations for drug interdiction efforts in these territories by reallocating resources from elsewhere in the Coast Guard. According to Coast Guard officials, these additional resources are drawn from other missions, such as alien migrant interdiction. Beginning in September 2012, the Coast Guard implemented a surge operation to provide additional vessels and aircraft to regularly patrol Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. According to Coast Guard officials, the increased vessel and aircraft deployments have since become the new baseline level of resources to be provided for drug interdiction operations there. According to Coast Guard data, the number of vessel hours spent conducting drug interdiction operations in these territories more than tripled from fiscal years 2009 through 2013. Similarly, the number of maritime patrol aircraft hours spent conducting drug interdiction operations in the territories increasedfrom about 150 flight hours in fiscal year 2011 to about 1,000 hours in fiscal year 2013. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2014. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-14-527: Accessed July 7, 2014 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664098.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664098.pdf Shelf Number: 132631 Keywords: Border SecurityCoast GuardDrug EnforcementDrug TraffickingHomeland SecurityMaritime CrimeMaritime Security |
Author: Jenkins, Brian Michael Title: Identifying Enemies Among Us: Evolving Terrorist Threats and the Continuing Challenges of Domestic Intelligence Collection and Information Sharing Summary: This report summarizes the discussions at a seminar organized and hosted by the RAND Corporation at which a group of acting and former senior government and law enforcement officials, practitioners, and experts examined domestic intelligence operations and information sharing as these relate to terrorist threats. The collective experience of the participants spanned the breadth of the homeland security apparatus. The participants included officials who have served or are serving in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of Defense (DoD), state and local law enforcement agencies, first-responder organizations, and state-level homeland security agencies. A similar group met three years ago to discuss lessons learned from avoiding terrorist attacks at home, the role of DHS's Bureau of Intelligence and Analysis, and the value and focus of fusion centers. One of the goals of the meeting reported here was to measure how much progress was being made (or not made, as the case may be) in several critical areas of homeland security. The seminar was conducted within RAND's continuing program of self-initiated research. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 14, 2014 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF300/CF317/RAND_CF317.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF300/CF317/RAND_CF317.pdf Shelf Number: 111284 Keywords: Domestic TerrorismHomeland SecurityIntelligence GatheringTerrorism |
Author: Strom, Kevin Title: Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in Detecting U.S. Terrorist Plots, 1999-2009 Summary: Since 2001, the intelligence community has sought methods to improve the process for uncovering and thwarting domestic terrorist plots before they occur. Vital to these efforts are the more than 17,000 state and local U.S. law enforcement agencies whose role in the counterterrorism process has become increasingly recognized. As part of an on-going study for the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (IHSS), this report examines open-source material on 86 foiled and executed terrorist plots against U.S. targets from 1999 to 2009 to determine the types of information and activities that led to (or could have led to) their discovery. Our findings provide law enforcement, homeland security officials, and policy makers with an improved understanding of the types of clues and methods that should be emphasized to more reliably prevent terrorist attacks, including the need to: -Recognize the importance of law enforcement and public vigilance in thwarting terror attacks. More than 80% of foiled terrorist plots were discovered via observations from law enforcement or the general public. Tips included reports of plots as well as reports of suspicious activity, such as pre-operational surveillance, para-military training, smuggling activities, and the discovery of suspicious documents. - Continue to investigate Al Qaeda and Allied Movements (AQAM), but do not overlook other groups, and pay particular attention to plots by "lone wolves." Less than half of U.S. terror plots examined had links to AQAM, and many non-AQAM plots, primarily those with white supremacist or anti-government/militia ties, rivaled AQAM plots in important ways. Additionally, plots by single actors ("lone wolves") have proven particularly successful, reaching execution nearly twice as often as plots by groups. - Ensure processes and training are in place that enable law enforcement personnel to identify terrorist activity during routine criminal investigations. Almost one in five plots were foiled "accidentally" during investigations into seemingly unrelated crimes. Training is needed to recognize when ordinary crimes may be connected to terrorism. - Work to establish good relations with local communities and avoid tactics that might alienate them. Approximately 40% of plots were thwarted as a result of tips from the public and informants. Establishing trust with persons in or near radical movements is jeopardized by tactics such as racial, ethnic, religious, or ideological profiling. - Support "quality assurance" processes to ensure initial clues are properly pursued and findings shared. Investigating leads and sharing information across agencies led to foiling the vast majority of terrorist plots in our sample. Similarly, breakdowns in these basic processes led to lost opportunities to thwart some of the worst attacks, including 9/11. - Expand the federal standards for categorizing suspicious activity reports (SARs). A large majority of the initial clue types we identified, including public and informant tips, as well as law enforcement observations made during routine criminal investigations, are only indirectly referenced in the current national SAR standards. Expanding them would enable more comprehensive reporting and greater information sharing of potential terrorist activity. Details: Research Triangle Park, NC: Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, 2010. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 17, 2014 at: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/Building_on_Clues_Strom.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/Building_on_Clues_Strom.pdf Shelf Number: 132707 Keywords: Counter-terrorismCriminal InvestigationsHomeland SecurityIntelligence GatheringTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Strom, Kevin Title: Building on Clues: Methods to Help State and Local Law Enforcement Detect and Characterize Terrorist Activitiy. Final Report Summary: For the past decade, members of the law enforcement and intelligence communities have been working to develop methods and processes to identify and thwart terrorist plots. As part of these efforts, state and local law enforcement agencies have been increasingly recognized as the "first-line preventers" of terrorism (Kelling & Bratton, 2006). The network of over 17,000 law enforcement agencies, including regional and state fusion centers, represents a resource that exponentially increases the United States' ability to identify, report, and analyze information that is potentially terrorist-related. However, these agencies also face ongoing challenges in this counterterrorism role. Perhaps the most pressing issue has been the lack of coordination and standardization of counterterrorism practices at the state and local levels. For example, in the absence of federal guidance, local jurisdictions have often developed different procedures for collecting and prioritizing suspicious activity reports (SARs) - reports of activities and behaviors potentially related to terrorism collected from incident reports, field interviews, 911 calls, and tips from the public. The lack of standardization has impeded the sharing and analysis of such information (Suspicious Activity Report Support and Implementation Project, 2008). Federal agencies such as the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of Defense (DOD), among others, have made it part of their mission to standardize this process. One of the first steps was the introduction of the Nationwide SAR Initiative (NSI), which created "a unified process for reporting, tracking, and accessing of SARs" (National Strategy for Information Sharing [NSIS], 2007, p. A1-7). This project, funded by the Institute for Homeland Security Solutions (IHSS), considered the collection and use of SARs at the state and local level. We assess how tips and clues generated from state and local sources have been used to prevent terrorist plots, assess the strengths and weaknesses of data sources from which SARs are often derived, and make recommendations for improving the collection, processing, and evaluation of tips and clues reported at the local level. The project was conducted in three phases. Phase I included an analysis of publicly-reported terrorist plots against U.S. targets from 1999 to 2009, including both foiled and executed plots, to determine what types of suspicious behaviors and means of reporting most frequently led to (or could have led to) their discovery and ultimate prevention (Strom et al., 2010). The report published from Phase I examined open-source material on 86 foiled and executed terrorist plots against U.S. targets. In Phase II, we conducted interviews with members of the law enforcement, fusion center, and intelligence communities to gain an improved understanding for how these agencies collect, process, and analyze SARs. In addition, we sought to gain more perspective on how these agencies could better use the information gathered and what challenges they face with respect to SARs. Phase III of the study assessed the primary data sources for SARs, the processes used to collect and analyze SARs, and approaches used to prioritize SARs. We also developed a set of recommendations that can be used by law enforcement and fusion center personnel to improve their practices of collecting, managing and prioritizing SARs. The work conducted across these phases resulted in a set of recommendations and conclusions, which we believe can improve the SAR process. Details: Research Triangle Park, NC: Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, 2011. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 18, 2014 at: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/IHSS_Building_on_Clue_Final_Report_FINAL_April-2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://sites.duke.edu/ihss/files/2011/12/IHSS_Building_on_Clue_Final_Report_FINAL_April-2011.pdf Shelf Number: 125754 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Criminal Investigations Fusion CentersHomeland Security Intelligence Gathering Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: Seghetti, Lisa Title: Border Security: Immigration Inspections at Port of Entry Summary: About 362 million travelers (citizens and non-citizens) entered the United States in FY2013, including about 102 million air passengers and crew, 18 million sea passengers and crew, and 242 million incoming land travelers. At the same time about 205,000 aliens were denied admission at ports of entry (POEs); and about 24,000 persons were arrested at POEs on criminal warrants. (Not all persons arrested are denied admission, including because some are U.S. citizens.) Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Office of Field Operations (OFO) is responsible for conducting immigration inspections at America's 329 POEs. CBP's primary immigration enforcement mission at ports of entry is to confirm that travelers are eligible to enter the United States and to exclude inadmissible aliens. Yet strict enforcement is in tension with a second core mission: to facilitate the flow of lawful travelers, who are the vast majority of persons seeking admission. A fundamental question for Congress and DHS is how to balance these competing concerns. In general, DHS and CBP rely on "risk management" to strike this balance. One part of the risk management strategy is to conduct screening at multiple points in the immigration process, beginning well before travelers arrive at U.S. POEs. DHS and other departments involved in the inspections process use a number of screening tools to distinguish between known, low-risk travelers and lesser-known, higher-risk travelers. Low-risk travelers may be eligible for expedited admissions processing, while higher-risk travelers are usually subject to more extensive secondary inspections. As part of its dual mission, and in support of its broader mandate to manage the U.S. immigration system, DHS also is responsible for implementing an electronic entry-exit system at POEs. Congress required DHS' predecessor to develop an entry-exit system beginning in 1996, but the implementation of a fully automated, biometric system has proven to be an elusive goal. The current system collects and stores biographic entry data (e.g., name, date of birth, travel history) from almost all non-citizens entering the United States, but only collects biometric data (e.g., fingerprints and digital photographs) from non-citizens entering at air or seaports, and from a subset of land travelers that excludes most Mexican and Canadian visitors. With respect to exit data, the current system relies on information sharing agreements with air and sea carriers and with Canada to collect biographic data from air and sea travelers and from certain non-citizens exiting through northern border land ports; but the system does not collect data from persons exiting by southern border land ports and does not collect any biometric exit data. Questions also have been raised about DHS' ability to use existing entry-exit data to identify and apprehend visa over-stayers. The inspections process and entry-exit system may raise a number of questions for Congress, including in the context of the ongoing debate about immigration reform. What is the scope of illegal migration through ports of entry, and how can Congress and DHS minimize illegal flows without unduly slowing legal travel? Congress may consider steps to enhance POE personnel and infrastructure and to expand trusted travel programs. Congress also may continue to seek the completion of the entry-exit system, a program that has been the subject of ongoing legislative activity since 1996, as summarized in the appendix to this report. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: R43356: Accessed July 31, 2014 at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43356.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43356.pdf Shelf Number: 132857 Keywords: Border Security (U.S.)Homeland SecurityIllegal ImmigrationImmigrationImmigration EnforcementRisk ManagementUndocumented Immigrants |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Risk-Informed Covert Assessments and Oversight of Corrective Actions Could Strengthen Capabilities at the Border Summary: The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) covert operations provide limited assessment of capabilities to detect and interdict the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials into the United States. DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Operational Field Testing Division (OFTD) conducted 144 covert operations at 86 locations from fiscal years 2006 through 2013, selecting its locations from a total of 655 U.S. air, land, and sea port facilities; checkpoints; and certain international locations. These operations allowed OFTD to assess capabilities for detecting and interdicting-or intercepting-nuclear and radiological materials at locations tested. Results showed differences in the rate of success for interdicting smuggled nuclear and radiological materials across facility types. CBP had a $1 million budget for covert operations of various activities-including nuclear and radiological testing-covering fiscal years 2009 through 2013, and DHS policy requires that components with limited resources make risk-informed decisions. However, CBP testing does not inform capabilities across all border locations, and CBP has not conducted a risk assessment that could inform and prioritize the locations, materials, and technologies to be tested through covert operations. Given limited resources, assessing risk to prioritize the most dangerous materials, most vulnerable locations, and most critical equipment for testing through covert operations, DHS could better inform its decisions on how to expend its limited resources effectively, consistent with the department's risk management policies. OFTD has not issued reports annually as planned on covert operation results and recommendations, limiting CBP oversight for improving capabilities to detect and interdict smuggling at the border. OFTD has issued three reports on the results of its covert operations at U.S. ports of entry since 2007. However, OFTD officials stated that because of resource constraints, reports have not been timely and do not include the results of covert tests conducted at checkpoints. Furthermore, OFTD tracks the status of corrective actions taken to address recommendations in these reports; however, CBP does not track corrective actions identified from their individual covert operations that were not included in these reports. Establishing appropriate time frames for reporting of covert operations results and addressing barriers to meeting these time frames would help enhance CBP's accountability for its covert testing operations. Further, developing a mechanism to track whether ports of entry and checkpoints have implemented corrective actions could help inform management decision making on the need for further investments in equipment or personnel training to protect U.S. borders. Why GAO Did This Study Preventing terrorists from smuggling nuclear or radiological materials into the United States is a top national priority. To address this threat, DHS has deployed radiation detection equipment and trained staff to use it. CBP conducts covert operations to test capabilities for detecting and interdicting nuclear and radiological materials at air, land, and sea ports of entry into the United States as well as checkpoints. GAO was asked to review CBP's covert testing operations. This report assesses the extent to which (1) CBP covert operations assess capabilities at air, land, and sea ports and checkpoints to detect and interdict nuclear and radiological material smuggled across the border and (2) CBP reports its covert operations results and provides oversight to ensure that corrective actions are implemented. GAO analyzed documents, such as test summaries, directives, and planning and guidance papers and interviewed DHS, CBP, and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office officials. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in July 2014. Information that DHS deemed sensitive has been redacted. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DHS inform priorities for covert operations by using an assessment of risk, determining time frames for reporting results, addressing barriers for meeting time frames, and developing a mechanism to track corrective actions. DHS concurred with GAO's recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2014. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-14-826: Accessed October 15, 2014 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665998.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/665998.pdf Shelf Number: 133922 Keywords: Border SecurityHomeland SEcurityNuclear Smuggling (U.S.)Terrorism |
Author: Cole, Jared P. Title: Terrorist Databases and the No Fly List: Procedural Due Process and Hurdles to Litigation Summary: In order to protect national security, the government maintains various terrorist watchlists, including the "No Fly" list, which contains the names of individuals to be denied boarding on commercial airline flights. Travelers on the No Fly list are not permitted to board an American airline or any flight on a foreign air carrier that lands or departs from U.S. territory or flies over U.S. airspace. Some persons have claimed that their alleged placement on the list was the result of an erroneous determination by the government that they posed a national security threat. In some cases, it has been reported that persons have been prevented from boarding an aircraft because they were mistakenly believed to be on the No Fly list, sometimes on account of having a name similar to another person who was actually on the list. As a result, various legal challenges to placement on the list have been brought in court. The Due Process Clause provides that no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Accordingly, when a person has been deprived of a constitutionally protected liberty interest, the government must follow certain procedures. Several courts have found that placement on the No Fly list may impair constitutionally protected interests, including the right to travel internationally, and the government's redress procedures must therefore satisfy due process. Typically, due process requires that the government provide a person with notice of the deprivation and an opportunity to be heard before a neutral party. However, the requirements of due process are not fixed, and can vary according to relevant factors. When determining the proper procedural protections in a given situation, courts employ the balancing test articulated by the Supreme Court in Matthews v. Eldridge, which weighs the private interests affected against the government's interest. Courts applying this balancing test might consider several factors, including the severity of the deprivation involved in placement on the No Fly list. In addition, courts may examine the risk of an erroneous deprivation under the current procedural framework and the potential value of imposing additional procedures on the process. Finally, courts may inquire into the government's interest in preserving the status quo, including the danger of permitting plaintiffs to access sensitive national security information. Resolution of the issue is currently pending as at least two federal courts have ruled that the government's redress procedures for travelers challenging placement on the No Fly list violate due process. The government is currently revising this process, although the precise details of what the new program will entail are unclear. Litigation is further complicated by several legal hurdles, such as the state secrets privilege, that can bar plaintiffs from accessing certain information during litigation. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2015. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: R43730: Accessed April 15, 2015 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43730.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43730.pdf Shelf Number: 135235 Keywords: Due ProcessHomeland SecurityNational SecurityTerrorismTerrorists (U.S.) |
Author: Hamm, Mark Title: Lone Wolf Terrorism in America: Using Knowledge of Radicalization Pathways To Forge Prevention Strategies Summary: This research offers the largest and most comprehensive database ever created on lone wolf terrorism, along with a theory-informed case study component based on direct contact with imprisoned lone wolf terrorists, and a comparative analysis distinguishing lone wolves from those who undergo radicalization in a group setting. Strictly in terms of lethality, the data indicate that lone wolf terrorism in America is not on the rise. Although lone wolf terrorism may not be increasing, it is undergoing two important changes in modus operandi. First, uniformed police and military personnel have become the primary target of lone wolf terrorists. Second, consistent with the relaxation of U.S. gun laws since the 1990s and the recent trend in mass shootings, the lone wolf's preferred weaponry is now a staggering range of high-velocity firearms. While there is no standard profile of the lone wolf terrorist, most of them are unemployed, single white males with a criminal record. Compared to members of terrorist groups, lone wolves are older, less educated and more prone to mental illness. The study validates a series of commonalities associated with pathways to radicalization for lone wolf terrorists. The radicalization model indicates that lone wolf terrorism begins with a combination of personal and political grievances which form the basis for an affinity with online sympathizers. This is followed by the identification of an enabler, followed by the broadcasting of terrorist intent. The final commonality is a triggering event, or the catalyst for terrorism. The ability of law enforcement and intelligence communities to detect and prevent lone wolf terrorism demands a clear understanding of these radicalization processes. Such insight may provide investigators with a sort of detection system, or "signatures" - as minimal as they may appear-that an individual with a terrorist intent will demonstrate in preparing for an attack. Crucial to this understanding is the broadcasting of intent. While lone wolves physically isolate from society, at the same time they seek recognition for their causes through spoken statements and threats, manifestos, e-mail messages, texting and videotaped proclamations. Focusing on this kind of immediate objective of radicalization among lone wolves, rather than on their underlying grievances, may sharpen our focus on the dangers posed by lone wolf terrorism. Details: Terre Haute, IN: Indiana State University, 2015. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 9, 2015 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248691.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248691.pdf Shelf Number: 135540 Keywords: Homeland SecurityLone Wolf TerrorismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Hoffman, Bruce Title: (U) The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century Summary: (U) The FBI 9/11 Review Commission was established in January 2014 pursuant to a congressional mandate. The United States Congress directed the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI, or the "Bureau") to create a commission with the expertise and scope to conduct a "comprehensive external review of the implementation of the recommendations related to the FBI that were proposed by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (commonly known as the 9/11 Commission)." The Review Commission was tasked specifically to report on: 1. An assessment of the progress made, and challenges in implementing the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission that are related to the FBI. 2. An analysis of the FBI's response to trends of domestic terror attacks since September 11, 2001, including the influence of domestic radicalization. 3. An assessment of any evidence not known to the FBI that was not considered by the 9/11 Commission related to any factors that contributed in any manner to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 4. Any additional recommendations with regard to FBI intelligence sharing and counterterrorism policy. (U) The Review Commission was funded Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2015. 128p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 9, 2015 at: http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/protecting-the-homeland-in-the-21st-century Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/protecting-the-homeland-in-the-21st-century Shelf Number: 135549 Keywords: Domestic TerrrorismFederal Bureau of InvestigationHomeland SecurityRadical GroupsTerrorism |
Author: Vidino, Lorenzo Title: Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe Summary: In response to the recent surge in the number of American Muslims involved in terrorist activities, several agencies in the U.S. government have begun devising a comprehensive counter-radicalization strategy. In doing so, they are following the lead of certain European countries that have invested significant human, financial, and political capital in counter-radicalization programs. The challenges European authorities have had to face are similar to those their U.S. counterparts are expected to confront, and several lessons are at hand from the European experience. Summary The recent surge in the number of American Muslims involved in terrorism has led U.S. - authorities to question the long-held assumption that American Muslims are immune to radicalization, and to follow the example of other Western democracies in devising a comprehensive counter-radicalization strategy. Radicalization is a highly individualized process determined by the complex interaction of - various personal and structural factors. Because no one theory can exhaustively explain it, policymakers must understand the many paths to radicalization and adopt flexible approaches when trying to combat it. The role of religion in the radicalization process is debated, but theories that set aside - ideology and religion as factors in the radicalization of Western jihadists are not convincing. Policymakers who choose to tackle religious aspects should do so cautiously, however, cognizant of the many implications of dealing with such a sensitive issue. Policymakers need to determine whether a counter-radicalization strategy aims to tackle violent radicalism alone or, more ambitiously, cognitive radicalism. The relation between the two forms is contested. Challenging cognitive radicalism, though possibly useful for both security and social cohesion purposes, is extremely difficult for any Western democracy. Finding partners in the Muslim community is vital to any counter-radicalization program. - In light of the fragmentation of that community, a diverse array of partners appears to be the best solution. There is the risk, however, that counter-radicalization efforts could be perceived by Muslims as unfairly targeting them. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report: Accessed May 14, 2015 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR262%20-%20Countering_Radicalization_in_America.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR262%20-%20Countering_Radicalization_in_America.pdf Shelf Number: 135633 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization Programs Extremist GroupsHomeland SecurityMuslimsRadical GroupsTerrorism |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice. Federal Bureau of Investigation Title: The FBI Story Summary: For the FBI and its partners, 2012 was a year that reminded us once again of the seriousness of the security threats facing our nation. During the year, extremists plotted to attack-unsuccessfully, thanks to the work of our Joint Terrorism Task Forces-the U.S. Capitol, the New York Federal Reserve Bank, and other landmarks on U.S. soil. Tragically, on the 11th anniversary of 9/11, a hateful attack in Benghazi took the lives of the U.S. Ambassador to Libya and three other Americans. In the cyber realm, a rising tide of hackers took electronic aim at global cyber infrastructure, causing untold damages. High-dollar white-collar crimes of all kinds also continued to siphon significant sums from the pocketbooks of consumers. And in Newtown, Connecticut, 20 young children and six adults lost their lives in one of the worst mass shootings in American history, ending a year of violence that saw similar tragedies around the country. Working with its colleagues around the globe, the FBI is committed to taking a leadership role in protecting the nation. As you can see from this book-an annual compilation of stories from the FBI's public website that provides a snapshot of Bureau milestones, activities, and accomplishments-we used the full range of our intelligence, investigative, and operational skills to address major threats during the year. We helped avert terrorist attacks and derail terrorist supporters, put cyber criminals and fraudsters behind bars, and dismantled violent gangs and organized crime groups. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2012. 119p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 28, 2015 at: http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/fbi-story/fbistory2012.pdf/view Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/fbi-story/fbistory2012.pdf/view Shelf Number: 129962 Keywords: Criminal IntelligenceFBIFederal Bureau of InvestigationHomeland SecurityTerrorism |
Author: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Title: Interim Report of the CBP Integrity Advisory Panel Summary: Created as part of the homeland security eorganization of 2003, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the single, unified agency to protect and secure our nation's borders. CBP is by far the largest law enforcement agency of our country. In terms of its more than 44,000 arms carrying, sworn law enforcement officers, CBP is more than double the size of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and substantially larger than New York Police Department (NYPD), the largest local police force in the U.S. Unquestionably, CBP is far more effective in performing its border protection mission than was the case pre-2003 when border enforcement authority and personnel were fragmented into four separate agencies aligned within three different departments of government. Yet as a border agency with a national security and law enforcement mission, CBP is vulnerable to the potential for corruption within its workforce which, if not detected and effectively investigated, could severely undermine its mission. Moreover, it is imperative, as with all law enforcement, that CBP officers and agents avoid using excessive and unnecessary force in carrying out their duties. To this end, it is essential that CBP be capable of effectively investigating and deterring the potential unlawful and out-of-policy use of force by its personnel . It is within this context that in December 2014, the Secretary of Homeland Security requested the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) to create the CBP Integrity Advisory Panel ("Panel"), a subcommittee of the HSAC, in order to take stock of and evaluate the progress of CBP regarding its efforts to deter and prevent corruption and the use of excessive force and its efforts to restore public confidence through more transparency with key stakeholders and the public. As part of the Secretary's tasking, he requested recommendations based upon law enforcement best practices regarding further steps needed to assure the highest level of integrity, compliance with use of force policy, incident response transparency, and stakeholder engagement. The Secretary's six specific tasking's are set forth in his letter to the HSAC dated December 9, 2014. (See Appendix B) This interim report discusses integrity and use of force/transparency issues separately, yet some of our recommendations apply to both. A prime example is our recommendation that the number of criminal investigators in CBP's Office of Internal Affairs (IA) be substantially increased. An adequately staffed IA is essential to giving CBP the capacity to timely and thoroughly investigate all allegations of corruption as well as all use of force violations of CBP policy. Since its inception less than four months ago, in March 2015, the Panel has met and reviewed numerous prior reports, gathered a prodigious amount of data and met with and interviewed dozens of representatives of CBP, Department of Homeland Security (DHS), various stakeholders and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). This is our first interim report and recommendations with more to follow in the future. Given the extraordinary importance of maintaining integrity and assuring compliance with use of force policy, the Panel believes that consideration of our recommendations, and action upon them, should not await our final report. Details: Washington, DC: U. S. Department of Homeland Security, 2015. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 14, 2015 at: http://soboco.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/HSAC-CBP-IAP-Interim-Report_FINAL_062915.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://soboco.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/HSAC-CBP-IAP-Interim-Report_FINAL_062915.pdf Shelf Number: 136026 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityHomeland SecurityNational SecurityUse of Force |
Author: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Title: Body-Worn Video Cameras for Law Enforcement Assessment Report. System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER) Summary: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established the System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER) Program to assist emergency responders making procurement decisions. Located within the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) of DHS, the SAVER Program conducts objective assessments and validations on commercially available equipment and systems and develops knowledge products that provide relevant equipment information to the emergency responder community. The SAVER Program mission includes: - Conducting impartial, practitioner-relevant, operationally oriented assessments and validations of emergency response equipment - Providing information, in the form of knowledge products, that enables decision-makers and responders to better select, procure, use, and maintain emergency response equipment. SAVER Program knowledge products provide information on equipment that falls under the categories listed in the DHS Authorized Equipment List (AEL), focusing primarily on two main questions for the responder community: "What equipment is available?" and "How does it perform?" These knowledge products are shared nationally with the responder community, providing a life- and cost-saving asset to DHS, as well as to Federal, state, and local responders. The SAVER Program is supported by a network of Technical Agents who perform assessment and validation activities. As a SAVER Program Technical Agent, the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center (SPAWARSYSCEN) Atlantic has been tasked to provide expertise and analysis on key subject areas, including communications, sensors, security, weapon detection, and surveillance, among others. In support of this tasking, SPAWARSYSCEN Atlantic developed this report to provide emergency responders with information obtained from an operationally oriented assessment of body-worn video cameras for law enforcement, which fall under AEL reference number 13LE-00-SURV titled Equipment, Law Enforcement Surveillance. Body-worn video cameras are valuable tools that can be used by law enforcement to record traffic stops, arrests, sobriety tests, and interviews. Body-worn video camera systems typically consist of a camera, microphone, battery, and onboard storage. They are designed to be head-mounted or worn at various locations on the body, depending on the model. In January 2015, the System Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER) Program conducted an operationally oriented assessment of body-worn video cameras for law enforcement. Seven body-worn video cameras were assessed by emergency responders. The criteria and scenarios used in this assessment were derived from the results of a focus group of emergency responders with experience using body-worn video cameras. The assessment addressed 16 evaluation criteria in three SAVER categories: Capability, Deployability, and Usability. Details: Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security; North Charleston, NC: Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Atlantic, 2015. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 20, 2015 at: http://www.firstresponder.gov/SAVER/Documents/Body-Worn-Cams-AR_0415-508.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.firstresponder.gov/SAVER/Documents/Body-Worn-Cams-AR_0415-508.pdf Shelf Number: 136112 Keywords: Body-Worn Video CamerasEmergency PreparednessFirst RespondersHomeland SecurityVideo CamerasVideo Surveillance |
Author: Edwards, Charlie Title: Out of Reach? The Role of Community Policing in Preventing Terrorism in Canada Summary: When the Kanishka project was being designed in 2010, there was a widespread perception both within Canada and internationally that the country had largely managed to avoid the threat from Al-Qa'ida-inspired terrorism. While there had been one or two isolated cases, these were rare exceptions. Canadian government officials rightly described the threat picture in Canada as 'limited' in comparison with European states and the country's next door neighbour, the US, where attacks directed by Al-Qa'ida had been successful or had reached a mature stage in planning. In contrast, the domestic threat picture in Canada was relatively benign. During the fieldwork phase the authors found this view to be largely still accepted by politicians, law-enforcement practitioners and the public at large. What was interesting to the authors, however, was that this view - influenced by events in Canada and overseas - was changing. A few cases of predominantly Islamist terrorism with links to Canada had appeared over the years. These cases involved, for example, Ahmed Ressam and Momin Khawaja, two individuals with Canadian passports (indeed, Khawaja is Canadian-born). They had connected with elements close to Al-Qaiida and had been involved in planning attacks at the international level, but neither had planned to launch terrorist attacks within Canada itself. A more 'home-grown' threat appeared to emerge in 2006, when Canada's security and intelligence agencies uncovered the so-called 'Toronto 18' cell; their ambitious plans were the first expression of a maturing and purely domestic threat, seeking connections through a network of young radicals across Europe and North America. The plot was successfully disrupted before it reached fruition. Shortly before the publication of this report, the situation changed dramatically as Canada experienced two significant incidents of domestic lone-actor terrorism. On 22 October 2014, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau shot and killed a soldier at the Canadian National War Memorial in Ottawa; police exchanged fire and eventually shot dead the gunman inside the parliament building. Two days earlier, Martin Couture-Rouleau had deliberately driven a car into a group of Canadian soldiers in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec, killing one and injuring others. Both individuals are thought to have been recent converts to Islam who had become radicalised. Prior to these events, the last major attack that had directly involved Canadian citizens with links to the homeland was the bombing on 23 June 1985 of Air India Flight 182 when Sikh extremists killed 329 people - the majority of whom were Canadian citizens flying from Toronto. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute, 2015. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed August 8, 2015 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201502_op_out_of_reach.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Canada URL: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201502https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201502_op_out_of_reach.pdf Shelf Number: 136369 Keywords: Community PolicingDomestic TerrorismExtremist GroupsHomeland SecurityRadical GroupsRadicalization |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Confidential Informants: Updates to Policy and Additional Guidance Would Improve Oversight by DOJ and DHS Agencies Summary: Federal law enforcement components used more than 16,000 confidential informants in fiscal year 2013 as part of criminal investigations. Informants can be critical to an investigation, but without appropriate oversight, problems can occur that undermine the credibility of the informant's role in an investigation. The Attorney General's Guidelines sets forth procedures on the management of informants, including vetting potential informants and overseeing informants' illegal activities that components authorize to support an investigation. GAO was asked to review the use of confidential informants. GAO reviewed the extent to which (1) DOJ and DHS components' policies address the Guidelines for vetting informants and overseeing their illegal activities and (2) selected components have monitoring processes to ensure compliance with the Guidelines. GAO reviewed components' documented policies and monitoring processes and interviewed agency officials about their practices. GAO visited components' field offices in three locations chosen based on the numbers of informants overseen, among other factors. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOJ and DHS and their components take actions to update components' policies and monitoring processes to improve handling and oversight of confidential informants. DOJ and DHS concurred with our recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2015. 59p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-15-807: Accessed September 16, 2015 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672514.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/672514.pdf Shelf Number: 136790 Keywords: Criminal InvestigationHomeland SecurityInformants |
Author: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Title: With Liberty and Justice for All: The State of Civil Rights at Immigration Detention Facilities Summary: The purpose of this report is to comprehensively examine the U.S. Government's compliance with federal immigration laws and detention policies, and also detail evidence regarding possible infringement upon the constitutional rights afforded to detained immigrants. More specifically, this report examines the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its component agencies' treatment of detained immigrants in immigration holding, processing, and detention centers throughout the United States. Prior to writing this report, the Commission gathered facts and data to analyze whether DHS, its component agencies, and private detention corporations with whom the federal government contracts to detain immigrants were complying with the Performance Based National Detention Standards, Prison Rape Elimination Act Standards, the Flores Settlement Agreement and other related immigrant child detention policies, and the United States Constitution. During the Commission's January 30, 2015, briefing, the Commission received written and oral testimony from DHS immigration detention officials and advocates detailing the strengths, weaknesses, and constitutional and civil rights implications of the U.S. immigration detention system. In May 2015, the Commission visited Karnes Family Detention Center and Port Isabel Detention Centers - both located in Texas - to corroborate the written and oral evidence the Commission gathered. Based upon an analysis of data gathered from the Commission's fact-gathering visit, evidence collected during panelists' briefing presentations and additional research, the Commission makes numerous findings and recommendations. The Commission's complete findings and recommendations are contained in the report, however the following bear special attention: The Commission recommends that DHS act immediately to release families from detention. The Commission also recommends that Congress should no longer fund family detention and should reduce its funding for immigration detention generally, in favor of alternatives to detention. The Commission found, among other issues, that several DHS immigration detention facilities were not complying with federal mandates and agency policies regarding the treatment of detained immigrants and detained unaccompanied immigrant children. Moreover, the Commission found evidence, both anecdotal and eyewitness that the U.S. Government was interfering with the constitutional rights afforded to detained immigrants. While the U.S. Government made improvements to the U.S. immigration detention system, the Commission, among other numerous suggestions, recommends that the government convene an intergovernmental compliance task force to investigate, analyze, and strengthen compliance regiments carried out by the U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) Removal Operations' Detention Standards Compliance Unit. Moreover, the Commission recommends that the U.S. Government work harder to ensure detainees' access to due process and the right to assistance of counsel under the Fifth Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, 2015. 276p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 30, 2015 at: http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/Statutory_Enforcement_Report2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/Statutory_Enforcement_Report2015.pdf Shelf Number: 136891 Keywords: Homeland SecurityIllegal ImmigrantsImmigrant DetentionImmigration |
Author: Plant, Jeremy F. Title: Securing and Protecting America's Railroad System: U.S. Railroad and Opportunities for Terrorist Threats Summary: On any given day, thousands of trains move across the American landscape. Each one of them presents a potential threat to the safety of individuals and families, to the continued functioning of our communities and our economy, and to the life of our great cities. Whether carrying millions of workers to and from their jobs, or providing the safest means of transporting hazardous materials, or bringing food and agricultural necessities to consumers, railroads pose an inviting target to would-be terrorists. Yet no significant act of terrorism has been directed against U. S. railroads, and we lack hard information on the nature of the terrorist risks involved in rail transport. This report highlights the potential threats, examines the response of government and the rail industry to the post-9/11 security responsibilities, and suggests ways in which public policy and rail operations can be better directed to meet the challenges of security in an age of terrorist activity. Efforts to secure the nation's rail system have been undertaken by federal, state, and local government agencies and by private rail operators. These activities differ fundamentally between the passenger and freight modes. Driven by events such as the Madrid and London rail attacks, and by the assumption that since the 9/11/01 events all passenger modes of travel in the U.S. constitute potential terrorist targets, passenger rail security has been largely entrusted to the public sector, albeit with less attention and fewer resources granted for passenger rail security than for aviation. Freight rail security has also been driven by events but has been guided by the private sector rail industry. Resources currently directed to rail security are inadequate, given the potential for catastrophic loss of life or economic disruption from attacks on the rail system. The growing use of rail systems for work-related passenger travel and the critical role played by freight railroads in U.S. and global commerce makes insuring their security a matter of urgent public concern. While the efforts to secure the system led by the Department of Homeland Security represent a good start in tackling the issues, legislation specifically dealing with rail security is needed to identify the threats, clarify the roles of the various public and private actors, and establish a level of funding commensurate with the importance of the rail system and the potential loss of life and economic damage that might result from terrorist attacks. In addition to prevention, the rail system plays or can play an important role in mitigation and recovery efforts after man-made or natural disasters. Details: Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania State University Harrisburg, 2007. 82p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 15, 2015 at: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.476.9059&rep=rep1&type=pdf Year: 2007 Country: United States URL: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.476.9059&rep=rep1&type=pdf Shelf Number: 136985 Keywords: Homeland SecurityRailroadsTerrorismTransit CrimeTransit SafetyTransportation Security |
Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: With Hate in their Hearts: The State of White Supremacy in the United States Summary: The recent tragic shooting spree in June 2015 that took nine lives at Emanuel AME Church, a predominantly African-American church in Charleston, South Carolina, starkly revealed the pain and suffering that someone motivated by hate can cause. The suspect in the shootings, Dylann Storm Roof, is a suspected white supremacist. The horrific incident-following earlier deadly shooting sprees by white supremacists in Kansas, Wisconsin, and elsewhere-makes understanding white supremacy in the United States a necessity. - White supremacist ideology in the United States today is dominated by the belief that whites are doomed to extinction by a rising tide of non-whites who are controlled and manipulated by the Jews-unless action is taken now. This core belief is exemplified by slogans such as the so-called Fourteen Words: "We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children." - During the recent surge of right-wing extremist activity in the United States that began in 2009, white supremacists did not grow appreciably in numbers, as anti-government extremists did, but existing white supremacists did become more angry and agitated, with a consequent rise of serious white supremacist violence. - Most white supremacists do not belong to organized hate groups, but rather participate in the white supremacist movement as unaffiliated individuals. Thus the size of the white supremacist movement is considerably greater than just the members of hate groups. Among white supremacist groups, gangs are becoming increasingly important. - The white supremacist movement has a number of different components, including 1) neo-Nazis; 2) racist skinheads; 3) "traditional" white supremacists; 4) Christian Identity adherents; and 5) white supremacist prison gangs. The prison gangs are growing in size, while the other four sub-movements are stagnant or in decline. In addition, there are a growing number of Odinists, or white supremacist Norse pagans. There are also "intellectual" white supremacists who seek to provide an intellectual veneer or justification for white supremacist concepts. - White supremacists engage in a wide variety of activities to promote their ideas and causes or to cause fear in their enemies. They also engage in an array of social activities in which white supremacists gather for food and festivities. - Among domestic extremist movements active in the United States, white supremacists are by far the most violent, committing about 83% of the extremist-related murders in the United States in the past 10 years and being involved in about 52% of the shootouts between extremists and police. White supremacists also regularly engage in a variety of terrorist plots, acts and conspiracies. However, white supremacists also have a high degree of involvement with traditional forms of criminal activity as well as ideologically-based criminal activity. Most of the murders committed by white supremacists are done for non-ideological reasons. However, even if such murders are ignored, white supremacists still commit the most lethal violence of any domestic extremist movement in the United States. Details: New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2015. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2016 at: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/state-of-white-supremacy-united-states-2015.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/state-of-white-supremacy-united-states-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 137446 Keywords: Extremist GroupsHate CrimesHomeland SecurityRacismRadical GroupsWhite Supremacists |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Firearms Trafficking to Mexico Have Improved, but Some Collaboration Challenges Remain Summary: Violent crimes committed by drug trafficking organizations in Mexico often involve firearms, and a 2009 GAO report found that many of these firearms originated in the United States. ATF and ICE have sought to stem firearms trafficking from the United States to Mexico. GAO was asked to undertake a follow-up review to its 2009 report (GAO-09-709) addressing these issues. This report examines, among other things, (1) the origin of firearms seized in Mexico that have been traced by ATF, (2) the extent to which collaboration among U.S. agencies combating firearms trafficking has improved, and (3) the extent to which the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy measures progress by U.S. agencies to stem firearms trafficking to Mexico. To address these objectives, GAO analyzed program information and firearms tracing data from 2009 to 2014, and met with U.S. and Mexican officials on both sides of the border. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General of the United States take steps to formally monitor implementation of the 2009 MOU between ATF and ICE. GAO also recommends that ONDCP establish comprehensive indicators that more accurately reflect progress made in efforts to stem arms trafficking to Mexico. The Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, and ONDCP agreed with GAO's recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2016. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-16-223: Accessed January 12, 2016 at: http://democrats-foreignaffairs.house.gov/sites/democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/files/01-16%20GAO%20Report%20on%20US%20Efforts%20to%20Combat%20Firearms%20Trafficking%20to%20Mexico.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://democrats-foreignaffairs.house.gov/sites/democrats.foreignaffairs.house.gov/files/01-16%20GAO%20Report%20on%20US%20Efforts%20to%20Combat%20Firearms%20Trafficking%20to%20Mexico.pdf Shelf Number: 137468 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingFirearms TraffickingHomeland SecurityTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel Title: Final Report of the Task Force on Combating Terrorism and Foreign Fighter Travel Summary: Today we are witnessing the largest global convergence of jihadists in history, as individuals from more than 100 countries have migrated to the conflict zone in Syria and Iraq since 2011. Some initially flew to the region to join opposition groups seeking to oust Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, but most are now joining the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), inspired to become a part of the group's "caliphate" and to expand its repressive society. Over 25,000 foreign fighters have traveled to the battlefield to enlist with Islamist terrorist groups, including at least 4,500 Westerners. More than 250 individuals from the United States have also joined or attempted to fight with extremists in the conflict zone. These fighters pose a serious threat to the United States and its allies. Armed with combat experience and extremist connections, many of them are only a plane-flight away from our shores. Even if they do not return home to plot attacks, foreign fighters have taken the lead in recruiting a new generation of terrorists and are seeking to radicalize Westerners online to spread terror back home. Responding to the growing threat, the House Homeland Security Committee established the Task Force on Combating Terrorist and Foreign Fighter Travel in March 2015. Chairman Michael McCaul and Ranking Member Bennie Thompson appointed a bipartisan group of eight lawmakers charged with reviewing the threat to the United States from foreign fighters, examining the government's preparedness to respond to a surge in terrorist travel, and providing a final report with findings and recommendations to address the challenge. Members and staff also assessed security measures in other countries, as U.S. defenses depend partly on whether foreign governments are able to interdict extremists before they reach our shores. Details: Washington, DC: The Task Force, 2016. 66p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 3, 2016 at: https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/TaskForceFinalReport.pdf Shelf Number: 137746 Keywords: Airport SecurityBorder SecurityExtremistsHomeland SecurityRadicalsTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Georgetown University, Justice Policy Institute Title: Report: Lone Wolf Terrorism Summary: The United States (US) is the primary target among western states for lone wolf terrorist (LWT) attacks, and the frequency of attacks continues to increase. Even though LWT attacks remain less common and precipitate fewer casualties than terrorist attacks conducted by organizations, the US must continue to focus counterterrorism resources and encourage further research to combat this threat to national security. In this assessment, the Georgetown National Security Critical Issue Task Force (NSCITF) hopes to inform key stakeholders about the most critical lone wolf terrorism issues and spark new policy discussions on how to address the problem. The NSCITF articulates eight findings that inform the collective understanding of lone wolf terrorism and offers three actionable recommendations to address those findings. First, the NSCITF finds that no single USG definition on lone wolf terrorism exists. Second, the NSCITF identifies the following four current trends in domestic LWT attacks, each of which highlight multiple issues that US policymakers must consider when drafting counterterrorism policies directed at LWTs: 1) Increased targeting of law enforcement (LE) and military personnel; 2) Overwhelming use firearms to conduct attacks, compared to LWTs in other western countries who rely on hijackings or bombs; 3) Increased radicalization via the Internet, extremist media, and the civilian workplace; and, 4) Proclamation of an individual ideology instead of claiming affinity to specific, organized extremist groups. Third, despite the presence of overarching trends among domestic LWTs, the NSCITF determines that profiling fails to target potential LWTs effectively. Consequently, in the fourth finding, the NSCITF provides a framework to understand how an individual becomes a LWT and to identify possible intervention points. Fifth, the NSCITF develops a typology that organizes lone wolves in terms of their ideological autonomy and social competence to explicate why lone wolves operate alone, a key gap in the extant literature on terrorism. The final three findings address US federal and local law enforcement policies to prevent LWT attacks. In the sixth finding, the NSCITF identifies the challenges of using traditional law enforcement tactics to identify and stop LWTs. Specifically, the NSCITF highlights how the expansion of the Internet and social media offers individuals an ability to become radicalized without physically interacting with others and research various attack methodologies undetected. The seventh finding demonstrates that aggressive law enforcement tactics - namely, surveillance and monitoring of targeted individuals - risk community mistrust because of perceived infringements on civil liberties and privacy rights. In the final finding, the NSCITF notes that the US lacks a comprehensive, "whole of government" approach that coherently and systematically organizes the federal, local, and state efforts to combat lone wolf terrorism. Based on the above findings, the NSCITF offers three recommendations. First, the USG should adopt a standard definition of lone wolf terrorism. Second, the USG should appoint clear leadership over the problem of lone wolf terrorism to streamline future policy responses and improve governmental coordination at the federal, state, and local levels. Finally, the USG should emphasize the prevention and short-circuiting of the radicalization process. Each recommendation will help the USG streamline future policy responses and improve governmental coordination at the federal, state, and local levels to prevent future LWT attacks. Details: Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2015. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2016 at: http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NCITF-Final-Paper.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NCITF-Final-Paper.pdf Shelf Number: 137881 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismDomestic TerrorismExtremist GroupsHomeland SecurityLaw EnforcementLone Wolf TerrorismRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Southern Poverty Law Center Title: Age of the Wolf: A Study of the Rise of Lone Wolf and Leaderless Resistance Terrorism Summary: The study, which covers the period between April 1, 2009, and Feb. 1, 2015, and includes violence from both the radical right and homegrown jihadists, finds that a domestic terrorist attack or foiled attack occurred, on average, every 34 days. It also shows that fully 74% of the more than 60 incidents examined were carried out, or planned, by a lone wolf, a single person operating entirely alone. A total of 90% of the incidents were the work of just one or two persons, the study found. The long-term trend away from violence planned and committed by groups and toward lone wolf terrorism is a worrying one. Authorities have had far more success penetrating plots concocted by several people than individuals who act on their own. Indeed, the lone wolf's chief asset is the fact that no one else knows of his plans for violence and they are therefore exceedingly difficult to disrupt. Next week's summit, to be hosted by President Obama, is meant to "better understand, identify, and prevent the cycle of radicalization to violence at home in the United States and abroad," the White House said. Although the meeting is ostensibly devoted to all forms of terrorism, there is a danger, in the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo massacre in Paris, that Islamist terror will be the primary focus. That would be a serious mistake. There's no question that the jihadist threat is a tremendous one. Close to 3,000 Americans were murdered by Al Qaeda on Sept. 11, 2001, far more than the number killed by any other form of terrorism. And officials are now warning that the Islamic State, known for its barbaric beheadings and the burning alive of a Jordanian pilot, may be plotting to kidnap Americans abroad in a slew of other countries. But that is not the only terrorist threat facing Americans today. A large number of independent studies have agreed that since the 9/11 mass murder, more people have been killed in America by non-Islamic domestic terrorists than jihadists. That fact is also apparent in the new SPLC study of the 2009-2015 period. Since 9/11, however, the government has focused very heavily on jihadists, sometimes to the exclusion of violence from various forms of domestic extremists. That was first apparent in the immediate aftermath of the Al Qaeda attacks, when almost all government resources were channeled toward battling foreign jihadists. A stark example of that is the way the Justice Department has allowed its Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee to go into hibernation since that day. But it is also reflected in the way that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is charged with providing law enforcement information and analysis of all kinds of violent extremism, let its team devoted to non-Islamic domestic terrorism fall apart in the aftermath of a controversial leaked report. The 2009 report, which detailed the resurgence of the radical right in the aftermath of Obama's 2008 election, was pilloried by pundits and politicians who wrongly saw it as an attack on all conservatives. As a result, then-DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano apologized for it, and the DHS intelligence team that wrote it has since virtually disbanded. The temptation to focus on horrific groups like Al Qaeda and the Islamic State is wholly understandable. And the federal government recently has taken steps to address the terrorist threat more comprehensively, with Attorney General Eric Holder announcing the coming reconstitution of the Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee. There has been a recent increase in funding for studies of terrorism and radicalization, and the FBI has produced a number of informative reports. And Holder seems to understand clearly that lone wolves and small cells are an increasing threat. "It's something that frankly keeps me up at night, worrying about the lone wolf or a group of people, a very small group of people, who decide to get arms on their own and do what we saw in France," he said recently. But it's critical that Wednesday's gathering at the White House takes on terrorism in all its forms, Islamic and non-Islamic, foreign and domestic. Federal agencies must reinvigorate their work in studying and analyzing the radical right, helping law enforcement agencies around the country understand and counter the very real threat of domestic terrorism from the milieu that produced mass murderer Timothy McVeigh. It's not a question of focusing on one or another type of terror. No matter the source, we simply cannot afford to ignore the ongoing carnage. Details: Montgomery, AL: SPLC, 2015. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 19, 2016 at: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/lone-wolf-splc.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/lone-wolf-splc.pdf Shelf Number: 137895 Keywords: ExtremistsHomeland SecurityIslamic StateIslamistsJihadLone Wolf TerrorismRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Argueta, Carla N. Title: Border Security Metrics Between Ports of Entry Summary: Understanding the risks present at the U.S. borders and developing methods to measure border security are key challenges for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Border Patrol, the agency within DHS charged with securing the border between ports of entry. Metrics for border security are used at both the strategic level, by DHS, and at the operational level by Customs and Border Protection (Border Patrol). This report reviews DHS's and the Border Patrol's use of metrics in evaluating their objective to secure the border between ports of entry. DHS and the Border Patrol can use metrics to measure their performance and estimate risks at the border. Additionally, metrics provide Congress with an understanding of DHS's and Border Patrol's progress in securing the border. At a strategic level, DHS uses performance metrics to understand its ability to meet border security objectives. However, DHS has struggled to create a comprehensive measure of border security. Most recently, DHS has labored to create a new generation of performance metrics, through the estimation of unauthorized entry of migrants into the United States. This measure represents the volume of migration entering the United States and can be influenced by factors outside of DHS's control, and therefore may not directly speak on border security. Congress may want to consider whether this is an adequate performance metric for border security and whether additional and/or more comprehensive and targeted metrics are required. DHS's Annual Performance Report for FY2014-FY2016 reported two other performance metrics used to measure its progress in securing the border. First, the percentage of people apprehended multiple times along the Southwest border, or the recidivism rate, is used to capture the ability of the Border Patrol to deter migrants from re-entering the United States. Second, the rate of interdiction effectiveness along the Southwest border between ports of entry, or the effectiveness rate, measures the Border Patrol's ability to apprehend unauthorized migrants. In the past, DHS has used several different performance metrics. For example, from 2001 to 2004, DHS, and the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), used optimum deterrence as a measure for border security, defining it as the level where applying more border security would not significantly increase apprehensions or deterrence. In 2005, DHS began to use operational control as a new measure, describing it as the miles along the border where the Border Patrol had the ability to detect, identify, respond to, and interdict cross-border unauthorized activity. When operational control was retired as a metric, migrant apprehensions became the interim measure for border security from 2011 to 2013. At an operational level, the Border Patrol uses metrics within its risk assessments At an operational level, the Border Patrol uses metrics within its risk assessments. The estimation of risk at the sector level assists the Border Patrol in making day-to-day decisions with regard to how to best align its resources against different threats. The agency determines risk through its "State of the Border Risk Methodology." A secured border is characterized as low risk. The Border Patrol's methodology estimates the magnitude of risk by gathering and understanding intelligence information, developing a detailed awareness of threats at the border, and applying a standardized measurement of risk. These assessments are not used as metrics themselves. However, the Border Patrol's methodology monitors certain metrics at the sector level, such as the recidivist rate and effectiveness rate, which may be able to speak to the Border Patrol's performance. Metrics can provide an understanding of the state of the border. In reviewing border security metrics, Congress may be interested in issues surrounding the oversight of DHS's measurement practices, the determination of acceptable levels of risk for each metric, and the implementation of strategic and operational metrics and how they relate to one another. Moreover, Congress may consider how metrics can be used to inform decisions on expenditures and whether additional data and methodologies are needed to provide a more holistic view of border issues. Lastly, with migrant demographics shifting and some transit countries conducting their own enforcement of unauthorized migration, Congress may consider how these practices affect data and outcomes and what can be done to account for these changes. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2016 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R44386.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R44386.pdf Shelf Number: 137930 Keywords: Border SecurityHomeland SecurityIllegal ImmigrationImmigration PolicyMigrants |
Author: de Roy van Zuijdewijn, Jeanine Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism. Policy Paper 1: Personal Characteristics of Lone-Actor Terrorists Summary: The aim of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is to understand lone-actor terrorism in a European context. The project will develop a database of lone-actor cases from across Europe. Its overall objective is to see if it is possible to discern any trends or patterns that could be translated into useful observations or recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers. This is the first of four policy papers in the CLAT series and is published by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague. This paper focuses on the personal characteristics of lone-actor terrorists, resulting in a number of policy recommendations. The analysis specifically outlines the importance of benchmarking and looking at different sub-groups. It further identifies the importance of trust and openness, and of multi-agency co-operation. These factors might be the basis of formulating an effective response to the challenge of lone-actor terrorism Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism series No. 5: Accessed March 1, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_1_v2.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_1_v2.pdf Shelf Number: 138003 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismHomeland SecurityLone-Wolf TerroristsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Palombi, Simon Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism. Policy Paper 2: Attack Methodology and Logistics Summary: The aim of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is to understand lone-actor terrorism in a European context. The project will develop a database of lone-actor cases from across Europe. Its overall objective is to see if it is possible to discern any trends or patterns that could be translated into useful observations or recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers. This is the second of four policy papers in the CLAT series, published by RUSI on behalf of Chatham House. The CLAT project identified a need to understand the factors underlying the attack methodology and logistics of lone-actor terrorists. This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the key variables of the data set. The results are then used to develop a more nuanced understanding of the lone-actor terrorism threat in Europe. Details: London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2016. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: RUSI Occasional Paper; Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 6: Accessed March 1, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_2_v2.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_2_v2.pdf Shelf Number: 138006 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismHomeland Security Lone Wolf Terrorism Lone Wolf Terrorist Radicalization Terrorism |
Author: Smith, Melanie Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism. Policy Paper 3: Motivations, Political Engagement and Online Activity Summary: The aim of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is to understand lone-actor terrorism in a European context. The project will develop a database of lone-actor cases from across Europe. Its overall objective is to see if it is possible to discern any trends or patterns that could be translated into useful observations or recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers. This is the third of four policy papers in the CLAT series and is published by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue. Preventing every single instance of lone-actor terrorism is impossible. This is particularly true in countries where freedom of thought, speech and privacy are highly valued and must be protected. The recommendations stemming from this paper's analysis provide practical suggestions for preventing instances of lone-actor terrorism - based on findings relating to motivations, political engagement and online activity - that adhere to these principles. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2016. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 7: Accessed March 1, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_3.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_3.pdf Shelf Number: 138004 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismHomeland SecurityLone Wolf Terrorism Lone Wolf Terrorist Radicalization Social MediaTerrorism |
Author: Ellis, Clare Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism. Policy Paper 4: 'Leakage' and Interaction with Authorities Summary: This is the fourth and final policy paper in the CLAT series. It outlines the policy implications of analysis in relation to changes in perpetrator behaviour, 'leakage' of extreme views or intention to act, and interactions with public authorities in the time leading up to an attack. It provides a series of practical policy recommendations in order to develop an effective response to various lone-actor threats. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 8: Accessed march 1, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_4.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_policy_paper_4.pdf Shelf Number: 138005 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Homeland Security Lone-Wolf Terrorists RadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: Ellis, Clare Title: Lone-Actor Terrorism: Analysis Paper Summary: The aim of the Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism (CLAT) project is to understand lone-actor terrorism in a European context. The project will develop a database of lone-actor cases from across Europe. Its overall objective is to see if it is possible to discern any trends or patterns that could be translated into useful observations or recommendations for practitioners and policy-makers. This fourth paper of the series conducts a detailed examination of the lone-actor terrorist database. The findings reaffirm a key assertion from the earlier literature review: there is no consistent profile for a lone-actor terrorist. However, systematic analysis of cases from across Europe has provided valuable insights into the scale of the threat, the ways in which it is most likely to manifest, and the activities of lone-actor terrorists in the time leading up to the attack. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2016. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Countering Lone-Actor Terrorism Series: No. 4: Accessed march 2, 2016 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_analysis_paper.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201602_clat_analysis_paper.pdf Shelf Number: 138012 Keywords: Homeland Security Lone Wolf TerrorismRadical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: Smith, Brent L. Title: Patterns of Intervention in Federal Terrorism cases: Interim Report to Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Summary: America's response to terrorism has changed dramatically over the past thirty years. Changes have included everything from the way in which terrorism is portrayed politically, to the manner in which terrorists are investigated, prosecuted, and punished. Modifications to governmental interventions also have affected the manner in which terrorists plan and conduct terrorist activities as well as the manner in which they defend themselves in court. Although it would be difficult to address all of these changes in a single paper, the purpose of the current manuscript is to provide an overview of the most significant events that evoked changes in the manner in which terrorists are portrayed, pursued, and prosecuted as well as the way in which terrorists and their defenders have responded to federal prosecutorial efforts. The specific ways in which federal agencies respond to terrorism, however, are rooted in much larger political and social issues. Details: College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2011. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 28, 2016 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/publications/local_attachments/START_ATS_InterventionPatternsInterimReport_Aug2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/publications/local_attachments/START_ATS_InterventionPatternsInterimReport_Aug2011.pdf Shelf Number: 138441 Keywords: Homeland SecurityTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Jenkins, Brian Michael Title: Do Significant Terrorist Attacks Increase the Risk of Further Attacks? Initial Observations from a Statistical Analysis of Terrorist Attacks in the United States and Europe from 1970 to 2013 Summary: Major terrorist events in the United States and Europe generate fear among the public and prompt swifter responses from public officials, reflecting a belief that terrorist attacks occur in clusters. If there is one attack, the concern is that others will soon follow. That presumption leads to two analytical questions: Does a significant terrorist attack somehow inspire other terrorist attacks, and can terrorist attacks be anticipated statistically? To answer these questions, RAND researchers examine the historical record of terrorism in the United States and Europe between 1970 and the end of 2013. Using the Global Terrorism Database, the researchers find an absence of clustering for terrorist events around trigger events since 1994, no increases in terrorism on significant dates, and a decline of terrorism in the West since the 1970s, suggesting that the threat of terrorism should not affect individuals' behavior and decisions in the United States and Western Europe - not even in the wake of a significant terrorist event. However, heightened security may be justified. It may enable authorities to respond quickly to increased reports of suspicious activity and hoaxes that terrorist events inspire. Increased police presence also permits authorities to diagnose and intervene more rapidly if there are further incidents. Moreover, temporary security increases may be warranted as a precautionary measure, even if only to reassure an alarmed public that it is safe. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Perspectives: Accessed April 20, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE173/RAND_PE173.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE173/RAND_PE173.pdf Shelf Number: 138706 Keywords: Homeland SecurityTerrorismTerroristsThreat Assessment |
Author: Meyer, Peter J. Title: Unaccompanied Children from Central America: Foreign Policy Considerations Summary: Since FY2011, the number of unaccompanied alien children (UAC) traveling to the United States from the "northern triangle" nations of Central America - El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras - has increased sharply. U.S. authorities encountered more than 52,000 unaccompanied minors from the region at the U.S. border in FY2014, a more than 1,200% increase compared to FY2011. This unexpected surge of children strained U.S. government resources and created a complex crisis with humanitarian implications. U.S. apprehensions of unaccompanied minors from the northern triangle declined by 45% in FY2015. They increased in the first five months of FY2016, however, and experts warn that significant migration flows will continue until policymakers in the countries of origin and the international community address the poor socioeconomic and security conditions driving Central Americans to leave their homes. The 2014 migration crisis led to renewed focus on Central America, a region with which the United States historically has shared close political, economic, and cultural ties. The United States engages with Central American countries through a variety of mechanisms, including a security assistance package known as the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) and the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR). Over the past two years, the Obama Administration has sought closer cooperation with Central American governments to dissuade children from making the journey to the United States, target smuggling networks, and repatriate unauthorized migrants. The Administration also has introduced a whole-of-government "U.S. Strategy for Engagement in Central America" designed to increase economic opportunity, reduce extreme violence, and strengthen the effectiveness of state institutions in the region. The Administration requested $1 billion through the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development to implement the strategy in FY2016, and it has requested more than $770 million through those two agencies to continue implementation in FY2017. The governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are undertaking complementary efforts under their "Plan of the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle." Congress has expressed considerable concern about increased migration from Central America, with Members holding numerous hearings, traveling to the region, and introducing legislation designed to address the situation. Although Congress opted not to appropriate supplemental funding for programs in Central America in FY2014, it appropriated more than $570 million for the region in FY2015, which was $241 million more than the Administration originally requested. The Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235), also directed the Administration to develop a comprehensive strategy to address the key factors contributing to the migration of unaccompanied children to the United States. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113), appropriated $750 million in support of the Administration's Central America strategy in FY2016. The act also placed a number of conditions on the assistance, requiring governments in the region to take steps to improve border security, combat corruption, increase revenues, and address human rights concerns, among other actions. As Congress debates the Administration's FY2017 budget request and other legislative options to address increased migration from Central America, it might take into consideration a variety of interrelated issues. These issues might include the humanitarian implications of the current situation, the international humanitarian response, Central American governments' limited capacities to receive and reintegrate repatriated children, Central American governments' abilities and willingness to address poor security and socioeconomic conditions in their countries, and the extent to which the Mexican government is capable of limiting the transmigration of Central Americans through its territory. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: R43702: Accessed May 25, 2016 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43702.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Central America URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43702.pdf Shelf Number: 138656 Keywords: Child ProtectionHomeland SecurityHuman SmugglingImmigration EnforcementUnaccompanied Children |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Immigration Detention: Additional Actions Needed to Strengthen DHS Management of Short-Term Holding Facilities Summary: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for providing safe, secure, and humane confinement for detained aliens who may be subject to removal or have been ordered removed from the United States. For example, during fiscal years 2014 and 2015, Border Patrol apprehended 823,768 aliens and held them temporarily in holding facilities. GAO was asked to examine DHS's management and oversight of holding facilities. This report examines the extent to which DHS has (1) standards in place for the short-term custody of aliens and monitors compliance with established standards and (2) processes in place for obtaining and addressing complaints from aliens in holding facilities. GAO reviewed CBP and ICE data on time in custody and complaints. GAO also interviewed agency officials and visited 32 holding facilities selected based on geographical location and facility type, among other factors. The visit results are not generalizable, but provided insight to the oversight of holding facilities and management of complaints. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DHS establish a process to assess time in custody data for all individuals in holding facilities; issue guidance on how and which complaint mechanisms should be communicated to individuals in short-term custody; include a classification code in all complaint tracking systems related to DHS holding facilities; and develop a process for analyzing trends related to holding facility complaints. DHS concurred with the recommendations and identified planned actions. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2016. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-16-514: Accessed May 27, 2016 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677484.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/677484.pdf Shelf Number: 139230 Keywords: Homeland SecurityIllegal Immigrants Immigrant Detention Immigration Immigration PolicyUndocumented Immigrants |
Author: Arsenault, Jean-Francois Title: A Discussion of the Economics of Preclearance with Proposed Measurement Methodologies Summary: This report has three objectives: summarize the international literature on the economic and social impact of preclearance operations; identify additional benefits of preclearance not well covered in the literature; and propose feasible methodologies to quantitatively measure the benefits to Canada of establishing preclearance processes and facilities in different environments. Preclearance benefits have not generally been the subject of much measurement. Based on an analysis and literature review, benefits were classified in five categories: optimizing border resources; improving security; improving the experience of crossing the border for passengers; improving the experience of crossing the border for carriers; and generating 'spin-off' benefits. In general, benefits in the first four categories are additive, while the last category spans a wide range of beneficial impacts of preclearance which generally can only be assessed using input-output or computable general equilibrium models. The report describes each benefit, identifies the main recipient of the benefit, and proposes specific methodologies to measure these benefits. For some benefits, in particular those related to security, the inherent difficulties in measuring the impact of preclearance leads the authors to suggest a qualitative treatment. Some preliminary estimates, based on heavy assumptions, are provided as a first step towards an accurate measurement of benefits. Executive Summary Preclearance refers to a process in which customs, immigration and other border functions of a foreign country (e.g. United States) are undertaken within a host country (e.g. Canada). Such operations can potentially generate significant benefits for governments, users and carriers. Preclearance benefits, however, have not generally been the subject of much measurement. This report has three objectives: summarize the international literature on the economic and social impact of preclearance operations; identify additional benefits of preclearance not well covered in the literature; and propose feasible methodologies to quantitatively measure the benefits to Canada of establishing preclearance processes and facilities in various contexts. Details: Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2015. 78p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Report:2015-R032: Accessed July 26, 2016 at: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2015-r032/index-en.aspx Year: 2015 Country: Canada URL: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2015-r032/index-en.aspx Shelf Number: 139860 Keywords: Airport SecurityBorder SecurityHomeland SecuritySecurity |
Author: Gall, Julie M. Title: Domestic Lone Wolf Terrorists: An Examination of Patterns in Domestic Lone Wolf Targets, Weapons, and Ideologies Summary: This study identified patterns in domestic lone wolf terrorist attacks by examining data from the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI) and the University of Maryland Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Global Terrorism Database (GTD). To date, the databases have captured information on 92 separate attacks by domestic lone wolf terrorists. This study reviewed the incidents and identified patterns in the targets attacked, weapons utilized, and ideologies of the domestic lone wolves; emerging patterns from the other variables of interest; and the lethality of single-incident versus multi - incident domestic lone wolves. Descriptive statistics, cross - tabulations, and graphs were utilized to analyze and display the findings. The analysis yielded several noteworthy findings. Contrary to what was hypothesized, in most cases the ideology held by a domestic lone wolf did not predict the type of target attacked. Second, explosive devices were used in more than 50% of domestic lone wolf attacks. Whereas the use of explosive devices increased in the 1990s, firearm usage was fairly stable over the time period examined. Lastly, single incident domestic lone wolves (i.e., terrorists who engaged in only a single attack prior to death or apprehension) were found to be more lethal, in terms of casualties, than multi - incident domestic lone wolves. Future research should investigate the relationship of these findings to the behavior of larger terrorist organizations. If, in fact, domestic lone wolves do not behave, hold ideological motivations, or target venues in a similar fashion to group terrorists, then the counter-terrorism and intelligence communities, as well as policy makers, should pay additional attention to this unique breed of terrorists, since their actions may not be predictable on the basis of how better - known terrorist organizations act. Details: Fairfax, VA: George Mason University, 2014. 122p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed August 3, 2016 at: http://digilib.gmu.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1920/9164/Gall_gmu_0883E_10769.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://digilib.gmu.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/1920/9164/Gall_gmu_0883E_10769.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 139971 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism Homeland SecurityLone Wolf Terrorism |
Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: The Islamic State's Acolytes and the Challenges They Pose to U.S. Law Enforcement Summary: Analysis of publicly available information on homegrown violent jihadist activity in the United States since September 11, 2001, suggests that the Islamic State (IS) and its acolytes may pose broad challenges to domestic law enforcement and homeland security efforts. Homegrown IS-inspired plots can be broken into three rough categories based on the goals of the individuals involved. The first two focus on foreign fighters, the last on people willing to do harm in the United States: - The Departed - Americans, often described as foreign fighters, who plan to leave or have left the United States to fight for the Islamic State. - The Returned - American foreign fighters who trained with or fought in the ranks of the Islamic State and come back to the United States, where they can potentially plan and execute attacks at home. - The Inspired - Americans lured - in part - by IS propaganda to participate in terrorist plots within the United States. At least two other categories of IS foreign fighters pose some threat to U.S. interests: - The Lost - Unknown Americans who fight in the ranks of the Islamic State but do not plot terrorist attacks against the United States. Such individuals may come home after fighting abroad and remain unknown to U.S. law enforcement. Additionally, some American IS fighters will never book a trip back to the United States. Finally, some American IS supporters will perish abroad. - The Others - Foreign IS adherents who radicalize in and originate from places outside of the United States or non-American foreign fighters active in the ranks of the Islamic State. These persons could try to enter the United States when done fighting abroad. Federal law enforcement has numerous approaches to go after each of these categories of terrorist actors. These include the following: - Watchlisting - the federal counterterrorism watchlisting regimen effectively attempts to shrink "the lost" category described above. - Preemption - efforts geared toward preemption of terrorist activity can be broadly described in terms of interdiction (stopping a suspected terrorist from entering the United States, for example), law enforcement investigation, and government activities aimed at keeping radicalized individuals from morphing into terrorists, also known as countering violent extremism. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report R44521: Accessed September 6, 2016 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44110.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44110.pdf Shelf Number: 140169 Keywords: Foreign FightersHomeland SecurityISISIslamic StateTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremists |
Author: Davis, Lois M. Title: Assessment of the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) Program Summary: The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) created the State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training (SLATT) Program in 1996 to provide counterterrorism training to state, local, and tribal law enforcement personnel. The authors of this report assess the nature and value of the SLATT Program. The authors reviewed the current terrorism threat, both foreign and domestic, to gauge the need for the type of training that SLATT provides; examined how SLATT training is planned and operates; conducted a survey of participants of five SLATT investigative/intelligence workshops and train-the-trainer workshops; and conducted an analysis of the costs and benefits of SLATT to training participants based on results of a choice experiment that was part of the survey to identify what program features participants valued most. The authors conclude with suggestions for improving BJA's SLATT Program. Key Findings Terrorism Threat Assessment Analysis While the United States has not suffered an attack in the past 15 years as catastrophic as the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there appears to be no significant abatement of attack attempts or attack planning since 2011. There is an ongoing need to ensure that state and local law enforcement receives training in this area. Assessment of SLATT Workshops A majority of trainees have counterterrorism as a major responsibility of their position. Overall, 6 out of 10 workshop participants indicated that the information provided during the SLATT workshops would change their approach to international terrorist or domestic terrorist threats and/or how they might investigate them. The majority of survey respondents indicated that they had participated in only one or two SLATT trainings in the past five years. Assessment of Costs of SLATT to Law Enforcement Participants SLATT workshops are offered at no cost to law enforcement, though law enforcement agencies incur some modest costs in terms of sending officers to a training and backfilling the positions of those sent, and the agencies that host the SLATT trainings incur some costs in terms of working to plan, market, and support the event. Assessing Features and the Value of SLATT to Participants Across the two types of workshop participants, participants most valued training that was three days in duration and that was less than 100 miles away. Although investigative/intelligence workshop participants preferred a program with both domestic and international terrorist topics, they valued having the training include local examples of the terrorist threat in their region or jurisdiction more than the train-the-trainer workshop participants did. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 119p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 7, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1276.html Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1276.html Shelf Number: 145313 Keywords: Counter-terrorismDomestic TerrorismHomeland SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: The Terrorist Screening Database and Preventing Terrorist Travel Summary: After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal government developed a unified regimen to identify and list known or suspected terrorists. The regimen has received repeated congressional attention, and this report briefly discusses for congressional policymakers how the U.S. government fashions and uses the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) to achieve such an end. It also discusses how the federal government engages in two travel-related screening processes—visa screening and air passenger screening. Both processes involve subsets of the Terrorist Screening Database. The Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) The TSDB lies at the heart of federal efforts to identify and share information among U.S. law enforcement about identified people who may pose terrorism-related threats to the United States. It is managed by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), a multi-agency organization created by presidential directive in 2003 and administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The TSDB includes biographic identifiers for those known either to have or be suspected of having ties to terrorism. In some instances it also includes biometric information on such people. It stores hundreds of thousands of unique identities. Portions of the TSDB are exported to data systems in federal agencies that perform screening activities such as background checks, reviewing the records of passport and visa applicants, official encounters with travelers at U.S. border crossings, and air passenger screening. Foreign Nationals Traveling to the United States Two broad classes of foreign nationals are issued visas under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA): immigrants and non-immigrants. Many visitors, however, enter the United States without visas through the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). Under the VWP, foreign nationals from 38 countries with agreements with the United States—including most countries in the European Union—do not need visas to enter the United States for short-term business or tourism and are instead vetted using biographic information to authenticate and screen individuals. Screening Aliens Department of State (DOS) consular officers check the background of all visa applicants in “lookout” databases that draw on TSDB information and other counterterrorism information such as the material housed in the National Counterterrorism Center’s Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment. DOS specifically uses the Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) database, which surpassed 42.5 million records in 2012. Aliens entering through the VWP have been vetted through the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA), which checks them against the TSDB. In addition, before an international flight bound for the United States departs from a foreign airport, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers screen the passenger manifest. CBP inspectors also perform background checks and admissibility reviews at the ports of entry that draw on information from the TSDB. Screening at the Transportation Security Administration The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has initiated a number of risk-based screening initiatives to focus its resources and apply directed measures based on intelligence-driven assessments of security risk. A cornerstone of TSA’s risk-based initiatives is the PreCheck program. PreCheck is TSA’s latest version of a trusted traveler program that has been modeled after CBP programs. Under the PreCheck regimen, participants are vetted through a background check process (including screening against terrorist watchlist information). At selected airports, they are processed through expedited screening lanes, where they can keep shoes on and keep liquids and laptops inside carry-on bags. All passengers flying to or from U.S. airports are vetted using the TSA’s Secure Flight program. Secure Flight involves information from the TSDB housed in the No Fly List, Selectee List, and Expanded Selectee List to vet passenger name records. The No Fly List includes identities of individuals who may present a threat to civil aviation and national security. Listed individuals are not allowed to board a commercial aircraft flying into, out of, over, or within U.S. airspace; this also includes point-to-point international flights operated by U.S. carriers. The Selectee List includes individuals who must undergo additional security screening before being allowed to board a commercial aircraft. The Expanded Selectee List was created as an extra security measure in response to a failed attempt to trigger an explosive by a foreign terrorist onboard a U.S.-bound flight on December 25, 2009. It screens against all TSDB records that include a person’s first and last name and date of birth that are not already on the No Fly or Selectee lists. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2016. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report R44678: Accessed November 8, 2016 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44678.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44678.pdf Shelf Number: 146283 Keywords: Airport SecurityBorder SecurityHomeland SecurityTerroristTerrorists |
Author: Weine, Stevan Title: Building Resilience to Violent Extremism Among Somali-Americans in Minneapolis-St. Paul Summary: This study asked members of the Somalia-American community in Minneapolis-St. Paul to describe the challenges of living in a refugee community, how violent extremists try to exploit their condition for recruitment purposes, and what resources and strategies are needed to minimize their vulnerability. Using ethnographic methods, this study looked at the everyday lives of Somalia-American adolescent boys and young men in the context of their families and communities. It found opportunities for entering violent extremism as well as capacities for diminishing those opportunities. Based on empirical data and informed by relevant theory, it identified themes and built a model, Diminishing Opportunities for Violent Extremism (DOVE), which can help to inform prevention strategies for building community resilience to violent extremism in the Somalia-American community in Minneapolis-St. Paul. No one risk factor explained involvement in violent extremism. Rather it was the interaction of multiple risk factors at the peer, family, community, global, state, and societal levels. These risk factors combined to create an opportunity structure for violent extremism with three levels of opportunity: 1) youth's unaccountable times and unobserved spaces; 2) the perceived social legitimacy of violent extremism; and 3) contact with recruiters or associates. Involvement in violent extremism depended on the presence of all three, with decreasing proportions of adolescent boys and young men exposed to the latter two. Efforts to increase resilience should involve strengthening protective resources or what are called opportunity-reducing capacities. Furthermore, family and youth, community, and government can help to strengthen protective resources at each of the three levels of opportunity. Priorities include diminishing: 1) youth's unaccountable times and unobserved spaces; 2) the perceived social legitimacy of violent extremism; and 3) the potential for contacts with terrorist recruiters or associates. Building community resilience to violent extremism should be approached through community collaboration and capacity building. Interventions may involve government, community, and families working collaboratively to improve each other's capacities. Shared goals could be to: 1) collaboratively strengthen families; 2) develop community support for families and youth; and 3) adopt new governmental strategies for community support and protection. One way to determine priority areas for prevention might include identifying protective resources with the greatest potential for addressing multiple risk factors. Collaborations between government, community, and families and youth can then be built to enhance these capacities. Based on the current study, promising preventive interventions in the Somalia-American community in Minneapolis-St. Paul might include: 1) building a web-based resource that includes information and training about risks and safeguards for use by youth, parents, and community service providers; 2) providing Somali youth and young adults with opportunities for service in their community and humanitarian and peace work, thus creating alternative ways for youth to channel their passion for Somalia; and 3) providing logistical support and training to elders and critical voices in the community and on the web. Additional research is needed in communities under threat to show which acts of building resilience work with whom under what circumstances and why. One way to do this would be to collaborate with the community to develop, pilot, and evaluate a multilevel community resilience-based prevention strategy in Minneapolis-St. Paul based on the DOVE model. Another would be to use the DOVE model as a basis for assessing other communities targeted by violent extremists, in the United States and abroad, so as to refine the model and approaches that can reliably assess communities at risk and help to inform and prioritize prevention strategies Details: College Park, MD: START, 2012. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Final Report to Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Accessed December 10, 2016 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/Weine_BuildingResiliencetoViolentExtremism_SomaliAmericans.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/Weine_BuildingResiliencetoViolentExtremism_SomaliAmericans.pdf Shelf Number: 146042 Keywords: Extremist GroupsHomeland SecurityRadical groupsTerrorismTerrorist RecruitmentViolent Extremism |
Author: Owens, Kimberly B. Title: Beyond hate: countering violent extremism from the white power movement Summary: Counterterrorism efforts are a major focus for the homeland security enterprise. Throughout the world, however, efforts have largely focused on countering violent extremism from Islamist organizations. While Islamist terrorists have been responsible for more deaths in the United States, this research focuses on white power domestic terrorism. It considers successful methods from the United States and the United Kingdom (UK), but applies them to factions of the right-wing movement, rather than Salafi-jihadist groups. This research is a case study comparison of former right-wing leaders, both of whom were associated with planned domestic terror plots. Significantly, the research included participation of individuals formerly active within the politically motivated Ku Klux Klan, and the religiously motivated the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (CSA). It revealed a common anti-government theme between the vastly different groups, as well as the sociological underpinnings for participation in the Klan, within the theoretical framework of Social Identity Theory. While extremism is an unpleasant fact, perhaps violence can be mitigated, and having dialogue with those who once carried the torch of white power rhetoric may hold some answers, or provide a starting point for successful counterterrorism efforts. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. 160p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed December 16, 2016 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/38992/13Dec_Owens_Kimberly.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/38992/13Dec_Owens_Kimberly.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 146134 Keywords: Counter-terrorismDomestic TerrorismExtremist GroupsHomeland SecurityRadical GroupsViolent Extremism |
Author: Garcia, Michael John Title: Barriers Along the U.S. Borders: Key Authorities and Requirements Summary: Federal law authorizes the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to construct barriers along the U.S. borders to deter illegal crossings. DHS is also required to construct reinforced fencing along at least 700 miles of the land border with Mexico (a border that stretches 1,933 miles). Congress has not provided a deadline for DHS to meet this 700-mile requirement, and as of the date of this report, fencing would need to be deployed along nearly 50 additional miles to satisfy the 700-mile requirement. Nor has Congress provided guidelines regarding the specific characteristics of fencing or other physical barriers (e.g., their height or material composition) deployed along the border, beyond specifying that required fencing must be reinforced. The primary statute authorizing the deployment of fencing and other barriers along the international borders is Section 102 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA; P.L. 104-208, div. C). Congress made significant amendments to IIRIRA Section 102 through three enactments - the REAL ID Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-13, div. B), the Secure Fence Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-367), and the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161, div. E). These amendments required DHS to construct hundreds of miles of new fencing along the U.S.-Mexico border, and they also gave the Secretary of DHS broad authority to waive - all legal requirements - that may impede construction of barriers and roads under IIRIRA Section 102. These statutory modifications, along with increased funding for border projects, resulted in the deployment of several hundred miles of new barriers along the southwest border between 2005 and 2011. But in the years following, DHS largely stopped deploying additional fencing, as the agency altered its enforcement strategy in a manner that places less priority upon barrier construction. On January 25, 2017, President Donald J. Trump issued an executive order that, among other things, instructs the Secretary of Homeland Security to “take all appropriate steps to immediately plan, design, and construct a physical wall along the southern border ... to most effectively achieve complete operational control" of the U.S.-Mexico border. The order defines a 'wall' to mean "a contiguous, physical wall or other similarly secure, contiguous, and impassable physical barrier." The order does not identify the contemplated mileage of the wall to be constructed. Until recently, interest in the framework governing the deployment of barriers along the international border typically focused on the stringency of the statutory mandate to deploy fencing along at least 700 miles of the U.S.-Mexico border. But attention has now shifted to those provisions of law that permit deployment of fencing or other physical barriers along additional mileage. IIRIRA Section 102 authorizes DHS to construct additional fencing or other barriers along the U.S. land borders beyond the 700 miles specified in statute. Indeed, nothing in current law would appear to bar DHS from installing hundreds of miles of additional physical barriers, at least so long as this action was determined appropriate to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal entry or was deemed warranted to achieve "operational control" of the southern border. DHS's policy not to deploy a substantial amount of additional fencing, beyond what is expressly required by law, appeared primarily premised on policy considerations and funding constraints, rather than significant legal impediments. This report discusses the statutory framework governing the deployment of fencing and other barriers along the U.S. international borders. For more extensive discussion of ongoing activities and operations along the border between ports of entry, see CRS Report R42138, Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry, by Carla N. Argueta. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: R43975: Accessed February 4, 2017 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43975.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43975.pdf Shelf Number: 145879 Keywords: Border SecurityHomeland SecurityIllegal ImmigrationImmigration Enforcement |
Author: Davis, Lynn E. Title: A Strategy to Counter ISIL as a Transregional Threat Summary: The debate in the past over counter-ISIL strategies has tended to focus on rather stark alternatives that are based on different ways to employ U.S. military forces: disengagement, containment, and aggressive rollback using combat forces. Our strategy seeks to broaden the focus to policies beyond the military dimension. Even though U.S. leverage is limited to affect the political situations in Iraq and Syria, the United States should focus on removing the underlying conditions sustaining ISIL and other violent jihadist groups, i.e., the lack of security, justice, and political representation. In addition, the United States needs to re-evaluate how to balance the aims of the counter-ISIL campaign with future territorial and political ambitions of the Kurds, given the risk of violence between Shia and Kurds in Iraq and Turkey and the YPG in Syria. In the absence of commitments on the part of the Kurds to limit their territorial ambitions, and to avoid fueling conflict across the region, the United States should be cautious in the ways it supports the YPG and peshmerga in its counter-ISIL military campaign. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Perspective: Accessed February 11, 2017 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE228.html Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE228.html Shelf Number: 145032 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Homeland SecurityISIS Islamic StateRadical Groups Terrorist |
Author: Klausen, Jytte Title: The Role of Social Networks in the Evolution of Al Qaeda-Inspired Violent Extremism in the United States, 1990-2015 Summary: 1. Purpose of Study: This report analyses the networks and organizations that mobilize and direct Americans for jihadist action, or that raise money in the US for Hamas and Hezbollah. The study employs a quasi-experimental method using a control-case design, comparing the network structures of American terrorism offenders inspired by Hezbollah with those of Sunni extremist groups aligned with Al Qaeda, and in recent years ISIL. 2. The Problem: How and why do foreign terrorist organizations recruit Americans to their cause? Three answers have been proposed to this question: Homegrown terrorism is a tactic developed by the foreign terrorist organization to further its strategic interest in attacking Western targets. Command and control is essential to all terrorist organizations. Homegrown terrorism is essentially "leaderless". The root cause of militancy lies at home. US militants may declare allegiance to foreign terrorist organizations, but this is just a matter of aspiration. Terrorist groups are comprised of leaders and foot soldiers, and tailor their operations to meet strategic goals, including, perhaps most importantly, keeping their numbers up. An emphasis on recruitment requires an open structure; fundraising requires centralized control over the flow of money; plotting attacks needs a covert and decentralized and covert organization. 2. Data and Methodology: The data were collected as part of the Western Jihadism Project (WJP), a database of Western nationals associated with terrorist plots related to Al Qaeda and aligned groups, including ISIL, from the early 1990s to the end of 2015. Over the past twenty-five years, close to 800 residents or citizens of the U.S. have committed terrorism offenses inspired by one of the many Islamist terrorist groups that have been active in this country.Of these, about 560 may be described as "homegrown" terrorists: American citizens or residents who have been arrested or have died in incidents related to Al Qaeda and its many affiliates and successors. Foreigners who have attacked the United States, e.g. the September 11 hijackers, or have been brought to trial in the United States, are excluded from this estimate, and are not considered in this study. Data were also collected on Americans convicted on charges related to Hamas and Hezbollah in order to assess differences in network organization that are related to the particular objectives of international terrorist groups operating in the United States. All data were collected from court records and other public documentation. Data collection procedures were designed to facilitate social network analysis through the comprehensive coding of information about communications and relationship between known terrorist offenders. The study uses a method termed social network analysis (SNA). Developed by sociologists to study informal network dynamics, it has proved to be helpful in ascertaining structures, variations and patterns of change in terrorist organizations. 3. Key Findings: 2015 ended with a record number of arrests in the U.S. related to Salafi-jihadist inspired terrorism, the highest count since the 9/11 attacks. The 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings and the ability of home-based if not necessarily homegrown militants to carry out successful mass shooting attacks in 2015 and 2016 are further indications that the country faces a significant and growing threat from Americans who are inspired by the Salafi-jihadist ideology and who are guided by recruiters acting on behalf of foreign terrorist organizations. Islamist terrorism in the United States has taken many different forms. These range from the pyramidal hierarchy of the Brooklyn-based cell in the 1990s to the family-based criminal fundraising schemes run by Hamas and Hezbollah and the recent decentralized pop-up cells of Americans who have become enamored of the Islamic State’s propaganda. The 1993 Brooklyn-based cell was markedly hierarchical and typical for an enclave-based terrorist organization that combines proselytizing and recruitment with planning and mobilization for terrorism. It was therefore vulnerable to prosecution and suppression, and its legacy for jihadist terrorism in the Untied States was minimal. Only actors who escaped abroad were able to carry on. Hamas and Hezbollah have used the United States as a base for raising funds, and occasionally as a safe harbor for important operatives. They retained the character of diaspora organizations focused on supporting organizations in the Middle East and eschewed domestic recruitment and mobilization for violent action in the United States. Highly centralized and vertical networks, they tend to organize around large-scale family-based fraud conspiracies involving siblings, parents and children, spouses, in-laws, uncles, cousins, and even more distant relatives. While the cells lacked broader connections within the United States, they were linked to the mother organizations in Lebanon or Gaza, often through nodes placed outside the United States. The number of Americans who die abroad in connection with terrorist actions on behalf of foreign terrorist organizations has risen sharply in recent years. Homegrown American militants nearly always first want to go abroad to fight. Later, they may be turned around to carry out attacks at home—or if they are frustrated in their ambition to go abroad, choose to commit acts of terrorism at home. After the 9/11 attacks, jihadist recruitment in the United States recovered only slowly, facilitated by travel to Al Qaeda affiliates in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, and a web-based proselytizing and recruitment strategy. In the last two years, travel to territories controlled by ISIL produced an uptick in deaths. Recruitment networks funneling people abroad look very different from the networks of the past that were intent of organizing attacks at home. The Islamic State’s recruitment structure presents a classic pattern of what is known as a star network, i.e. a communication network in which all nodes are independently connected to one central unit, here the recruiters for the Islamic State. Flat, dispersed, and highly connected through the central hub, all traffic goes through the leadership based abroad. The peripheral nodes may be comprised of just one person linking up via a home computer or the node may be a pop-up cell of friends and family communicating with the central hub. But characteristically those on the periphery have little awareness of each other. The new network structure associated with social media recruitment prioritizes recruitment over exercising control and command of violent plots. It is inaccurate to say that it exemplified “leaderless” terrorism as all information and action scripts run through the central hub of the network, comprised of recruiters and middle-men acting on behalf of the ISIL. Jihadist recruitment has reached into small and mid-sized cities in every state of the country. The impact of online recruitment is evident in the diversity of American terrorism offenders, who today have come from forty different ethnicities and all races. In 2015 investigations related to the Islamic State were in progress in all fifty states. Given the extraordinary diversity of the American homegrown terrorism offenders, no common denominator and no common set of grievances, or even common motivations, can explain what makes a few individuals opt to join groups espousing violent jihad. 4. Inferences and Recommendations For Policy: Family members and spouses are often the first to know when a person is about to do something. American homegrown terrorists rebel against the nation and their parents, and against the American Muslim community. Establish a duty to report: State and federal laws should make it a duty to report suspicions about imminent criminal activity related to terrorism. The legal construction may mirror current rules regarding the obligation to report child abuse if the family member, teacher, or community member has “cause to believe” that a risk to the public exists. But what are bystanders supposed to see? There is a real risk that American Muslims will be unfairly stereotyped in the absence of a clearly formulated public education program that focus on signs of radicalization to violent extremism. Focus on community education: The growing involvement of converts and the diffusion of risk outside the metropolitan areas suggests a need to educate community leaders, teachers, prison wardens and social workers in the detection of the signs of dangerous radicalization. The number of Americans participating in lethal attacks abroad has increased. For this reason and because of the intimate connection between perpetrating an attack at home and going abroad—in whatever order— the expression of a desire to go abroad to fight for a jihadist organization should be treated as an immediate risk to homeland security. Disrupt and intercept travel to foreign terrorist organizations and insurgencies: Withdrawal of passports is one tool. Preventing the development of hidden communities of extremism should continue be a high priority. Radicalization takes place in online and offline networks and peer groups. Profile the networks: Social network analysis may provide a fuller picture of an individual’s risk profile if it is used to profile all contact points, ranging from social media networks to offline engagements with other militants. The focus should be on top-down suppression of the purveyors of extreme political violence rather than bottom-up elimination of militant social media activists. Many would-be terrorists are caught online. That does not mean that they radicalized online. Moreover, online data have proven of value to law enforcement. Suppress Internet Producers of Online Violent Extremism: Policy should focus on targeting and suppressing the recruiters rather than retail-level consumers of terrorist propaganda. Details: Final Report to the U.S. Department of Justice, 2016. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2017 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250416.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250416.pdf Shelf Number: 146964 Keywords: Al QaedaExtremistsHomegrown TerrorismHomeland SecurityISILIslamRadical GroupsSocial NetworksTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Parker, Tony C. Title: Establishing a Deradicalization/Disengagement Model for America's Correctional Facilities: Recommendations for Countering Prison Radicalization Summary: Prison radicalization has been identified as a potentially significant threat to America's homeland security. When considering the inmate population currently housed within the Federal Bureau of Prisons with a terrorism nexus and the fact that 95 percent of our inmate population will return to our communities, the need for a proactive posture to prison radicalization becomes evident. Currently, the United States has no prison deradicalization program. This thesis provides a comparative analysis of two deradicalization/disengagement programs currently utilized in Singapore and Saudi Arabia. The analysis identifies externally valid data that provides the basis for recommendations for United States correctional policymakers in building a framework for a United States prison deradicalization model. This thesis also examines the current literature, relevant to prison radicalization and the prison environment that may promote prison radicalization. Through an analysis of these environmental elements, specific recommendations are made that attempt to counter the contributing factors, within the prison environment, that make the prison setting a fertile ground for radicalization. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. 106p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed February 23, 2017 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32881/13Mar_Parker_Tony.pdf?sequence=1 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/32881/13Mar_Parker_Tony.pdf?sequence=1 Shelf Number: 144858 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismDeradicalizationExtremismHomeland SecurityPrisonersPrisonsRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorism |
Author: U.S. Office of the Director of National Intellilgence Title: Domestic Approach to National Intelligence Summary: This publication comprises inputs from a broad array of participants representing elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) and its partners in the domestic field. We thank everyone involved for their time and valuable contributions. The process began with meetings and resulted in many conversations, drafts, revisions, and rounds of coordination with subject matter experts, lawyers, privacy and civil liberties officials, and senior leadership. Over time, we realized the topic is very complex and often characterized differently by the various participants and stakeholders, depending upon their vantage point and mission. Segments explaining the role of specific IC agencies and departments were written and provided by the entity itself. The Domestic Approach to National Intelligence describes the "as is," or current picture, of the operating environment for the IC's key engagements with federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, and private sector partners inside the United States. The next step-one that may be even more complex and challenging - is to move beyond the "as is" descriptions and work toward a vision of the "should be." Challenges aside, we owe it to the American people to strengthen the national security apparatus to best protect our citizens and their privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. Details: Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 14, 2017 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=798173 Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=798173 Shelf Number: 146176 Keywords: Homeland SecurityNational IntelligenceNational SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Hemmings, John Title: Safeguarding our Systems: Managing Chinese Investment into the UK's Digital and Critical National Infrastructure Summary: - China's investment into Western advanced economies -- including that of the UK -- is increasing and changing in scope surging from EUR 14 billion in 2015 to EUR 20 billion in 2016, a 44% jump. More than 60% of the value of deals has been by state-owned enterprises, indicating this push is led by state strategy than commercial interests. - In 2016, China invested $11.15 billion into the UK. More than double the amount in 2015 and the most in any one year going back to 2005. - China's economic strategy, Made in China: 2025, might threaten the long-term survival of UK businesses unless some sort of government protection is afforded to them or unless China affords British businesses more access to China's home market. - Because of cyber vulnerabilities, critical national infrastructure will be at the forefront of any future war. - The current review system could be improved and rationalised: -- It has allowed access to the UK's digital and critical infrastructure with elements of China's defence industrial concerns -- It has allowed deals that have affected the UK's closest military allies -- It allows for domestic and foreign pressure on the government of the day -- A formal investment screening regime is both necessary and desirable to protect the UK's economic interests and its national security. - A new regime should be built, which is adequately resourced to carry out the difficult task of tracking foreign direct investment (FDI) into the sensitive parts of the UK's economy. - The new regime should begin to coordinate more closely with the UK's closet military and intelligence-sharing allies, including the Five Eyes partners and NATO member states. - Any new regime should carry out its review process in a judicious but swift manner so that foreign investment in the UK is not hampered or harmed. This report suggests that the regime should be sufficiently able to pass its decisions within 30 days of receiving an inquiry. - Ideally, any regime should be overseen by a special committee in Parliament to ensure that it is sufficiently funded and resourced to carry out its activities, and that it is carrying them out in a legal, expedient and sufficient manner. Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, 2017. 54p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 7, 2017 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Safeguarding-Our-Systems-Report-FINAL-Digital.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Safeguarding-Our-Systems-Report-FINAL-Digital.pdf Shelf Number: 146764 Keywords: CybersecurityHomeland SecurityInfrastructure SecurityNational Security |
Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: Domestic Terrorism: An Overview Summary: The emphasis of counterterrorism policy in the United States since Al Qaeda's attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) has been on jihadist terrorism. However, in the last decade, domestic terrorists - people who commit crimes within the homeland and draw inspiration from U.S.-based extremist ideologies and movements - have killed American citizens and damaged property across the country. Not all of these criminals have been prosecuted under federal terrorism statutes, which does not imply that domestic terrorists are taken any less seriously than other terrorists. The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) do not officially designate domestic terrorist organizations, but they have openly delineated domestic terrorist "threats." These include individuals who commit crimes in the name of ideologies supporting animal rights, environmental rights, anarchism, white supremacy, anti-government ideals, black separatism, and beliefs about abortion. The boundary between constitutionally protected legitimate protest and domestic terrorist activity has received public attention. This boundary is highlighted by a number of criminal cases involving supporters of animal rights - one area in which specific legislation related to domestic terrorism has been crafted. The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (P.L. 109-374) expands the federal government's legal authority to combat animal rights extremists who engage in criminal activity. Signed into law in November 2006, it amended the Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-346). This report is intended as a primer on the issue, and four discussion topics in it may help explain domestic terrorism's relevance for policymakers: - Level of Activity. Domestic terrorists have been responsible for orchestrating numerous incidents since 9/11. - Use of Nontraditional Tactics. A large number of domestic terrorists do not necessarily use tactics such as suicide bombings or airplane hijackings. They have been known to engage in activities such as vandalism, trespassing, and tax fraud, for example. - Exploitation of the Internet. Domestic terrorists - much like their jihadist analogues - are often Internet and social-media savvy and use such platforms to share ideas and as resources for their operations. - Decentralized Nature of the Threat. Many domestic terrorists rely on the concept of leaderless resistance. This involves two levels of activity. On an operational level, militant, underground, ideologically motivated cells or individuals engage in illegal activity without any participation in or direction from an organization that maintains traditional leadership positions and membership rosters. On another level, the above-ground public face (the "political wing") of a domestic terrorist movement may focus on propaganda and the dissemination of ideology - engaging in protected speech. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2017. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report R44921: Accessed September 15, 2017 at: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44921.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R44921.pdf Shelf Number: 147336 Keywords: Counter-terrorismDomestic TerrorismHomeland SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Jones, Chris Title: Market Forces: The development of the EU Security-Industrial Complex Summary: Despite the economic crisis, EU funding for new security tools and technologies will double in the 2014-20 period compared to the previous 6 years. The biggest winners have been the "homeland security" industry whose influence on European policy continues to grow, constructing an ever more militarised and security-focused Europe. While the European Union project has faltered in recent years, afflicted by the fall-out of the economic crisis, the rise of anti-EU parties and the Brexit vote, there is one area where it has not only continued apace but made significant advances: Europe's security policies have not only gained political support from across its Member States but growing budgets and resources too. The increased securitisation of the European Union has relevance not only for its Member States but for the world which will be affected by the measures, technologies and strategies being developed, sold and deployed. The emergence of 'security' as the EU's increasingly default response to complex social and ecological crises is also significant given the current political context of rising authoritarian parties and governments all-too-willing to use the latest security tools to maintain and extend power. This report digs deep into the EU's funding of its security strategy. It shows that between 2014 and 2020, a total of at least L11 billion has been allocated to budgets directed towards security measures - L3.8 billion to the Internal Security Fund (ISF), L1.7 billion to the European Security Research Programme, L3.1 billion to the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (which has numerous uses in the context of security policy) and some L2.4 billion for EU home affairs agencies such as Europol and Frontex. While still a small amount in comparison to the EU's total budget of "1 trillion between 2014 and 2020, it is a significant development given that a decade ago the bloc had no dedicated budgets for security, justice or home affairs. The report's investigation of the different budgets also draws out the big picture of where the funding is going and what it is helping to construct: an all-encompassing vision of security that seeks to combat a seemingly limitless number of "threats" ranging from terrorism to petty crime, and which displays a marked tendency of treating the entire population (European and especially non-European) as potential objects of suspicion that must be surveyed and if necessary detained, obstructed or even killed. This vision has been propelled by military and security corporations whose profits depend on a world of suspicions, fears and threats - and who have not only been major beneficiaries of EU security spending, but have also been given an unprecedented role in designing the security research programme. In a 2009 report by Statewatch and TNI, we warned that EU's security, research and development policies were "coalescing around a high-tech blueprint for a new kind of security". We summed up the vision in the title of the report, NeoConOpticon, to capture the metaphor of an all-seeing prison combined with the increasingly neoconservative, corporate-led vision of the EU's security and defence policies. It warned that we were "turning a blind eye to the start of a new kind of arms race, one in which all the weapons are pointing inwards". That report examined the early years of EU security strategies, from 2003 to 2008, and focused on the beginnings of the European Security Research Programme (ESRP) and the 85 projects it had funded up to that point. Market Forces focuses on the development of EU security policies and budgets through the 2007-13 period and their successors, which were launched in 2014 and will run until 2020. These include the ESRP, which funds research to develop new technologies for law enforcement, border control, cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection and leans heavily towards technologies and techniques initially deployed or favoured by military forces: drones, data-mining tools, large-scale surveillance systems, biometric recognition and automated behaviour analysis tools. It also explicitly seeks to develop "dual-use" technologies for both civil and military use. The report also analyses the Internal Security Fund (ISF), distributed to EU Member States to enhance the powers of law enforcement and border control agencies (including through numerous new surveillance and analysis systems). The aim - albeit not yet realised - is that EU funds pay for both the development of new technologies and their subsequent purchase at EU or national level, creating a self-fulfilling loop of supply and demand. Despite warnings and public concerns over the direction of the EU's security strategy, the journey towards a world of ubiquitous public-private surveillance and control systems continues, for the time being, largely unabated. The report is divided into three sections: the first provides a summary of the early development of the European Security Research Programme, its incorporation into the EU's formal research agenda, and the concurrent development and implementation of EU policies and budgets in the area of justice and home affairs from 2007 to 2013. The second section looks at the institutions, corporations and organisations involved in the development and ongoing implementation of the EU's security research agenda and security policies, and the ways in which private interests have long-managed to successfully shape the public policy and research agenda. The third section looks at current EU security policies and budgets. It seeks to provide a general overview of aims and objectives of current policies, the funds available for implementing them, and which organisations have so far been the chief beneficiaries. The EU's security agenda is now so sprawling and complex that no one report can cover every aspect of it, but there are a few key themes that are worth drawing out here. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2017. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 18, 2017 at: https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/marketforces-report-tni-statewatch.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/marketforces-report-tni-statewatch.pdf Shelf Number: 147371 Keywords: Border SecurityCybersecurityHomeland SecurityLaw Enforcement TechnologySecurity PolicySurveillanceTerrorism |
Author: Parkin, William S. Title: Criminal Justice & Military Deaths at the Hands of Extremists Summary: As there have been a number of high profile incidents where extremists have targeted criminal justice personnel generally, and law enforcement officers specifically, it is important to provide some context with data on attacks over time. START researchers examined the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) to provide analysis on attacks on agents of the criminal justice system and military personnel in the United States between 1990 and 2015. The ECDB identifies 66 criminal justice/military homicides perpetrated by an offender associated with either al-Qaida and its associated movement (AQAM) or far-right extremism (FRE) in this time period. This background report presents information on these incidents, the offenders and victims of these attacks. Details: College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2016. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 26, 2017 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CriminalJusticeMilitaryDeathsbyExtremists_BackgroundReport_Nov2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CriminalJusticeMilitaryDeathsbyExtremists_BackgroundReport_Nov2016.pdf Shelf Number: 147461 Keywords: Extremist GroupsExtremist ViolenceHomeland SecurityHomicidesMilitary PersonnelTerrorists |
Author: Munchow, Sebastian von Title: Aftermath of the Terror Attack on Breitscheid Platz Christmas Market: Germany's Security Architecture and Parliamentary Inquiries Summary: On December 19th 2016, Anis Amri, a Tunisian citizen, hijacked a truck and crashed into a Christmas market at Breitscheid Platz in Berlin. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack, which resulted in twelve deaths and fifty additional casualties. Amri escaped the crime scene and travelled through Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and France to Northern Italy where police officers killed him near Milan three days later. This assault was the first major terrorist event in Germany for decades. Prior to this event, the most recent attacks were the Red Army Faction plots in the 1970s, the Olympics hostage-taking in 1972, and the right-wing motivated attack on Munich's Oktoberfest in 1980. This attack, in which a vehicle rammed into a crowded Christmas market in the center of Berlin, not only sparked a debate about Berlin's migration policy at large, but also focused the conversation on specific questions. How could Amri be seeking asylum in Germany despite his criminal record in Italy? How did he operate inside Germany using fourteen different identities? Did he rely on a network of supporters? How did he manage to travel through half of Europe before his life ended? Some political voices called for security-related reforms aimed at improving video surveillance, data exchange, and deportation processes, while others demanded a thorough parliamentary investigation of the plot. This paper will briefly touch upon those parliamentary attempts on state and federal level to explore the plot. It will then revisit federal inquiries into matters related to the security architecture over the past twenty-seven years as well as the coverage of these inquiries in the media. Finally, this study will conclude with some thoughts about whether a federal parliamentary inquiry should have been used to investigate what happened before, during, and after the attack. Details: Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2017. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper Series, No. 28: Accessed October 10, 2017 at: http://www.marshallcenter.org/MCPUBLICWEB/mcdocs/files/College/F_Publications/occPapers/occ-paper_28-en.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Germany URL: http://www.marshallcenter.org/MCPUBLICWEB/mcdocs/files/College/F_Publications/occPapers/occ-paper_28-en.pdf Shelf Number: 147653 Keywords: Homeland SecuritySecurityTerrorism |
Author: Sheppard, Jill Title: Attitudes to National Security: Balancing Safety and Privacy Summary: The most recent ANUpoll explores Australians' willingness to trade off their personal rights and freedoms for national security. Government responses to the threat of terrorism often incur a cost to citizens, by way of reductions in privacy, freedom of movement, and other individual rights and civil liberties. Such a 'trade-off' approach, where the respect for fundamental liberal rights and values is reconciled with the need for communal security, according to the threat level, is meant to strike an appropriate balance between these two cornerstones of liberalism. Sacrificing some freedoms to protect the Australian community is therefore presented by governments as a necessary cost, but one that is proportionate to the need for safety. Yet this trade-off between increased security and the reduction in some civil liberties also presents a dilemma to democratic societies: namely, the extent to which the risk of terrorist attacks can actually be contained without compromising the defining principles of Australia's liberal order. While in theory the idea of finding an appropriate balance seems straightforward, in practice it can be difficult to determine how much weight should be attached to the respective values of security versus privacy. When examining attitudes towards safety and privacy, it is consequently important to understand national security in terms of not only preventing terrorist violence, but also considering the political consequences any such measures have for our democratic societies. This is why this survey took particular interest in how the public views this increased need for surveillance with regard to the Muslim population, who are commonly perceived as being at a higher risk of radicalization and of being susceptible to violent extremist ideologies. The survey of 1200 Australians finds widespread support for current counter-terrorism measures, such as retention of telecommunications metadata, strict border control policies, revocation of citizenship of 'foreign fighters' with more than one nationality, and bans on travel to sites of certain international conflicts. Even when posed as a trade-off between an individual's rights and the protection of national security, the Australians surveyed express support for freedom-limiting policies in the fight against terrorism. The findings also illustrate substantial public awareness of Muslims identified as being at a higher risk of radicalization and affiliation with terrorist groups than the rest of the population. More importantly, this ANUpoll supports the notion that many Australians conflate terrorism and Islamic extremism, with 22 per cent of Australians 'not much' or 'not at all' bothered by the possibility of Muslims being singled out for additional surveillance and monitoring. This indicates a disconnect from the Australian Government's emphasis on cooperation with the Muslim community over enhanced law enforcement. This is significant insofar as it highlights an ongoing public perception of Muslims in Western societies as a potential danger to national security. This can result in stigmatisation, social divisions, and public backlash against the government counter-terrorism measures from those who feel unfairly targeted. Details: Canberra: Australian National University, Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, College of Arts and Social Sciences, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Report No. 22: Accessed November 13, 2017 at: http://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/sites/politicsir.anu.edu.au/files/ANUpoll-22-Security.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: http://politicsir.cass.anu.edu.au/sites/politicsir.anu.edu.au/files/ANUpoll-22-Security.pdf Shelf Number: 148149 Keywords: Extremist ViolenceHomeland SecurityMuslimesNational SecurityTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Victoria State Government Title: Expert Panel on Terrorism and Violent Extremism Prevention and Response Powers. Report 2 Summary: In June 2017, the Victorian government established the independent Expert Panel on Terrorism and Violent Extremism Prevention and Response Powers ('Expert Panel'), led by former Victoria Police Chief Commissioner, Ken Lay AO, and former Victorian Court of Appeal Justice, the Hon David Harper AM. The panel was tasked with examining and evaluating the operation and effectiveness of Victoria's key legislation and related powers and procedures of relevant agencies to prevent, monitor, investigate and respond to terrorism. This second report from the panel extends the focus of the first report to include the full spectrum of policies and programs to prevent and intervene early in relation to emerging risks of violent extremism, or to respond rapidly to risks after they have eventuated. It contains 26 recommendations relating to: countering violent extremism; enhancing disengagement programs; changing the definition of a terrorist act; creating a support and engagement order; creating an offence for the possession of terrorism related material; extending the preventative detention scheme to minors; and creating a post-sentence supervision scheme for high-risk terrorist offenders. Details: Melbourne: Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2017. 121p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 21, 2017 at: http://apo.org.au/system/files/120241/apo-nid120241-482731.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: http://apo.org.au/system/files/120241/apo-nid120241-482731.pdf Shelf Number: 148285 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremist GroupsHomeland Security Preventive DetentionTerrorism TerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Jenkins, Brian Michael Title: The Origins of America's Jihadists Summary: The U.S. homeland faces a multilayered threat from terrorist organizations that could try to carry out a major terrorist operation in the United States or sabotage a U.S.-bound airliner, from Americans returning from jihadist fronts or European returnees who might try to enter the United States, and from homegrown terrorists inspired by jihadist ideology to carry out attacks in the United States. Homegrown jihadists account for most of the terrorist activity in the United States since 9/11. American Muslims appear unreceptive to the violent ideologies promoted by al Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). A small fraction express favorable views of the tactics that those organizations use, but expressions of support for political violence do not translate to a willingness to engage in violence. Efforts by jihadist terrorist organizations to inspire terrorist attacks in the United States have thus far yielded meager results. This essay identifies 86 plots to carry out terrorist attacks and 22 actual attacks since 9/11. These involve 178 planners and perpetrators. (This total does not include those who provided material support to jihadist groups or left the United States to join jihadist groups abroad but who did not participate in terrorist attacks or plots to carry out attacks here.) American jihadists are made in the United States, not imported. Of the 178 jihadist planners and perpetrators, 86 were U.S.-born citizens. The others were naturalized U.S. citizens (46) or legal permanent residents (23)- in other words, people who had long residencies in the United States before arrest. (One more was a U.S. citizen, but it is unclear whether he was born here or naturalized.) Eight of the 178 terrorist attackers and plotters were in the United States on temporary visas, three were asylum seekers, four had been brought into the country illegally (three as small children and one as a teenager), and two were refugees. Three foreigners were participants in a plot to attack John F. Kennedy (JFK) International Airport but did not enter the United States. The status of the remaining few is unknown. The nation has invested significant resources in preventing terrorist attacks. Public statements indicate that federal and local authorities have followed hundreds of thousands of tips and conducted thousands of investigations since 9/11. An average of 11 people per year have carried out or have been arrested for plotting jihadist terrorist attacks. Authorities have been able to uncover and thwart most of the terrorist plots, keeping the total death toll under 100 during the 15-year period since 9/11-clearly a needless loss of life but a remarkable intelligence and law enforcement success. No American jihadist group has emerged to sustain a terrorist campaign. There is no evidence of an active jihadist underground to support a continuing terrorist holy war. There has been no American intifada, just an occasional isolated plot or attack. Out of tens of millions of foreign arrivals every year, including temporary visitors, immigrants, and refugees, 91 people known to have been born abroad were involved in jihadist terrorist plots since 9/11. Information on arrival dates is available for 66 of these entrants-only 13 of them arrived in the country after 9/11, when entry procedures were tightened. Vetting is not a broken system. Nationality is a poor predictor of later terrorist activity. Foreign-born jihadists come from 39 Muslim-majority countries, with Pakistan leading the list, but concern about possible attempts by returning European foreign fighters to enter the United States requires looking at a larger set of national origins. Vetting people coming to the United States, no matter how rigorous, cannot identify those who radicalize here. Most of the foreign jihadists arrived in the United States when they were very young. The average age upon arrival was 14.9 years. The average age at the time of the attack or arrest in a terrorist plot was 27.7. Determining whether a young teenager might, more than 12 years later, turn out to be a jihadist terrorist would require the bureaucratic equivalent of divine foresight. Of the 25 people involved in actual jihadist terrorist attacks, only one returned to the United States after training abroad with clear intentions to carry out an attack. Adding the "shoe" and "underwear" bombers (bringing the total to 27) makes three entering the country or boarding a U.S.-bound airliner with terrorist intentions. Six others entered or returned to the United States within several years of the attack, but subsequent investigations turned up no proof of connections with terrorist groups while they were abroad. The 18 others (72 percent) had no record of recent travel abroad. The complexity of terrorist motives defies easy diagnosis. Religious beliefs and jihadist ideologies play an important role but are only one component of a constellation of motives. Remote recruiting has increasingly made jihadist ideology a conveyer of individual discontents. Feelings of alienation, anger, vengeance, disillusion, dissatisfaction, and boredom; life crises; and even mental disabilities appear in the life stories of individual jihadists. Some of those engaged in jihadist attacks had previously come to the attention of the authorities. Several of these, including the shooter in Little Rock, Arkansas, one of the Boston bombers, and the attacker who killed 49 people in Orlando, Florida, had been interviewed by Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officials at some point in their history and were assessed as posing no immediate danger. In some cases, that assessment might have been correct at the time, but personal circumstances changed the person's trajectory. Predicting dangerousness is difficult. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017. 99p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2017 at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE251/RAND_PE251.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE251/RAND_PE251.pdf Shelf Number: 148507 Keywords: Homeland SecurityJihadistsTerrorismTerrorist OrganizationTerrorists |
Author: Singh, Jasjit Title: The Idea, Context, Framing and Realities of 'Sikh Radicalisation' in Britain Summary: The report examines the context and reality of Sikh activism in the UK. It draws on Dr Singh's earlier work on religious and cultural transmission among young British Sikhs, Sikh diasporas, religious movements/communities and the state in UK South Asian disaporas. Bringing together evidence from historic and contemporary media sources, academic literature, social media, internet discussion forums, ethnographic fieldwork and a series of semi-structured interviews, the report answers the following questions: FRAMING SIKH ACTIVISM IN BRITAIN: Which incidents have taken place in Britain involving Sikhs including protests and flashpoints and how have these impacted on the discourse around Sikhs in Britain? NARRATIVES AND ISSUES: Which narratives and issues are relevant in encouraging Sikhs in Britain to participate in these protests and incidents? Are there specific political / religious narratives and how are these linked to cultural issues? THE TRANSMISSION OF NARRATIVES: How are these narratives transmitted? How are Sikh organisations / institutions involved? TYPES OF SIKH ACTIVISM: Are there different types of Sikh activism and what are the key issues of focus? THE IMPACT OF SIKH ACTIVISM IN BRITAIN: What is the impact of Sikh activism on the British public? The report also maps events and incidents of Sikh political violence, highlighting how Sikh activism in Britain fundamentally changed following the events of 1984. In June 1984 Operation Bluestar saw the Indian forces storming the Harmandir Sahib (often referred to as the Golden Temple). In November the same year, Sikh bodyguards assassinated the Indian Prime Minister, triggering a wave of violence against Sikhs across India. These events remain traumatic issues for many Sikhs in Britain. Since then most incidents of Sikh violence have occurred against other Sikhs for doctrinal, personal or political reasons. The report concludes that Sikhs in Britain do not pose a security threat as there is no conflict with 'the West'. In terms of integration, the main threat of violence is from the exploitation of inter-community and/or intra-community tensions and any resulting vigilantism. Details: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, Lancaster: 2017. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 4, 2017 at: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/sikh-radicalisation-full-report/ Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/sikh-radicalisation-full-report/ Shelf Number: 148691 Keywords: ExtremistsHomeland SecurityRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Lee, Benjamin Title: Ideological Transmission II: Peers, Education and Prisons Summary: Peers, education and prisons is the second of three literature reviews on ideological transmission. The first review dealt with the ideological influence of the family on young people. The third review will deal with transmission by and through political and religious organisations. This second review focuses on secondary socialisation, and considers ideological transmission within social groups (peers), centred on educational settings, including schools, universities and university societies, and prisons. The research questions that inform these reports are as follows: How is political and religious ideology (beliefs, values, attitudes, and embodied practices) passed on between and across generations and to newcomers? Who is responsible for ideological transmission? Where and when does ideological transmission take place? How do these issues apply to the transmission of extremist and terrorist ideologies? These questions are addressed across three stages of the research review, with findings summarised in the final report. In research on families, the focus on intergenerational transmission and socialisation is well developed (see Ideological Transmission I: Families), but that is not the case in research on friendship and other peer networks. This report has revealed that there is little work that concentrates explicitly on ideological transmission between peers. Studies have focused predominantly on behaviours, relationships and to a lesser extent influences, with relatively little consideration of ideas, values and beliefs or their connection to action. Details: Lancaster, UK: Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, 2017. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 4, 2017 at: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/peers-education-prisons/ Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/peers-education-prisons/ Shelf Number: 148692 Keywords: ExtremistsHomeland Security Peer InfluenceRadical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists |
Author: McQuaid, Julia Title: Independent Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts against Al-Qaeda Summary: Section 1228 of the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) states, "The Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence, shall provide for the conduct of an independent assessment of the effectiveness of the United States' efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat AlQaeda, including its affiliated groups, associated groups, and adherents since September 11, 2001." The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (ASD (SO/LIC)) asked CNA to conduct this independent assessment, the results of which are presented in this report. Details: Arlington, VA: CNA Corporation, 2017. 380p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 8, 2017 at: https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/DRM-2017-U-015710-2Rev.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/DRM-2017-U-015710-2Rev.pdf Shelf Number: 148763 Keywords: Al-Quaida Homeland SecurityTerrorism Terrorists |
Author: Smith, Brian T. Title: Ethics on the Fly: Toward a Drone-Specific Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Summary: This thesis examines the issue of law enforcement's use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) from an ethical perspective. It describes ethics as rules governing individual conduct that are functionally specific, relating to the role one plays in society. The role police play in U.S. communities and the ethical frameworks they use to guide their conduct have a great impact in defining the relationship between the people and their government in the American context, colored as it is by the social contract and the idea, enshrined in the Declaration of Independence, that the legitimacy of any government is derived from the consent of the governed.[1] Empowered to enforce the laws by which society has corporately agreed to be governed, police have a unique ethical relationship to the law. For an action to be ethical for police to take, it must first be legal. The law is a necessary deontological reference point for officers and agencies in defining right and wrong conduct. Unfortunately, in the current environment, legislation governing UAS use by police agencies is lacking. This circumstance creates a referential void for law enforcement executives seeking to put drone technology to use in service of the public. From a homeland security perspective, public safety stands to be greatly enhanced by the fielding of these versatile platforms. UAS will allow law enforcement agencies without manned aviation units to realize gains in situational awareness, crime scene investigation, accident investigation, search and rescue operations, warrant service, and tactical operations. At issue is how to put the technology to use in these legitimate public safety missions in a way that adequately addresses the privacy and other concerns that accompany any discussion about domestic drone use by government. It is imperative that these issues be considered if public support for law enforcement UAS deployment is to be secured.[2] Yet, at present, the discussion about the ethics of UAS employment for law enforcement purposes is nearly absent from the literature. This research seeks to help fill that void. The primary research question posed by this thesis is whether a prevailing ethical framework exists to govern the use of UAS for domestic law enforcement functions. This thesis concluded that no such consensus exists. Indeed, this research found no single set of ethical guidelines is available to which all American police agencies subscribe. Rather, state and local law enforcement in the United States is fragmented, which results in a lack of standardization regarding ethical norms. With over 18,000 law enforcement agencies nationwide,[3] law enforcement in the United States is far from a unitary project. Whether by accident or by design, this circumstance allows agencies to be responsive to local and regional concerns with regard to the ethics of policing. As a secondary research question, this thesis considers what ethical frameworks might be applied to this problem through an examination of the emerging literature. A hybrid research methodology using elements of the case study method, as well as a policy analysis section, are used in developing this thesis. Using the case study method, it examines evidence of ethical frameworks currently in use by domestic law enforcement agencies. The evidence considered is largely documentary and considered against the ethical standards society expects of law enforcement. Once described, a comparative policy analysis is performed to identify any overlapping areas of concern that appear to be held in common. This study identified seven common dimensions of ethical concern regarding UAS employment: Engagement Accountability Transparency Privacy Legality Use of Force Safety This thesis recommends that agencies currently using or preparing to use UAS for law enforcement missions address these dimensions in a drone-specific code of conduct, both to guide decision making for officers in the field and to inform the public regarding the uses and limitations of these increasingly capable public safety tools. Further, this thesis recommends the code of conduct be made available for public review and that it be considered a living document that is expected to change over time. Public opinion is not static; society's expectations are subject to refinement over time. It is in this light, possessing a capacity for change, that the code of conduct should be understood when considering drones and their place alongside other tools employed in law enforcement missions. Of the more than 18,000 law enforcement agencies in the United States,[4] only 20 agencies have a certificate of waiver authorization (COA) with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to operate drones.[5] Accordingly, very little experience exists from which to draw regarding what acceptable and unacceptable conduct looks like in law enforcement's use of drones. UAS use by police is just one facet of an ever-broadening debate in this country about the costs of security in the modern world. The debate about police use of drones is a debate about the future of policing. Law enforcement agencies are uniquely positioned at this moment to lead that conversation, demonstrating that drone technology can contribute to this nation's collective security in a way consistent with American principles and that maintains the consent of the governed. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2016. 79p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed March 28, 2018 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=792232 Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=792232 Shelf Number: 149603 Keywords: Code of ConductDronesHomeland SecurityLaw EnforcementPolice SurveillancePolice TechnologyUnmanned Aerial System |
Author: National Threat Assessment Center Title: investigating Ideologically Inspired Violent Extremists: Local Partners Are An Asset. A Case Study of Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad Summary: The U.S. Secret Service conducts threat assessment investigations on individuals who come to attention for having a threatening or concerning interest in Secret Service protected interests (e.g., the White House, the Inauguration). A routine part of the investigative process is working within local communities to gather additional information that enhances the assessment of the risk these individuals may pose. Federal investigations into ideologically motivated violent extremists, who are at risk for engaging in targeted violence, can also be enhanced by gathering such community-level information from those who have knowledge about these individuals. These efforts involve working with local law enforcement and other public safety partners to learn more about those under investigation, as well as interviewing others who are familiar with these individuals. Using examples from the case of Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, this document shares some of the information local agencies and individuals had about his behavior prior to the incident. Muhammad opened fire on two uniformed service members outside the Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, AR, in June 2009. A case summary of Muhammad's life also follows. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Secret Service, 2015. 15p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 4, 2018 at: https://www.secretservice.gov/data/protection/ntac/Abdulhakim_Muhammad_Using_Local_Assets.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://www.secretservice.gov/data/protection/ntac/Abdulhakim_Muhammad_Using_Local_Assets.pdf Shelf Number: 149672 Keywords: ExtremismHomeland SecuritySecret ServiceThreat AssessmentViolent Extremists |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Performance Management and Planning for Expansion of DHS's Visa Security Program Summary: The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) manages the Visa Security Program (VSP), which provides an additional layer of review to the visa adjudication process; however, VSP agents are not consistently providing required training to consular officers. ICE implemented the Pre-Adjudicated Threat Recognition and Intelligence Operations Team (PATRIOT) in fiscal year 2014. PATRIOT screens 100 percent of nonimmigrant visa applications at VSP posts against U.S. databases, and U.S.-based analysts manually vet applications with potential matches to derogatory information. VSP agents at post then make recommendations to Department of State (State) consular officers on whether to refuse a visa. In fiscal year 2016, VSP screened over 2.1 million visa applications, and recommended over 8,000 visa refusals. In addition, VSP agents and VSP-funded locally employed staff dedicated approximately 43 percent of their work hours in fiscal year 2016 to non-VSP activities-such as assisting ICE investigations not directly related to visas. ICE increased the percentage of VSP posts providing quarterly training from 30 percent in fiscal year 2014 to 79 percent in fiscal year 2016. However, some trainings are not targeted to the specific post and do not address identified threats to the visa process, as required. Ensuring that VSP agents provide required training would help ensure consular officers have information that could assist them in adjudicating visas. ICE developed objectives and performance measures for VSP, but its measures are not outcome-based and limit the agency's ability to assess the effectiveness of VSP. As of fiscal year 2017, none of VSP's 19 established performance measures are outcome-based. For example, ICE measures its activities, such as number of visa refusals VSP agents recommended, rather than the outcomes of those recommendations. ICE officials stated that measuring VSP's outcomes is difficult due to the qualitative nature of the program's benefits; however, solely tracking activities, such as number of recommended refusals, does not allow ICE to evaluate VSP's effectiveness. Developing and implementing outcome-based performance measures, consistent with best practices for performance management, would help ICE determine whether VSP is achieving its objectives. ICE evaluated options for VSP expansion but its site selection process did not incorporate PATRIOT data or options for remote operations that, for example, use U.S.-based VSP agents. ICE has previously utilized PATRIOT to gather data to estimate program capacity, but ICE officials stated that they do not use PATRIOT to collect data on the potential number of ineligible visa applicants and workload for posts under consideration for VSP expansion. By incorporating PATRIOT data on posts under consideration into its site selection process, ICE could more effectively manage human capital and other resources. Further, ICE has implemented remote VSP operations in some posts, but does not consider such approaches during its annual site selection process. ICE documentation stated that ICE could successfully screen and vet applicants remotely through VSP, however the officials' preferred approach is to deploy agents to posts overseas. Incorporating remote options for VSP operations could help identify opportunities to further expand VSP and better utilize resources. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2018. 69p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-18-314: Accessed April 4, 2018 at: https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690865.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/690732.pdf Shelf Number: 149678 Keywords: Border SecurityHomeland SecurityImmigration and Customs EnforcementImmigration EnforcementVisas |
Author: Isacson, Adam Title: Lessons from San Diego's Border Wall: The limits to using walls for migration, drug trafficking challenges Summary: The prototypes for President Trump's proposed border wall are currently sitting just outside San Diego, California, an area that serves as a perfect example of how limited walls, fences, and barriers can be when dealing with migration and drug trafficking challenges. As designated by Customs and Border Protection, the San Diego sector covers 60 miles of the westernmost U.S.-Mexico border, and 46 of them are already fenced off. Here, fence-building has revealed a new set of border challenges that a wall can't fix. The San Diego sector shows that: - Fences or walls can reduce migration in urban areas, but make no difference in rural areas. In densely populated border areas, border-crossers can quickly mix in to the population. But nearly all densely populated sections of the U.S.-Mexico border have long since been walled off. In rural areas, where crossers must travel miles of terrain, having to climb a wall first is not much of a deterrent. A wall would be a waste of scarce budget resources. - People who seek protected status aren't deterred by walls. Some asylum-seekers even climbed existing fence at the prototype site while construction was occurring. In San Diego, they include growing numbers of Central American children and families. Last year in the sector, arrivals included thousands of Haitians who journeyed from Brazil, many of whom now live in Tijuana. The presence or absence of a fence made no difference in their decision to seek out U.S. authorities to petition for protection. - Fences are irrelevant to drug flows. Of all nine border sectors, San Diego leads in seizures of heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, and probably fentanyl. Authorities find the vast majority of these drugs at legal border crossings-not in the spaces between where walls would be built. Interdicting more drugs at the border would require generous investment in modern, well-staffed ports of entry-but instead, the Trump administration is asking Congress to pay for a wall. - The border doesn't need a wall. It needs better-equipped ports of entry, investigative capacity, technology, and far more ability to deal with humanitarian flows. In its current form, the 2018 Homeland Security Appropriations bill is pursuing a wrong and wasteful approach. The experience of San Diego makes that clear. Details: Washington, DC: WOLA, 2017. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 28, 2018 at: https://www.wola.org/analysis/wola-report-lessons-san-diegos-border-wall/ Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.wola.org/analysis/wola-report-lessons-san-diegos-border-wall/ Shelf Number: 149951 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingHomeland SecurityIllegal ImmigrantsImmigration Enforcement |
Author: American Civil Liberties Union Title: Bad Trip: Debunking the TSA's 'Behavior Detection' Program Summary: Documents obtained by the ACLU through a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit concerning the TSA's behavior detection program reinforce that the program utilizes unscientific techniques and creates an unacceptable risk of racial and religious profiling. Independent experts and government auditors have long criticized the behavior detection program as flawed and wasteful-the program cost at least $1.5 billion through 2015. The TSA's own documents and materials in its files now vindicate those criticisms. The documents show the evolution of the behavior detection program and make clear the extent to which it is a program of surveillance of unsuspecting travelers based on unreliable indicators. "Behavior detection officers," some of them dressed in plain clothes, scrutinize travelers at airports for over 90 behaviors that the TSA associates with stress, fear, or deception, looking for what the TSA calls signs of "mal-intent." The reliability of these so-called indicators is not supported by the scientific studies in the TSA files. The behavior detection officers may then engage travelers in "casual conversation" that is actually an effort to probe the basis for any purported signs of deception. When the officers think they perceive those behaviors, they follow the travelers, subject them to additional screening, and at times bring in law enforcement officers who can investigate them further. The TSA has repeatedly claimed that the behavior detection program is grounded in valid science, but the records that the ACLU obtained show that the TSA has in its possession a significant body of research that contradicts those claims. The records include numerous academic studies and articles that directly undermine the premise of the program: the notion that TSA officers can identify threats to aviation security with some reliability based on specific behaviors in an airport setting. In fact, the scientific literature in the TSA's own files reinforces that deception detection is inherently unreliable, and that many of the behaviors the TSA is apparently relying on are actually useless in detecting deception. The documents further show that the TSA either overstated the scientific validity of behavior detection techniques in communications with members of Congress and government auditors, or did not disclose information that discredited the program's scientific validity. The documents also include materials that range from culturally insensitive to racially and religiously biased and sexist. We do not know whether and to what extent the TSA relied on some of these materials in implementing its behavior detection program, but the materials do not provide credible support for its validity. Finally, previously undisclosed internal investigative materials shed more light on, and substantiate already public allegations of, racial and religious profiling by behavior detection officers at specific airports-Newark, Miami, Chicago, and Honolulu. The TSA should-indeed, must-screen passengers for weapons or other items that could threaten aviation security, but documents in its own files make clear that its behavior detection program does not further that mission. Congress should discontinue funding the TSA's behavior detection program, and the TSA should implement a rigorous anti-discrimination training program for its workforce. Details: New York: ACLU, 2017. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 14, 2018 at: https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/dem17-tsa_detection_report-v02.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/dem17-tsa_detection_report-v02.pdf Shelf Number: 150182 Keywords: Airline PassengersAirport SecurityHomeland SecurityPassenger ScreeningRacial Profiling |
Author: Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending Title: Stimson Study Group on Counterterrorism Spending: Protecting American While Promoting Efficiencies and Accountability Summary: The United States currently lacks an accurate accounting of how much it has spent on the fight against terrorism. Without accurate data, policymakers will have difficulty evaluating whether the nation spends too much or too little on the counterterrorism (CT) mission, and whether current spending is doing its job effectively or efficiently. In the summer of 2017, the Stimson Center convened a nonpartisan study group to provide an initial tally of total CT spending since 9/11, to examine gaps in the understanding of CT spending, and to offer recommendations for improving U.S. government efforts to account for these expenditures. Stimson's research suggests that total spending that has been characterized as CT-related - including expenditures for government-wide homeland security efforts, international programs, and the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria - totaled $2.8 trillion during fiscal years 2002 through 2017. According to the group's research, annual CT spending peaked at $260 billion in 2008 at the height of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. This represents a 16-fold increase over the 2001 total. In 2017, as war funding declined, total CT spending amounted to $175 billion, nearly an 11-fold increase from the 2001 level. With this growth, CT spending has become a substantial component of total discretionary spending for programs across a wide range of areas, including defense, education, and medical research. Of $18 trillion in discretionary spending between fiscal years 2002-2017, CT spending made up nearly 16 percent of the whole.[i] At its peak in 2008, CT spending amounted to 22 percent of total discretionary spending. By 2017, CT spending had fallen to 14 percent of the total. Despite this drop, the study group found no indication that CT spending is likely to continue to decline. At the same time, budgetary caps enacted in 2011 in the Budget Control Act (BCA) have created an attractive fiscal loophole by placing new pressures on spending while exempting spending characterized as emergency or war spending, also known as overseas contingency operations (OCO). In recent years, billions of dollars in spending unrelated to the wars has been characterized as OCO in order to exempt it from the BCA caps. This practice makes it more difficult to identify spending that is truly dedicated to CT and to evaluate potential trade-offs. The Stimson study group found a variety of weaknesses in definitions, tracking, and consistencies that limit accuracy and contribute to a lack of transparency regarding the current data on CT spending. These weaknesses make it difficult to evaluate whether CT spending has been effective at enhancing security at home or overseas. The study group's recommendations are designed to improve the accuracy of tracking CT spending and to provide greater clarity for budget planning for future CT programs. The study group concluded that a broader set of parameters is urgently needed in order to make the full federal investment in CT more transparent, to identify gaps and trade-offs, and to permit more useful evaluations of the effectiveness and efficiency of that spending. 1. Create a clear and transparent counterterrorism funding report. Congress should reinstate and expand the statutory requirement that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) compile data and analyze government-wide U.S. homeland security spending in its annual budget request. OMB should provide metrics that show Congress and the public the scope of counter-terrorism spending relative to total discretionary spending and total spending, including mandatory spending. 2. Adopt a detailed agency-wide definition for counter-terrorism spending. OMB and Congress should develop, adopt, and enforce a clear, usable set of criteria to define counter-terrorism spending, including programs with the primary purpose of preventing, mitigating, or responding to terrorist attacks in the United States or overseas. This definition may be tailored to individual agency missions as long as agencies show how any counterterrorism spending addresses a credible threat to the United States. 3. Build on current accounting structures to anticipate future budget pressures. OMB should work with agencies to build on the current accounting structure to distinguish counter-terrorism spending at the program, activity, and project levels, identifying ongoing vs. incremental emergency needs. 4. Tie the definition of war spending to specific activities. OMB and Congress should develop and implement clear criteria for terrorism-related spending through overseas contingency operations and other emergency authorities. This should include the cost of deploying U.S. troops to conflict zones; countering terrorist groups through military, diplomatic, or other operations; training foreign militaries; and conducting emergency military response activities within the United States that have a counter-terrorism focus. Overseas contingency operations should be limited to such spending. 5. Require Congress to separately approve emergency or wartime spending. Congress should pass new legislation that requires it to vote separately to approve spending that is designated as war-related emergency or wartime overseas contingency operations spending before those funds can be obligated. Details: Washington, DC: Stimson, 2018. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2018 at: https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/CT_Spending_Report_0.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/CT_Spending_Report_0.pdf Shelf Number: 150191 Keywords: Costs of TerrorismCounter-terrorismHomeland SecurityTerrorism |
Author: Bier, David J. Title: Extreme Vetting of Immigrants: Estimating Terrorism Vetting Failures Summary: President Donald Trump has promised to implement "extreme vetting" of immigrants and foreign travelers, asserting that widespread vetting failures had allowed many terrorists to enter the United States. This policy analysis provides the first estimate of the number of terrorism vetting failures, both before and after the vetting enhancements implemented in response to the September 11, 2001, attacks. Vetting failures are rare and have become much rarer since 9/11. A terrorism vetting failure occurs when a foreigner is granted entry to the United States who had terrorist associations or sympathies and who later committed a terrorism offense including support for terrorist groups abroad. This analysis defines vetting failure broadly to include individuals who had privately held extremist views before entry. Moreover, unless evidence exists to the contrary, it assumes that anyone who entered the United States legally either as an adult or older teenager, and who was charged with a terrorism offense within a decade of entry, entered as a result of a vetting failure, even without any evidence that he or she was radicalized prior to entry. By this definition, only 13 people - 2 percent of the 531 individuals convicted of terrorism offenses or killed while committing an offense since 9/11 - entered due to a vetting failure in the post-9/11 security system. There were 52 vetting failures in the 15 years leading up to 9/11, four times as many as in the 15 years since the attacks. From 2002 to 2016, the vetting system failed and permitted the entry of 1 radicalized terrorist for every 29 million visa or status approvals. This rate was 84 percent lower than during the 15-year period leading up to the 9/11 attacks. Only 1 of the 13 post-9/11 vetting failures resulted in a deadly attack in the United States. Thus, the rate for deadly terrorists was 1 for every 379 million visa or status approvals from 2002 through 2016. During this same period, the chance of an American being killed in an attack committed by a terrorist who entered as a result of a vetting failure was 1 in 328 million per year. The risk from vetting failures was 99.5 percent lower during this period than during the 15-year period from 1987 to 2001. The evidence indicates that the U.S. vetting system is already "extreme" enough to handle the challenge of foreign terrorist infiltration. Details: Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 2018. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Analysis No. 838: Accessed May 17, 2018 at: https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-838.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-838.pdf Shelf Number: 150249 Keywords: Homeland SecurityImmigration EnforcementTerrorismTerrorists |
Author: Justice, Joel M. Title: Active shooters: is law enforcement ready for a Mumbai style attack? Summary: Between April 16, 2007, and December 14, 2012, the United States has seen 25 mass shootings, seven of which occurred in 2012. A report by United States Department of Homeland Security, in 2009, suggested that the United States will be the target of a terrorist act that could cause a high number of casualties. The November 26, 2008, attack on Mumbai is a transparent example of how determined terrorists, trained to die fighting, can bring a large metropolitan city to its knees. It is entirely probable that Mumbai-type attacks could occur in the United States. Since the local law enforcement respond to attacks in progress, any active shooter event would be handled by the local jurisdiction. Many law enforcement agencies have begun to incorporate tactical plans to respond to Mumbai-type terrorist attacks. This thesis focused on police preparedness of select large metropolitan law enforcement agencies for potential Mumbai-type terrorist attacks. A comparative analysis of these police agencies was conducted, which showed that the frequency of training was found to be varying and inadequate by these agencies. A similar concern was that none of the agencies had equipped all the police officers with rifles, which were deemed critical to engage well-equipped active shooters. It is the conclusion of the thesis that gaps in preparedness exist and law enforcement organizations have room for improvement. It was also concluded that agencies need to enhance communication capability between neighboring jurisdictions and focus on triage of the victims during the early stages of attacks when medical personnel would be unable to approach. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. 101p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed August 27, 2018 at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a589604.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a589604.pdf Shelf Number: 151270 Keywords: Active Shooters Counter-Terrorism Homeland SecurityHomicides Mass Casualties Mass Shootings Terrorism |
Author: Ashby, Paul Title: NAFTA-land Security: The Merida Initiative, Transnational Threats, and U.S. Security Projection in Mexico Summary: This thesis explores recent U.S. bilateral aid to Mexico through the Merida Initiative (MI), a $2.3 billion assistance commitment on the part of the United States (U.S.) officially justified as helping Mexico build its capacity to take on violent drug cartels and thereby improve security in both countries. There has been a good amount of engaging work on the MI. However this extant literature has not undertaken detailed policy analysis of the aid programme, leading to conclusions that it is a fresh approach to the Mexican counternarcotics (CN) challenge, or that CN is a 'fig leaf' for the U.S. to pursue other 'real' goals. This is a core gap in the literature this project seeks to fill. Through policy analysis, I make an empirically supported argument that Merida is a component of a far more ambitious policy agenda to regionalise security with Mexico more generally. This involves stabilising Mexico itself, not least in response to serious drug-related violence. However the U.S. also aims to improve its own security by giving greater 'depth' to its borders, and seeks protect the political economy of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) from variegated security threats. In this way, recent U.S. policy in Mexico is both derivative of its wider grand strategic traditions in stabilising key political economies in line with its interests, and representative of some distinct developments stemming from the deeply integrated U.S.-Mexican economy as part of NAFTA. To assure U.S. interests accrued to it through the increasingly holistic North American economy, the U.S. has used the MI as the main vehicle in the construction of a nascent 'NAFTA-land Security' framework. Details: Canterbury, UK: University of Kent, 2015. 322p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed October 24, 2018 at: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/48367/ Year: 2014 Country: Mexico URL: https://kar.kent.ac.uk/48367/ Shelf Number: 153069 Keywords: Drug CartelsDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceHomeland SecurityMerida InitiativeOrganized CrimeWar on Drugs |
Author: U.S. Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States Title: Preventing Extremism in Fragile States: A New Approach Summary: Despite our success protecting America's homeland, extremism is spreading. Since 9/11, the number of terrorist attacks worldwide per year has increased five-fold. As long as this continues, the United States will remain vulnerable to terrorism while extremism contributes to chaos, conflict, and coercion that drains U.S. resources, weakens our allies, and provides openings for our competitors. We need a new strategy to prevent extremism in fragile states. If we can mitigate the underlying conditions that allow extremism to emerge and spread in these states, the United States will be closer to breaking out of the costly cycle of perpetual crisis response, pushing back against the growing threat of extremism, and positioning itself effectively for strategic engagement with its competitors. Recent successes in the fight against the Islamic State makes this a unique opportunity to focus on prevention. We must move from defeating terrorists, to preventing extremism. Established in response to a request from the U.S. Congress in 2017, the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States has developed a new strategy that represents the insightful and bipartisan foreign policy thinking of fifteen leading former policymakers, legislators, and other experts on how to empower fragile states to resist extremism on their own. Executive Summary -- We need a new strategy to prevent the spread of extremism, which threatens our homeland, our strategic interests, and our values. Our current focus on counterterrorism is necessary, but neither sufficient nor cost-effective. Congress has charged this Task Force with developing a new approach, one that will get ahead of the problem. We need a new strategy because, despite our success protecting the homeland, terrorism is spreading. Worldwide, annual terrorist attacks have increased five-fold since 2001. The number of self-professed Salafi-jihadist fighters has more than tripled and they are now present in nineteen countries in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Near East. We need a new strategy because the costs of our current approach are unsustainable. Over the last eighteen years, ten thousand Americans have lost their lives and fifty thousand have been wounded fighting this threat, at an estimated cost of $5.9 trillion to U.S. taxpayers. We need a new strategy because terrorism is not the only threat we face. Terrorism is a symptom, but extremism - an ideology calling for the imposition of a totalitarian order intent on destroying free societies like ours-is the disease. Extremism both preys on fragile states and contributes to chaos, conflict, and coercion that kills innocents, drains U.S. resources, forecloses future market opportunities, weakens our allies, and provides openings for our competitors. To reduce our expenditure of blood and treasure, protect against future threats, and preserve American leadership and values in contested parts of the world, we must not only respond to terrorism but also strive to prevent extremism from taking root in the first place. This does not mean seeking to stop all violence or to rebuild nations in vulnerable regions of the world. Instead, it means recognizing that even modest preventive investments-if they are strategic, coordinated, and well-timed-can reduce the risk that extremists will exploit fragile states. The objective of a preventive approach should be to strengthen societies that are vulnerable to extremism so they can become self-reliant, better able to resist this scourge, and protect their hard-earned economic and security gains. This imperative for prevention is not new. Back in 2004, the 9/11 Commission argued that counter-terrorism and homeland security must be coupled with "a preventive strategy that is as much, or more, political as it is military." That call has not been answered. And so the threat continues to rise, the costs mount, and the need for a preventive strategy grows more compelling. Progress has undoubtedly been made since 9/11. The U.S. government has a better understanding of what works. There is bipartisan agreement in Congress that a new approach is needed. However, the United States cannot-nor should it-carry this burden alone. U.S. leadership is needed to catalyze international donors to support preventing extremism. And the international community-both donor countries and multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank-are increasingly willing to engage these problems with us, including through the Global Coalition to Defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. But challenges persist. There is still insufficient prioritization, coordination, or agreement on what to do, both within the U.S. government and across the international community. Our Task Force offers three recommendations to build on emerging opportunities and overcome persistent hurdles to preventing extremism effectively. First, there must be a new effort to unite around a joint strategy aimed at preventing the underlying causes of extremism. The United States should adopt a shared framework for strategic prevention that recognizes that extremism is a political and ideological problem. The framework should also identify building partnerships with leaders, civil society, and private sector actors in fragile states who are committed to governing accountability as the best approach to preventing extremism. Extremists' attempts to, in the Middle East and Africa, establish an absolutist state ruled by a rigid, twisted, and false interpretation of Islam resonate only in societies where the existing state has failed its people. The antidote to extremist ideology, therefore, must be political. But inclusive institutions, accountable governments, and civic participation cannot be imposed from the outside. What the United States can do is identify, encourage, and build partnerships with leaders in fragile states including nationally and locally, in government and civil society with women, youth, and the private sector who are committed to rebuilding trust in their states and societies. However, bitter experience teaches that where such leaders are lacking, the United States stands little chance of furthering its long-term interests. In such cases, it must seek to seize opportunities where possible and always mitigate the risk that its engagement, or that of other actors, could do more harm than good. Second, to ensure that agencies have the resources, processes, and authorities they need to operationalize this shared framework, the Congress and the Executive Branch should launch a Strategic Prevention Initiative to align all U.S. policy instruments, from bilateral assistance to diplomatic engagement, in support of prevention. The Initiative should set out the roles and responsibilities of each department for undertaking prevention. Its principal objective should be to promote long-term coordination between agencies in fragile states. It should grant policymakers new authorities to implement a preventive strategy. In particular, because local conditions and needs differ widely, it is important that U.S. diplomats and development professionals on the ground in fragile states be given direct responsibility, flexibility, and funding to experiment with and develop effective and tailored solutions. However, the United States neither can nor should prevent extremism by itself. It is not the only country with a vested interest in doing so and can build more effective partnerships with fragile states if other countries cooperate. Thus, our Task Force calls on the United States to establish a Partnership Development Fund, a new international platform for donors and the private sector to pool their resources and coordinate their activities in support of prevention. This would ensure that the work being done by the United States as part of the Strategic Prevention Initiative is matched by other international donors working jointly toward the same goals. It would create a mechanism for other countries to share the burden and incentivize an enterprise-driven approach. A single, unified source of assistance might also entice fragile states that would otherwise look elsewhere for help. A preventive strategy will not stop every terrorist attack. It will take time to produce results. It will require us to recognize the limits of our influence and work hard to leverage our resources more effectively. And it is not something that we can implement alone-our international partners should do their fair share. But it offers our best hope. Neither open-ended military operations, nor indefinite foreign assistance, nor retrenchment offers a better alternative. Through targeted, evidence-based, strategic investments where the risks are the highest, our interests the greatest, and our partners the most willing, prevention provides a cost-effective means to slow, contain, and eventually roll back the spread of extremism. The United States needs to enable fragile states and societies to take the lead in averting future extremist threats. If we succeed, our children and grandchildren will live in a more peaceful world. Details: Washington, DC: USIP, 2019. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 5, 2019 at: https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/preventing-extremism-fragile-states-new-approach Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/02/preventing-extremism-fragile-states-new-approach Shelf Number: 154816 Keywords: Counter-terrorismExtremismHomeland SecurityRadical GroupsRadicalizationTerrorismViolent Extremism |
Author: Levitt, Matthew Title: Neither Remaining Nor Expanding: The Decline of the Islamic State Summary: In step with the progression of the coalition war against the Islamic State over the course of 2016, the threat of IS-directed attacks in the West continued to trend upward, posing significant challenges for social media companies, law enforcement, intelligence agencies, and local communities alike. Edited by Matthew Levitt, this eighth volume in the Institute's Counterterrorism Lectures Series spans the period from February 2016 to November 2017, offering a snapshot of how officials, experts, and CT practitioners addressed some of the most pressing challenges at the height of the battle against IS and the beginning of its decline. This volume includes lectures by the following experts; the positions were current at the time of presentation: Ali Mohsen al-Alaq, governor, Central Bank of Iraq Shanna Batten, director, Community Resilience Initiatives Program, Center for Health and Homeland Security, University of Maryland; Rand Beers, deputy assistant to the president for Homeland Security, Obama administration; Monika Bickert, head of global policy management, Facebook; William Brannif, executive director, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism; Lord Richard Dannatt, chief of the general staff, British Army; commander of British forces, Afghanistan; advisor to David Cameron; Olivier Decottignies, TWI diplomat in residence; second counselor, French Embassy, Iran Muhammad Fraser-Rahim, executive director, North America, Quilliam International; Bruce Hoffman, director, Center for Security Studies, Georgetown University; Boaz Ganor, dean and Ronald Lauder Chair for Counter-Terrorism, Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy, IDC, Herzliya, Israel; Daniel L. Glaser, assistant secretary for terrorist financing, Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, Treasury Department; Seamus Hughes, deputy director, Program on Extremism, George Washington University; James F. Jeffrey, Philip Solondz Distinguished Fellow, TWI; former ambassador to Iraq, Turkey, and Albania; Richard Kemp, senior associate fellow, Royal United Services Institute; commander, British forces, Afghanistan; head, international terrorism team, UK Joint Intelligence Committee; Gilles de Kerchove, counterterrorism coordinator, European Union; Naomi Kikoler, deputy director, Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Matthew Levitt, Fromer-Wexler fellow and director, Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence (now the Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence), TWI; Marlene Mazel, TWI adjunct scholar; director, Counter-Terrorism Litigation Division, Israeli Ministry of Justice; Klaus Naumann, former chief of staff, German Bundeswehr; chairman, NATO Military Committee Farah Pandith, adjunct senior fellow, Council on Foreign Relations; senior fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University; Samantha Ravich, deputy national security advisor for Vice President Cheney; Eric Rosand, director, The Prevention Project: Organizing Against Violent Extremism, Global Center on Cooperative Security; Dick Schoof, national coordinator for security and counterterrorism, Netherlands; Michael Steinbach, executive assistant director, National Security Branch, FBI. Details: Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2018. 104p Source: Internet Resource: Counterterrorism Lectures 2016-17: Accessed March 12, 2019 at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus155-CT8-7.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus155-CT8-7.pdf Shelf Number: 154930 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Genocide Homeland SecurityISIS Islamic State Terrorism Violent Extremism |
Author: Ackerman, Gary Title: On the Horizon: Security Challenges at the Nexus of State and Non-State Actors and Emerging/Disruptive Technologies Summary: Innovation and new technologies have many positive attributes and provide significant improvement to humanity, much that is likely unforeseen at the time of initial discovery. The unpredictability of the technology trajectories can lead to significant negative consequences. This white paper aims to discuss the massive leaps in innovation and understand what this means for national security. The articles are briefly summarized below. In Chapter 1, entitled "Third Offset Implications for Homeland Security: Tranquility or Turbulence," Robert McCreight states that the overall future trajectory of modern technologies hinges on a fairly imperfect and periodically naive grasp of dual-use science and technology and what it portends for our planet and its inhabitants. He goes on to say that one immediate concern is to determine not only how it is affecting our current way of life, geopolitics, the economy, social stability, governance, security, and the ordinary functions and determinants of the natural world around us, but also weigh the downstream consequences of technology growth, diversity, and convergence on all of those things ten to twenty years on. If advanced dual-use technologies hold the potential for a vast array of unanticipated threats in the next few years, we will need effective doctrine, strategy, and deterrence measures. He asks a key question: How to begin to establish criteria which guarantees that humans retain ultimate control, management, and direction of advanced dual-use technologies and thereby thwart untoward and dangerous outcomes arising from their mix of expected and unexpected outcomes. He advances five possible criteria for wrestling with the emergence of ADUCT (advanced dual-use convergent technologies) in a manner that sketches out an approach for the short term and allows flexibility for modifications and improvements along the way over the next decade. Gina Ligon and Michael Logan in Chapter 2, "Malevolent Innovation: Novelty and Effectiveness in Terror Attacks," state that terrorism provides a model context for examining creativity, as the need for survival and innovation pervades these destructive and malevolent groups. Despite this, creativity and innovation remain underdeveloped concepts in terrorism research. One reason for this is the limited empirical data about this phenomenon, making it unclear which tenets of creativity research hold versus which do not translate in the domain of terrorism. The present effort overcomes this by examining the dimensions of malevolent innovation in a large sample of terrorist attacks. To anticipate adversary threats, it is critical that we examine all of the possible combinations of VEO innovation developed in the past. This particular effort can provide planners with exemplars of the highest levels of VEO innovation across a large dataset of violent extremist organizations, providing a comprehensive look at what is possible and what should be prevented. Don Rassler in Chapter 3 "Back to the Future: The Islamic State, Drones, and Future Threats" states that the Islamic State is an irony of sorts, as while the organization looks to, is inspired by, and seeks to recreate the past certain aspects of the group's behavior also provide a window into conflicts of the future. A key case study in this regard is the Islamic State's drone program, and specifically how the group "overcame technical and cost asymmetries," and creatively developed a novel and scalable drone-based weapons system "constructed from commercial components that challenged - at least for a period of time - states' ability to respond." He goes on to state that the Islamic State's drone accomplishments speak to, and have a number of important implications regarding, the character and style of future threats that are either constructed around or that significantly leverage dual-use commercial technologies. He concludes by stating to stay ahead of the issue, and to better prepare for a future that will almost certainly be typified by the proliferation of other hybrid threats that leverage and/or repurpose commercial systems in dangerous ways, the United States should identify the pathways and methods that allowed the Islamic State to acquire and scale its fleet of quad-copter drones in the first place, and trace the evolution of functional threat streams. Bennett Clifford in Chapter 4, "Exploring Pro-Islamic State Instructional Material on Telegram," makes several key observations: - English-speaking supporters of the Islamic State (ISIS) use the messaging application Telegram to distribute a range of information, including instructional material - manuals and guides designed to aid operatives with step-by-step procedures for providing assistance to the group. - Channel administrators distribute whichever manuals they believe can be of aid to aspiring operatives, regardless of its ideological background. - Telegram's internal file-sharing features and lax approach to content moderation allow channel administrators to create repositories of instructional information within Telegram channels. - While attack-planning manuals available on Telegram channels understandably pose a large concern for counter-terrorism authorities, operational security and cyber-security manuals are also frequently distributed, relatively easy to implement, and help operatives successfully conduct activities in support of terrorist groups while minimizing the risk of detection or apprehension. In Chapter 5 entitled "Examining the Present and Future Role of Cybercrime-as-a-Service in Terror and Extremism," Thomas Holt makes the case that the rise of online illicit markets that enable the sale of cybercrime tools and stolen personal information have made it possible for individuals to engage in technically sophisticated forms of crime regardless of level of computer skill. Ideological and terror groups over the last decade have expressed an interest in cyber-attacks as a means to cause harm, though it is not clear how much ability they have to perform such attacks. As a result, cybercrime markets may engender their attacks, though it is not clear how often this may occur, or what conditions would lead to their use. He provides recommendations for policy and research to disrupt cybercrime markets and improve our knowledge of ideologically-motivated cyber-attackers generally. - Cybercrime markets generate millions of dollars in revenue and enable non-technical actors to perform sophisticated attacks. - They may provide a point of entry for ideologically-motivated extremists and terrorists to engage in cyber-attacks. - These markets can be disrupted through traditional law enforcement investigations, and may also be affected through other extra-legal efforts such as Sybil attacks. - Research is needed on the radicalization process of ideologically-motivated actors who engage in cyber-attacks, and how this differs from those who have engaged in physical attacks. Rebecca Earnhardt and Gary Ackerman in Chapter 6 entitled "Modelling Terrorist Technology Transfer," make the point that while technology transfer occurs as a part of routine life, the topic remains relatively understudied in the terrorism literature. As terrorists engage in increasingly lethal and technologically sophisticated attacks, the concern surrounding terrorists acquiring cutting-edge weaponry and related technologies is accumulating. They go on to describe the Terrorist Technology Transfer (T3) project which provides a first cut at addressing this critical operational gap in knowledge through the exploration of extant technology transfer literature, construction of the first iteration of the T3 Model, and illustrative application of the model to an emerging technological threat. They conclude by stating the T3 project indicates the promise of having not only research, but also operational and policy impacts. It raises the possibility of providing government stakeholders, including intelligence, law enforcement, military, and policy agencies with a variety of insights and operational tools In Chapter 7, "Hacking the Human Body: The Cyber-Bio Convergence," Rebecca Earnhardt makes the point that the increasing convergence between the fields of biosecurity and cybersecurity may result in consequences that analysts have yet considered. Biotechnology use and expertise expansion beyond practitioners have stoked concerns about a wide range of traditional biosecurity issues including shielding the outputs from advanced gene editing systems or protecting university lab data storage systems. As biotechnology advances, including digitization and automation of systems that were once localized and only accessible to those directly involved on related research, biosecurity and cybersecurity fields continue to intersect. She concludes by stating a fully-fledged research project would explore the cyber security risk factors that are cited commonly as key vulnerabilities, and filter these cyber security risk factors through an adversary technology adoption decision making and motivational analysis. In Chapter 8 entitled "Evolving Human and Machine Interdependence in Conflict: Advantages, Risks, and Conundrums," R. E. Burnett makes several key points: - Emerging science and technology will continue to disrupt customary characteristics of political and kinetic conflicts among states and non-state actors. - The increasing complex interdependence between humans and machines is one area for particular examination. - We cannot reliably predict whether or not human roles will rapidly give way to a more dominant robotic style of war, so we must prepare for a variety of futures, per the Scharre/Horowitz autonomy typologies. - Humans involved with machines that operate at vastly greater speeds and volumes of data will further create problems of cognitive demand for the human soldier that need to be examined. - We must investigate this not only in terms of technical performance, but also from a more holistic perspective, to include the social, political, and psychological dimensions of the soldier and of the citizen. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security2019. 67p. Source: Internet Resource: A Strategic Multilayer Assessment (SMA) Periodic Publication: Accessed May 4, 2019 at: https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/DoD_DHS-On-the-Horizon-White-Paper-_FINAL.pdf Year: 2019 Country: United States URL: https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/DoD_DHS-On-the-Horizon-White-Paper-_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 155659 Keywords: BiosecurityCybercrimeCybersecurityDronesEmerging TechnologiesExtremismHomeland SecurityRadicalismTerrorismViolent Extremism |